Political Parties in North and East Syria

This article attempts to present a comprehensive list of political parties, alliances, and activist organizations, both Kurdish and non-Kurdish, that are active in the territory known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, often known as Rojava. Also included are a few Kurdish parties operating in other parts of Syria and abroad as well as a number of defunct groups. Although several lists and guides of this nature have been published, many are out of date and few (at least those in English) go into much detail. Below I will give a brief introduction to Syrian Kurdish politics, followed by all the parties I could find information on. At the bottom of the article you will find a diagram detailing the history of the original Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria and its offshoots and a list of recommended reading.

Note that I do not always list a party’s ideology; I have found that Syrian Kurdish parties usually have vague platforms and separate themselves from other parties via leadership and organizational disputes rather than ideological substance. Several parties have very similar or even identical names and are often distinguished by the name of their leader. Finally, please note that I am fluent in neither Kurdish nor Arabic and have relied on Google Translate for a great deal of my information. I welcome any corrections, additions, or other feedback.


The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and its military, the Syrian Democratic Forces, are one of the major players in the Syrian civil war (2011 – ongoing). The AANES/SDF work closely with the United States and have complicated relationships with both the Syrian government and what remains of the rebels. The major political forces making up this faction are largely the product of the unique history behind the Syrian Kurdish people.

Although the geographical and cultural region known as Kurdistan has never been a single polity, many Kurds hoped to have a nation of their own at the end of World War I, but these hopes were dashed. Instead, Kurds found themselves divided by borders created by the League of Nations. The northern parts of Kurdistan, known to Kurds as “Bakur” (meaning “north”), became part of the Republic of Turkey. The southern parts (“Bashur”) were included in the British-sponsored Kingdom of Iraq, while the western parts (“Rojava”) went to the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon. The eastern parts (“Rojhilat”) were already part of Iran. Within Rojava, three Kurdish enclaves, or Cantons, have traditionally been identified: Afrin in northwest Aleppo Governorate, Kobanî in northeast Aleppo, and Jazira in northern al-Hasakah Governorate.

The first Syrian Kurdish political party was the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria, formed in 1957 as a companion to the Iraq-based Kurdistan Democratic Party of Mustafa Barzani. The KDPS suffered from internal strife as well as repression from the Syrian government, especially since the rise of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party in the mid-60s, and split many times over the following decades, resulting in a multitude of parties, many of which use variants of the KDPS name. Of the over 90 parties listed in this article, a third can trace their origins to the original KDPS. These parties largely defined Syrian Kurdish politics in the 20th century, but in the past two decades a new force has displaced their influence.

Formed in 2003, the Democratic Union Party (abbreviated PYD in Kurdish) has taken a leading role in the Syrian Kurdish community since the start of the Syrian civil war. Using popular support and pre-established networks, the PYD has built a series of autonomous administrations in Rojava and nearby territory. Allying with some rebel brigades, fighting off many others, and generally avoiding confrontation with the government, the PYD-led administration has presented an alternative to both the Assad dictatorship and the rebel warlords. But as the sister party to the highly controversial Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), it has struggled to withstand international scrutiny. Turkey refuses to accept any PKK-linked group so close to its own territory and has launched a number of assaults on the AANES. Domestically, the PYD faces opposition from its chief rival, the Kurdish National Council (KNC/ENKS), founded in 2011 as an alliance of several Kurdish parties (most with roots in the KDPS). The KNC accuses the PYD of repression and corruption. However, it arguably enjoys more support from the Kurdish diaspora than in Syria and has been beset by internal conflicts and splits, with some members preferring to work with the PYD. Many non-Kurds who have come under AANES territory are also skeptical of the PYD, though there are also many non-Kurds who support it.

The current political landscape in Rojava and the wider AANES can be broadly divided into two factions: the Kurdish National Unity Parties, which is composed of the PYD and several parties that support it to varying degrees, and the Peace and Freedom Front, made up of the KNC and three non-Kurdish allies. The KNUP and PFF are in talks to discuss reforms of the AANES system and determine a common platform for negotiations with the Syrian government. Other parties include the Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party, Democratic Yekîtî, and a host of minor parties with little or no influence.


Kurdish National Unity Parties (أحزاب الوحدة الوطنية الكردية / Partiyên Yekîtiya Niştimanî ya Kurd)

Formed in May 2020, in the midst of PYD-KNC negotiations, as an alliance of pro-AANES administration parties. Effectively composed of four pre-existing alliances (TEV-DEM, KDCK, HNKS, and YHKR) as well as several independent parties.

Frequently known by the Kurdish abbreviation TEV-DEM. Founded in January 2011 as the PYD’s mass organization. It served to encourage wider participating in civil society and build the local self-governing bodies that the PYD envisioned. From 2013 to 2015, TEV-DEM functioned as Rojava’s de-facto governing body, replacing the Kurdish Supreme Committee (see KNC entry). Upon the establishment of the Syrian Democratic Council, TEV-DEM became the governing coalition. Although several other parties have joined, it has always been led (indeed controlled) by the PYD.

Often known by its Kurdish initials “PYD”. Secretly formed in 2003 by members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a leftist Kurdish group waging a guerrilla war with the Turkish government. Syria had served as a refuge for these fighters, but in the late 1990s Hafez al-Assad, under pressure from Turkey, ceased his support for the PKK and drove it underground. While many PKK cadres fled to the Qandil Mountains of Iraq, some (including native Syrian Kurds) stayed to create a branch that specifically addressed the problems of Syrian Kurds. The new party played a role in the 2004 Qamishli riots and several demonstrations over the course of the 2000s; for this it faced especially harsh repression from the Syrian government. Nevertheless, the PYD was able to maintain its internal structures and gain support from the Kurdish populace, especially in Afrin and Kobanî. When the first protests in Syria began in early 2011, the PYD generally refrained from criticizing the government and was even accused by pro-opposition Kurdish parties of repressing protests. However, as the Assad government’s forces gradually withdrew from Kurdish areas to focus on the more rebellious parts of the country, the PYD began asserting control. Using the networks it had established over the years and its newly-founded militia – the People’s Protection Units (YPG) – the PYD began building an autonomous government in the cantons. These cantons expanded as the YPG and its Syriac/Assyrian and Arab allies halted and eventually reversed incursions by Islamist and jihadist rebels. The political and military forces of the AANES, in which the PYD plays a dominant role, have garnered much priase domestically and around the world for their encouragement of gender equality, generally good human rights record, and success in fighting the Islamic State. However, the PYD has also come under criticism for political repression of opponents as well as its continued links with the PKK, which continues to fight Turkey. In theory, each of the parties that make up the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) uphold the same ideology but operate independently. In practice, many observers and critics have argued that the PKK leadership in Qandil has at the very least substantial input regarding each KCK party’s activities, leading to concern that PYD-led administration in northern Syria would never be accepted by Turkey or other regional powers. In ideological terms, the PYD’s espouses Democratic Confederalism, the philosophy created by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan, imprisoned by Turkey since 1999, was influenced by libertarian socialists and anarchists like the American Murray Bookchin to abandon the PKK’s earlier Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. The PYD’s governing philosophy emphasizes ethnic and religious pluralism, decentralized democracy, and progressive values, especially feminism. It also presents an alternative to traditional Kurdish nationalism by stressing local autonomy instead of separatism. Critics, such as the KNC, allege that Democratic Confederalism is merely the newest form of a cult built around Öcalan and that the PYD operates an authoritarian police state. Although the AANES is in theory a decentralized direct democracy with multiple parties, the PYD is highly influential if not completely dominant in all levels of government. Furthermore, the police force (Asayish) and the main component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (the YPG/YPJ) were formed by the PYD and still operate largely as partisan organizations. Non-Kurdish critics also charge the PYD and the wider KCK with secretly retaining Kurdish nationalist and separatist dreams.

    • Kongreya Star [see activist organizations section]
    • Democratic Peace Party of Kurdistan (حزب السلام الديمقراطي الكردستاني / Partîya Aştîya Demuqrat ya Kurdistanê)

Split from Syrian Kurdish Democratic Accord in 2013. A left-wing party that emphasizes Kurdish unity across international borders. Blames both the Assad regime and foreign powers, particularly Turkey, for the war. Calls for the release of Öcalan and the resumption of the Turkish-PKK peace process (after Turkey withdraws from Kurdish areas in Syria). Calls for the Kurdish National Council to break ties with the National Coalition and Islamist rebels, for TEV-DEM to release KNC prisoners, and for TEV-DEM and KNC to reconcile.

Founded in 1981-1983. It was largely dormant from 1995-2012, when it revived and eventually joined TEV-DEM. The party does not appear to be connected to the Turkish or Iraqi parties of the same name. It retains its original Marxist-Leninist ideology, while being supportive of the PYD.

Founded in 2011. A liberal party that supported the original 2011 protests and continues to call for the peaceful end of the Assad regime. It was an original signatory of the pro-opposition Syrian Democratic Gathering, although it has since left that organization (which is currently pro-Turkey). It was among the early supporters of federalism. Respects Abdullah Öcalan and calls for the resumption of the Turkey-PKK peace process (after Turkey retreats from Rojava).

Formed sometime by early 2016, in part by former PYD members. It remains very close to the PYD and the PKK, to the point that it does not appear to have much of an independent existence.

    • Syriac Union Party* (ܓܒܐ ܕܚܘܝܕܐ ܣܘܪܝܝܐ / حزب الإتحاد السرياني)

The SUP is a descendant of the Mesopotamia Freedom Party, a secessionist group operating in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and possibly Lebanon. The MFP formulated an ideology known as Dawronoye, which blended Assyrian nationalism with secularism and left-wing politics. It was allied with the PKK and fought mainly against the Iraqi KDP, although MFP-PKK relations worsened for a while in the early 2000s. In 2005 the MFP changed its name to the Mesopotamia National Council and renounced violence, though it maintained the right to resume military operations. The same year, the Syriac Union Party was founded as the MNC’s branch in Syria. The SUP has been closely allied with the PYD throughout the Syrian civil war, although in the early years it was also sympathetic to the opposition. The Syriac Military Council and the all-female Bethnahrain Women’s Protection Units serve as the party’s armed wing alongside the Sutoro, which is an Assyrian equivalent of the Asayish police force. Through the MNC, it maintains links with the Lebanese SUP and several parties in Iraq (one of which, interestingly enough, jointly operates the Ninevah Plain Forces militia with the KDP-leaning Bethnahrain Democratic Party). Alongside the PYD, the SUP was part of the NCC until 2015. [*Although the SUP is part of TEV-DEM, it is not a member of the wider Kurdish National Unity Parties.]

    • Yazidi House* [*not part of wider Kurdish National Unity Parties; see Syrian Yazidi Union]

Formed in March 2016 by several left-leaning parties. It supports the federalist system; most members oppose secession from Syria. It also supports a political solution to the civil war. Close to TEV-DEM.

Founded in 1975 as a split from Salah Bedreddin’s left-wing KDPS after Bedreddin had been outed as sponsored by Saddam Hussein. Another issue behind the split was relations with the PUK in Iraq; the Kurdish Left Party supported friendly relations, while Bedreddin opposed Talalbani’s PUK. Today the party espouses a typical democratic socialist platform. It left the Kurdish National Council in early 2014 and has been close to the PYD since then. It was also a member of the Marxist Left Assembly, a gathering of leftist opposition parties; it may have left that alliance.


Formed in May 2015 as the Green Party of Kurdistan; renamed in May 2021. A social democratic and environmentalist party, in vein with other Green parties around the world. In contrast to the pacifism of most Green parties though, this party loudly proclaims support for the PKK. It also advocates for Kurdish independence and unification.

Founded sometime between 2004 and 2006 as the Kurdistan Democratic Change Movement; it adopted its current name in January 2015. The party supported the original 2011 protests but has opposed the rebels and opposition in exile, instead advocating reconciliation with the Assad regime. Strongly supportive of the PYD and Öcalan. Also seems to support (at least to some extent) the Iraqi KDP and PUK. Possibly connected to the Iraqi-based Kurdistan Renewal Movement.

Founded in 2014. It views the 2011 revolution positively but sees the opposition as having failed the Syrian people. Still opposes the Assad regime.

Split from the Kurdistan Communist Party in mid-2015. Originally known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (no connection to the more well-known PKK); it adopted its current name in 2017. Probably no relation to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party that split from the Kurdish Left Party in 1980 and merged into the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria (Democratic Yekîtî) in the early 1990s. Like the Kurdistan Communist Party, the Kurdistan Workers’ Union is Marxist-Leninist but supports the PYD’s governance.

Formed in February 2016 by five parties that had previously left (or been expelled from) the Kurdish National Council. These parties were somewhat critical of the PYD’s ideology and practices but accepted and participated in the Syrian Democratic Council and the wider federal system set up by the PYD/TEV-DEM. The HNKS often calls for reconciliation between the PYD/TEV-DEM and the KNC. Its largest party, Democratic Yekîtî, seems to have left sometime before the May 2020 creation of the Kurdish National Unity Parties.

Split from the Kurdish Left Party in 2012, reportedly over different views of the 2011 revolution. It left the Kurdish National Council in early 2014.

Split from the main KDPS in 1998, although some sources put the founding date earlier. Led by Nasreddin Ibrahim, this faction was of a more left-leaning orientation and had friendly relations with the PUK in Iraq. It was one of the original members of the National Coordination Committee. It was expelled from the Kurdish National Council in December 2014 for allegedly favoring the PYD.

Commonly known as “Rêkeftin” or “Wîfaq” (“accord” in Kurdish and Kurdified Arabic respectively). Split from the PYD in 2004. The PYD accused it of being an agent of the Syrian government and engaged in a brief armed conflict with it. In 2009 the party experienced a split, with the minority faction around Hajji Afrini eventually dissolving itself. The party joined the KNC in early 2012 and was expelled in December 2014 for allegedly being too close to the PYD. At one point it merged into the Kurdish Left Party but withdrew some time later. Considered very close to the PUK in Iraq.

Split from the Kurdish Reform Movement – Syria in 2014. This group’s leader, Amjad Othman, accused Faisal Yousef (KRM-S leader) of perpetrating the same kind of corruption that led Yousef to establish the KRM-S in the first place. Othman is currently the spokesman for the AANES’s legislature, the Syrian Democratic Council.

An alliance of five small, generally pro-PYD parties formed in August 2019. Based primarily in Jazira canton.

Also refers to itself as the Free Patriotic Union Party – Syria. Split from the main KDPS in 1999; it went by the name “Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria”. Led by Tawfiq Hamdoush, who lives in Germany. The party experienced a number of defections in the mid-2000s and Hamdoush merged it into the Modernity and Democracy Party of Syria. Sometime later it re-emerged and in 2014 the party adopted its current name. Another of the early callers for federalism. Although it has supported reconciliation between the PYD and the KNC, it is much closer to the former and distrustful of the latter. It views Abdullah Öcalan positively.

Split from the now-defunct Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria led by Abdul Rahman Alluji in 2012, shortly after Alluji died. Unlike the other parties using the KDPS name, the KDPS of Abdul Karim Sko strongly supports the PYD and praises Abdullah Öcalan. Before helping to form the YHKR, it was a member of TEV-DEM.

Founded by Suleiman Gero, a former journalist. He started political life in the Communist Party of Syria, which he left in 1998 out of disgust for its appeasement of the Assad regime. He later joined the Kurdish Freedom Party (Azadî) of Mustafa Cumma. After that party merged into the KDPS, he helped to form the Free Kurdistan Brotherhood Party, which later merged with another remnant of the Azadî party; sometime soon after he left, citing endless partisan scuffles. He seems to have formed his current party in 2016. The party is critically supportive of the PYD, and it also views the KRG in Iraq positively. On the other hand, it views both the Syrian government and the opposition very negatively. It is particularly skeptical of the ability of the various components of Syrian society to live together and supports Kurdish secession and the formation of an independent Kurdistan.

Formed in May 2017. Very supportive of the PYD; appears to share its ideology. Accordingly, it is very critical of the KNC. Led by Khanaf Mulla.

Formed in February 2016. Supports Öcalan and opposes the KNC. It blames Turkey for corrupting the opposition and forcing it to give up territory to the Assad government. Linked to the Kurdistan Republican Party in Iraqi Kurdistan.

  • Others

Other members of the Kurdish National Unity Parties include:

Split from the main KDPS in 1974. Close to the PYD and the PUK. It was one of the original members of the National Coordination Committee. Despite being a former member of the Kurdish National Council (it left in early 2014), it has historically been considered close to the Assad government and it views the Syrian revolution negatively. Led by Jamal Sheikh Baqi.

Seems to have been formed in January 2017. The party has not put out much in terms of platform. Most of its statements focus on supporting the SDF and condemning the Turkish government.

Split from the Kurdistan Freedom Party – Syria in mid-2017. Led by Aziz Othman, who represented the party at a Socialist International meeting in 2018. The party appears close to the HNKS.


Originally founded (sometime in 2013 at the latest) as the Kurdistan National Party. Supports both federalism and the right for Syria’s Kurds to an independence referendum. It is supportive of both the KDP and PUK in Iraq, and has generally maintained neutrality in the PYD-KNC dispute. Led by Shafiq Ibrahim.

Split from the Kurdish Future Movement (the faction currently led by Fadi Mehri) in February 2018. Led by Nahrain Mattini, who at that time was the leader of that KFM faction. She accused the KNC of being soft on Turkey’s invasion of Afrin Region. The party supports federalism and views both the YPG and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga positively.

Peace and Freedom Front (جبهة السلام والحرية / Eniya Aştî û Azadiyê)

Formed in July 2020, amidst ongoing PYD-KNC negotiations, as an alliance of parties that are critical of the PYD’s governance. It identifies as part of the opposition to the Assad government, but all four members are heavily critical of the Turkish intervention. It endorses decentralization but not necessarily federalism.

Formed in October 2011 to unite Kurdish parties that were not aligned with the PYD. Most of the notable Syrian Kurdish parties joined it. Iraqi KDP leader Massoud Barzani sponsored the initiative, and the KNC has always been closely associated with the Kurdistan Regional Government. In June 2012, Barzani helped the KNC reach a governing agreement with the PYD-led People’s Council of Western Kurdistan, resulting in the formation of the Kurdish Supreme Committee. But disagreements between the PYD and the KNC continued, and in late 2013 the KSC collapsed, with the PYD and its allies establishing a new government through TEV-DEM. Some KNC were becoming unformfortable with what they saw as the KDPS’ domination and intransigence regarding cooperation with the PYD; over the course of 2014 the organization experienced several defections and expulsions. The KNC has been member of the Turkey-based National Coalition since 2013 and expressed some sympathy for the armed opposition in the early years of the war. But as the conflict grew more violent and more sectarian, the KNC became increasingly critical of the mainstream opposition, accusing it of working with extreme jihadis and refusing to recognize Kurdish cultural and political rights. The KNC denounced the 2016 Turkish intervention as well the 2018 invasion of Afrin. Nevertheless, it retains National Coalition membership, and some of its members have participated in the pro-Turkish local councils in Afrin. The PYD and its allies often accuse the KNC of being Turkish puppets and have refused to let the KNC’s official militia, the Rojava Peshmerga, into Syria from Iraqi Kurdistan. The KNC, for its part, accuses the PYD of authoritarianism and corruption and has thus far refused to participate in the Syrian Democratic Council. In ideological terms, the KNC is distinguished from the PYD by its traditional Kurdish nationalism. It supports the idea of a federal Syria, but with autonomy specifically for the Kurdish cantons. Some member parties see independence and unification with the other parts of Kurdistan as a long-term goal.

The original KDPS was founded in 1957 as a Syrian branch of the Iraqi party, which was founded over a decade earlier. As a “big tent” Kurdish nationalist party, it incorporated figures from various political movements. Ideological infighting began almost immediately. Two major wings emerged: a right wing, which was strongly anti-communist and somewhat conservative and wanted to change the name of the party to the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Syria; and a left wing, which was influenced by Marxism and emphasized social justice and Kurdish nationalism within the Syrian framework. The split formalized in 1965, with the right wing eventually renaming itself as the Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria. This wing was affiliated with Jalal Talalbani, a major Iraqi KDP leader and rival of KDP founder Mustafa Barzani who would later found the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Meanwhile, the left wing would eventually disassociate itself from Barzani’s KDP. A third “neutral” faction of the original KDPS inherited the official affiliation with the Iraqi KDP. A unity initiative sponsored by Barzani in the early 1970s only made the splits worse. Eventually the Barzani-endorsed KDPS became the largest party still claiming the KDPS name. Today this KDPS is led by Saud al-Mulla.

Split from the KDPS of Nasreddin Ibrahim in April 2015 and rejoined the KNC in May, from which Nasreddin Ibrahim’s party had been expelled the previous December. This party is currently led by Khalil Ibrahim (relation to Nasreddin unknown). Unlike Nasreddin’s party, Khalil’s KDPS generally views the PUK negatively.

Originally known as the Kurdish Unity Party in Syria, more popularly known by the Kurdish word for Unity – “Yekîtî”. It split from the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in 1998-2000. Yekîtî disagreed with the decision by Democratic Yekîtî to tone down its pro-Kurdish demonstrations and agitation in response to the Syrian government’s crackdown. Yekîtî continued to loudly push for Kurdish rights, sometimes advocating outright autonomy. It was one of the major parties involved in Kurdish protests during the 2011 revolution. Within the KNC, it helped to form the Kurdish Democratic Political Union, which aimed at unifying its members and countering alleged PYD interference with the KNC’s affairs. But Yekîtî accused the KDPS of dominating the KDPU and left in mid-2013. Like other KNC parties, Yekîtî is harshly critical of the PYD. Its long-time leader, Ibrahim Biro, is the spokesman of the KNC and probably the most visible Syrian Kurdish critic of the PYD. He was forced into exile in August 2016 and operates from Europe. In late 2018 the party adopted its current name and elected Suleiman Oso as chairman, though Biro continues to serve as KNC spokesman.

Split from the Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in 1992, becoming closely allied with the main KDPS. It continued to use the KDPP name until adopting its current name in 2008. Currently led by Nemat Dawoud.

The original Kurdish Future Movement was founded in 2005 by activist Mashaal Tammo. Tammo spent more than three years in jail for his ardent promotion of Kurdish cultural and political freedoms; the government released him in mid-2011 as a gesture of goodwill towards the Kurds. Nevertheless, Tammo and his party were one of the major forces involved in Kurdish protests during the Syrian Revolution, along with Yekîtî and the two Azadî factions. In October 2011 Tammo was assassinated by unidentified gunmen, suspected to have been acting on orders of the Assad government. KFM members alleged that the PYD was involved. The Kurdish Future Movement has often been considered the closest of the Kurdish parties to the exiled Syrian opposition; unlike nearly all other parties, it generally rejected any plans for federalism or Kurdish autonomy, although it eventually came to support the latter. It also refused to join the KNC at first. In July 2012 it split, with some members declaring Jangidar Muhammad as chairman and others retaining allegiance to chairman Rezan Bahri Shaykhmus. The Shaykhmus wing was representative of the party’s presence in the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. This wing elected Siamand Hajo as chairman in 2014 and decided to create a party militia to protect members from persecution by the PYD, but this militia never materialized. The party (both factions, it seems) joined the KNC in 2015 after several KNC members had left. In February 2018 Hajo made statements in support of the Turkish-led rebel seizure of Afrin Region; his party and the KNC as a whole subsequently announced that he had been expelled, and he went on to form a new party (see Kurdistan Freedom Movement). Shaykhmus returned to the chairmanship and the party adopted its current name in October 2019.

This is the faction that declared Jangidar Muhammad chairman in 2012, representing the more domestic wing of the party. It was less stridently anti-PYD than the above faction. Fadi Mehri is its current leader.

Formed in October 2019 as a merger of Siamand Hajo’s followers and remnants of the Unified Kurdistan Azadî Party (see defunct section). Hajo, the new group’s leader, is notable for maintaining the anti-PYD KurdWatch website for many years. Pro-PYD sources have accused him of being close to al-Nusra and even for defending IS. Hajo was expelled from his faction of the Kurdish Future Movement in February 2018 for statements he made in support of the Turkish invasion of Afrin. He backtracked shortly thereafter, but his new party maintained a largely positive view of the Turkish invasion. Nevertheless, it criticized the behavior of Turkey’s allied rebel factions. Recently the party has become more critical of the Turkish operation as a whole. It was admitted to the KNC in May 2020. [Note: the party link above is the Facebook page for the party’s European organization, which appears more active than the page for the party itself.]

Split from the Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria sometime between 2010-2014; formerly known as the KDPP-Reform Movement. Its leader, Faisal Yousef, accused the KDPP of corruption and of stifling dissent, charges which would be aimed at Yousef himself in 2014 (see Syrian Reform Movement). In April 2018 Yousef was detained by the Asayish, who charged him and several other KNC leaders with treason for the KNC’s allegedly soft response to the Turkish-led rebel invasion of Afrin.

Split from the Kurdish Democratic Equality Party in 2008. Led by Tahir Safouk.

Split from the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria of Sheikh Ali in January 2015. This faction, led by Kameran Haji Abdo, represented the Qamishli wing of the party. Abdo accused Sheikh Ali of authoritarian policies and denounced him as too close to the PYD. Abdo’s faction then rejoined the KNC, from which the original party had been expelled the previous month. Fasla Yusuf is the current chairwoman.

Split from the Kurdistan Democratic Unity Party in March 2016. Led by Hajjar Ali (no relation to Sheikh Ali). The reasons for the split are unknown.

Split from the party of the same name led by Salih Gedo in early 2014 when Salih’s party left the KNC. This faction, led by Shallal Gedo, chose to remain. The two Gedos do not appear to be related.

    • Kurdistan Left Party – Syria (حزب اليسار الكردستاني – سوريا / Partiya Çepa Kurdistanê – Sûriya)

Split from the Kurdish Left Party sometime after it defected from the KNC. This faction is led by Mahmoud Mulla. It does not appear to have any social media or even a logo.

Formed in December 2011 as the Union of Kurdish Democratic Forces in Syria. It positioned itself as a “third force” between the PYD’s People’s Council of Western Kurdistan and the KNC, and it initially included several other parties under its umbrella, such as the Kurdish Future Movement, Syrian Kurdish Democratic Accord, the now-defunct Kurdistan Yekîtî Party, and possibly Nasreddin Ibrahim’s KDPS. Most of these other affiliates soon joined the KNC though, and the Union seems to have been mostly inactive until 2014. It adopted its current name in 2015; at some point, some pro-Turkish members split and later established the Syrian Kurdish Independents League. For a time the KDFS was a member of the Syrian Democratic Gathering and the Syrian National Assembly, minor opposition groups (the latter is listed further down). It seems to have joined the KNC sometime in 2017-2018. It strongly identifies with the 2011 revolution. It also supports federalism, though like the other KNC parties it is harshly critical of the PYD’s governance.

Founded in 2011. Like many KNC parties, it supports the Barzani family and the Iraqi KDP.

The most prominent pro-opposition Yazidi organization. Founded in 2012 in Germany; it soon experienced a split, with members supporting the PYD’s administration leaving and eventually forming Yazidi House (see Syrian Yazidi Union). The Syrian Yazidi Council became a member of both the KNC and the National Coalition, but in September 2016 it left both, citing the dominance of Arab nationalist and Islamist views in the Syrian opposition. It accused the KNC of ignoring this unbalance; it felt marginalized within the KNC and neglected by KRG sponsors in Iraq. The KNC eventually met some of the SYC’s demands, including an endorsement of a secular state with official recognition for the Yazidi religion, and the SYC rejoined the KNC sometime between Februaury and May 2017. Like the rest of the KNC, it criticizes the PYD for what it sees as abuse of power. It views the initial 2011 protests positively but says the revolution was hijacked by warlords and Islamists.

Formed in 1957. It is primarily composed of Western Assyrians, as opposed to the Eastern-based Assyrian Democratic Party. The ADO has long been an opponent of the Syrian government, and was among the founders of both the Syrian National Council and the Syrian National Coalition. The party has also reached something of an understanding with the PYD-led AANES, participating in the formation of the Syrian Democratic Council in late 2015. In January 2020 it helped form the Syrian Democratic Meeting, a secular opposition coalition which has a generally neutral stance on the rebel/SDF conflict. With the founding of the Peace and Freedom Front, it is unclear if the ADO is still part of the SDM.

Formed in March 2016; sometimes known as the Syrian Democratic Society. Emphasis on pluralist democracy. Led by Ahmad al-Jarba, prominent Shammar tribe leader and former president of the National Coalition. Jarba is close to Egypt and the UAE, as opposed to the pro-Turkish orientation of many Syrian opposition groups, and has been open to working with the PYD. His party gained representation in the SDC in late 2016. The party also has a military wing, the Syrian Elite Forces, which at various time has been stated to be either part of the SDF or simply closely cooperating with it. The SEF operates mainly in Deir ez-Zor, where it has been beset with defections and is practically defunct.

Formed in 2017 to represent Arab tribes in al-Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor Governorates. Despite its frequent criticsm of the SDF’s alleged abuses, the Council generally cooperates with it. Close to Syria’s Tomorrow Current.

Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria (حزب الديمقراطي التقدمي الكردي في سوريا / Partiya Dîmoqratî Pêşverû Kurd li Sûriyê)

Split from the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria in 1965. This was the original KDPS’ “right wing”, led from its official founding by Abdul Hamid Darwish until his death in late 2019. The party is the Syrian affiliate of Jalal Talalbani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Iraq. Though the PUK today is considered center-left and social democratic, the KDPP has always maintained a flexible centrist ideology. Darwish was seen as an ambitious and pragmatic leader, maneuvering the party this way and that depending on which way the wind blows. Before the war began he was often accused of being connected to the Mukharabat head in Qamishli. The party was a member of the Kurdish National Council but left in mid-2015 in protest of the KNC’s ties with the National Coalition. It supports reconciliation between the KNC and TEV-DEM.

Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria (Democratic Yekîtî) (Sheikh Ali) (حزب الوحدة الديمقراطي الكردي في سوريا / Partiya Yekîtî ya Demokrat a Kurd li Sûriyê)

Founded around in 1990 as a split from the Kurdish Popular Union Party in Syria. Over the next three years it absorbed several other smaller parties. Usually known as “Democratic Yekîtî”, it was very active in Kurdish protests and demonstrations in the 90s, which resulted in a harsh crackdown by the Syrian government. The party decided to tone down its approach to avoid repression, although it still participated in protests occasionally. It was one of three parties expelled from the KNC in December 2014 for allegedly being close to the PYD. The Qamishli wing of the party then broke off and rejoined the KNC, eventually renaming to the Kurdistan Democratic Unity Party. That wing split a year later, meaning that there are now three “Democratic Yekîtî” parties. This party, led by Sheikh Ali and representing the Afrin wing of the original party, seemed to be the largest of the three, at least prior to the Turkish-led invasion of Afrin. It helped create the HNKS and was its largest party until leaving sometime before the May 2020 creation of the Kurdish National Unity Parties. It is close to the Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party.

Arab National Coalition (الهيئة الوطنية العربية)

A catch-all Arab party. It advocates cooperation between the Assad government and the SDF against Turkey and its rebel allies.

Democratic Conservative Party (حزب المحافظين الديمقراط)

Founded in September 2017 as the political wing of the Shammar tribe’s Al-Sanadid Forces. The Shammar were the only major Arab tribe not to participate in the 2004 crackdown on Kurds after the Qamishli uprising. The leader of the Shammar in Syria, Humaydi Daham al-Hadi, allied himself with the PYD/YPG after the Syrian government largely abandoned al-Hasakah. He has also served as co-president (governor) of Jazira Region. The Democratic Conservative Party advocates for the preservation of traditional tribal interests and culture, while also denouncing religious fundamentalism. It favors closer relations between the AANES and the Assad government, though it remains closer to the former. In July 2018 security forces raided the party’s headquarters.

Assyrian Democratic Party (حزب الآشوري الديمقراطي / ܓܒܐ ܐܬܘܪܝܐ ܕܝܡܘܩܪܛܝܐ)

Split from the Assyrian Democratic Organization in 1978. Whereas the ADO is made up primarily of Western Assyrians and has been part of the repressed political opposition to the Assad regime, the ADP represents Assyrians in the Khabour valley in al-Hasakah Governorate (Jazira Region) and has traditionally been pro-government. When the civil war broke out, many ADP members joined pro-government militias. The Khabour Guards, founded in 2013 to fight ISIS, became the unofficial military wing of the party, alongside the more recently formed Nattoreh. The ADP and its militias have had an uneasy and sometimes downright hostile relationship with the PYD and Syriac Union Party, but in 2015 it joined the newly-established Syrian Democratic Council. In January 2017 the YPG handed security responsibilities for the Khabour Valley to the Khabour Guards and Nattoreh. The two ADP militias then formally joined the Syrian Democratic Forces. The Khabour Guards have since established closer relations to the SUP and severed affiliation with the ADP, triggering more tensions between the ADP and the PYD/SUP.

Modernity and Democracy Party of Syria (حزب الحداثة والديمقراطية في سوريا / Partiya Nûjenî û Demokratik li Sûrya)

Founded in 2001. A liberal party with emphasis on progressive values and support for federalism. Praises Öcalan as a “freedom fighter” and calls for his release. Very critical of the Assad government and blames it in part for the rise of the Islamic State and other jihadist groups.

Syrian Yazidi Union (اتحاد إيزيديي سوريا / Yekîtya Êzîdiyen Sûriyê)

Formed in April 2019 by five Yazidi organizations, the most important of which was Yazidi House, which is the Yazidi element in TEV-DEM. More Yazidi groups have since joined. It is less sympathetic to the opposition than the KNC-aligned Syrian Yazidi Council.

Kurdistan Popular Union Party (حزب الاتحاد الشعبي الكردستاني / Partiya Hevgirtina Gele Kurd)

Originally formed in 1975 as Unity of the People; renamed in 1980 to the Kurdish Popular Unity Party in Syria. It was led by Salah Badreddine, one of the early leaders of the Left Wing in the original KDPS. After ousting Osman Sabri from the leadership of the Left KDPS, Badreddine sought alliances with Yasser Arafat’s Fatah in Palestine and later Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party in Iraq. Many Kurds saw him as a sellout, and the KDPS Left split. Baddreddine’s faction experienced a major loss with the defection and subsequent formation of the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria in 1988-1990. The party dwindled into obscurity, and Badreddine resigned his chairmanship in 2003 in favor of his long-time assistant Mustafa Cumma. In 2005 the party merged with Khair al-Din Murad’s Kurdish Left Party faction to form the Kurdish Freedom Party in Syria (Azadî). Some of the Popular Union members disagreed with the merger and reformed the party (with a slightly adjusted name) in March 2006. It has remained a small party based in the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. The party values the SDF’s fight against ISIS in defense of Kurdish territory, but it strongly opposes the PYD and criticizes the expansion of its governance to Arab-majority areas. Its leader is Mustafa Othman.

Kurdistan Freedom Party – Syria (Kurdistan Azadî) (حزب آزادي الكوردستاني / Partiya Azadî Kurdistanî – Sûrya)

Split from the main KDPS in October 2015. The previous year had seen three parties merge into the KDPS – both factions of the Kurdish Freedom Party in Syria (Azadî) and the Kurdistan Unity Party (aka Kurdistan Yekîtî; see defunct section). But some members of these parties felt unsatisfied with the merger, saying their hopes for the merger had not been met and they had not been adequately consulted in party decisions. Consequently, members of the Azadî faction formerly led by Mustafa Osso came together with members of Kurdistan Yekîtî and a few other KDPS members to form the Kurdistan Freedom Party, or Kurdistan Azadî. The new group criticized the KNC for “not offering anything”. They praised TEV-DEM and the SDF for pushing back against IS, yet maintained a fairly skeptical stance on the PYD and called for reconciliation between the PYD and KNC. It also viewed the Iraqi KDP positively. The ex-Osso faction left in February 2016, but in January 2017 it reunited with Kurdistan Azadî and a smaller group called the Syrian Communication Current to form the Unified Kurdistan Freedom/Azadî Party. This formation only lasted a few months before falling apart, and Kurdistan Azadî has been an independent party since. It added “Syria” to the end of its name in November 2020. The party continues to be vocally opposed to the Assad government and supportive of the 2011 revolution, while also opposing the Turkish-led rebels. It has been invited to at least one Socialist International meeting. [Note: alternative link]

Kurdish Democratic Future Party in Syria (حزب المستقبل الديمقراطي الكردي في سوريا / Partiya Pêşeroj a Kurd a Demokrat li Sûriye)

Formed in December 2018. Sometimes omits the “Democratic” in its name. Supportive of the KNC; strongly identifies with the Iraqi KDP and Barzani. It views the opposition as having strayed from the values of the revolution, but it still expresses the desire to find common ground with both the rebels and Turkey.

National Democratic Meeting in Syria (قاء الوطني الديمقراطي في سوريا / Hevdîtina Niştimaniya Dîmoqrat li Sûriyê)

Originally founded in 2012 as the Kurdish National Democratic Meeting in Syria. Emphasizes Kurdish-Arab harmony and unity within Syria. It has generally supported the KNC and is critical of the PYD and PKK. The party maintains a close working relationship with the Republic Party, a small opposition group formed in 2014.

Free Kurdistan Unity Party (حزب يكيتي الكردستاني الحر / Partiya Yekîtî Kurdistanî ya Azad)

Split from Yekîtî in June 2019. It accused the Yekîtî leadership of arbitrarily dismissing officers and being soft on the Turkish occupation of Afrin. The party is critical of both the PYD and the KNC.

Kurdistan Hope Party (حزب هيوا الكوردستاني / Parti Hewayi Kurdistan)

Founded in November 2017. Somewhat left-leaning. The party sees federalism as the first step for Syrian Kurds to achieve independence and then unity with the other parts of Kurdistan; it also recognizes the right to self-determination for other Syrian ethnicities. It fiercely criticizes the main Kurdish parties (including the PYD and the KNC) as tools of the Assad regime and traitors to the Kurdish people.

Independent Arab Current (التيار العربي المستقل)

Formed in April 2019 to represent Arabs in SDF-controlled areas of Raqqa, Hasakah, and Deir ez-Zor Governorates. It generally supports the AANES government but maintains a distance between itself and the PYD. Opposes Iran and Turkey and is critical of the Assad government, but the party has been leaning towards Russia. In November 2020 it signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” with the Popular Will Party, which is part of the government’s “loyal opposition” and close to Russia. (Popular Will also signed a similar document with the Syrian Democratic Council.)

Democratic Gathering of the People of al-Bukamal and its Countryside (تجمع أبناء البوكمال وريفها الديمقراطي)

Formed in September 2020 by Arabs in and around the town of al-Bukamal in southern Deir ez-Zor Governorate, on the border with Iraq. Generally supports the SDF and opposes Iran. Close to the Independent Arab Current.

Democratic Socialist Arab Ba’ath Party (حزب البعث الديمقراطي العربي الاشتراكي)

Formed in 1970 by supporters of Salah Jadid. Representing the Ba’ath Party’s radical left-wing faction, Jadid had led Syria from the establishment of the Ba’athist regime in 1966 to 1970, when Hafez al-Assad ousted him and launched the Corrective Movement. The DSABP no longer supports one-party rule and instead upholads democratic socialism in addition to Arab nationalism, much like many modern Nasserist parties do. It was part of the NCC until 2015 and is also part of the National Democratic Rally, a left-wing opposition group founded in 1980. The DSABP was part of the Assembly for Kurdish Leftists and Democrats in Syria (which was originally formed without “Kurdish” in its name) but has not been listed in recent press coverage. The party does not appear to have any social media.

Syrian National Democratic Alliance (التحالف الوطني الديمقراطي السوري / Hevbendiya Niştimanî ya Demokrat a Sûrî)

Formed in September 2014. Mainly composed of Arabs. It emphasizes secularism, pluralism, and opposition to authoritarianism and extremism; it shares much of the PYD’s democratic confederalist platform. The party has essentially functioned as the PYD’s surrogate governing party in the “Shahba region” east of Afrin since that area’s liberation from IS by the SDF. Many FSA components within the SDF, such as Jaysh al-Thuwar and the Northern Democratic Brigade, have endorsed the SNDA. The party also has a good relationship with the Syrian Revolutionary Left Current, an anti-Assad revolutionary socialist group with Trotskyist and anarchist influences, and the Syrian Front, a liberal opposition group that has traditionally opposed federalism but came to support the SDF.

Future Syria Party (حزب سوريا المستقبل / Partiya Sûriyeya Pêşerojê)

Formed in Raqqa in March 2018. It stresses its support for a democratic and pluralistic Syrian society, as well as for a non-military, negotiated solution to the war. Like the Syrian National Democratic Alliance, it operates in predominantly Arab areas under SDF control and has good relations with FSA elements within the SDF, such as the Northern Democratic Brigade. Unlike the SNDA, however, the FSP does not explicitly endorse Democratic Confederalism and generally avoids using the word “federalism”, instead preferring “decentralization”. The party was founded amid an increasingly chilly atmosphere between the United States and Turkey, and the US apparently had some input in the formation. There is some speculation that the FSP was formed to assuage fears of separatism from Turkey and other regional actors, as well as to further dispute the notion that the SDF is dominated by the PYD. The party made headlines in October 2019 when its Secretary General Hevrin Khalaf was dragged from her car, beaten, and shot dead by Ahrar al-Sharqiya fighters during the Turkish-led Operation Peace Spring.

Syrian National Assembly (الجمعية الوطنية السورية)

Formed in 2014. A small Syrian opposition group composed mainly of Arabs. Emphasizes liberal democracy and an internationally-mediated political solution to the war. It helped to found the Syrian Democratic Meeting in January 2020 but left to join the SDC in June.

Kurdish Truth Movement – Syria (حركة راستي الكوردي – سوريا / Tevgera Rastî ya Kurd li Sûriyê)

Formed in 2012 as the Kurdish Democratic Truth Movement in Syria. It emphasized Kurdish unity and declared its support for “Barzani’s approach”. In January 2020 it absorbed the Kurdistan Peace Movement (see below), but the KPM appears to have left a few months later. The party’s status is unknown, as the most recent social media page I could find for it was last updated in 2013.

Kurdistan Peace Movement (حركة السلام الكوردستاني / Tevgera Aştîwazên Kurdistanê)

Split from the Free Patriotic Union Party – Rojava in May 2017. It merged into the Kurdish Truth Movement – Syria in January 2020, but the merger seems to have fallen apart within a few months. In addition to proclaiming the right to self-determination for Syria’s Kurds, it emphasizes Kurdish unity in the face of hostile entities in Syria and the region. As such, it views both the YPG and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga positively, though in political terms it appears closer to the KNC than the PYD. Opposes the Assad government. [Note: alternative page]

Syrian Kurdish Independents League (رابطة المستقلين الكرد السوريين / Kombenda Kurdên Serbixwe yên Sûryê)

Based in Afrin. Originally formed in late 2011 as the Union of Kurdish Democratic Forces in Syria. At some point the organization split, with most of its members continuing with a slightly adjusted name (see Kurdish Democratic Forces in Syria in the KNC section). Others reorganized under Turkish patronage and adopted their current name in 2016. Many members were formerly associated with the Kurdish Future Movement, including its leader, Abdul Aziz Tammo, who had been part of the Siamand Hajo-led wing. Another of its leaders, Azad Othman, was part of Mustafa Cumma’s faction of the Kurdish Freedom Party (before it merged with the KDPS) and has had connections with several Kurdish FSA brigades over the years. Strongly supportive of Turkey and its FSA allies. Criticizes the Kurdish National Council of being a tool of the PKK. Since the Turkish-led invasion of Afrin, it has replaced the KNC as the favored representative of the Kurds in the National Coalition.

National Initiative for Syrian Kurds (المبادرة الوطنية للاكراد السوريين)

Formed in 2009 and led by Omar Osei, a member of the Syrian People’s Assembly (parliament). In its founding statement, the group pledged to fight for Kurdish cultural freedom and democratic rights for the wider population, while respecting the Arab character of the nation as a whole. It has remained loyal to the government throughout the war, calling for rapproachment between the government and the SDF and criticizing the PYD for allying with America. The Initiative does not appear to have much support outside Damascus.

Youth Party for Development and Change (حزب الشباب للبناء والتغيير)

Formed in 2003, though it remained underground until 2012. It seems to have participated in some of the 2011 protests, but it opposed the armed uprising and supported the Assad government’s limited reforms. It is part of the Damascus Platform, an informal grouping of “loyal opposition” parties that express very mild criticism of the government and participate in international negotiations. Active in several areas across Syria, including the government-controlled sectors of Qamishli. Its leader, Kurdish woman Berwin Ibrahim, is close to Russia and wants to use Russian influence to improve Kurds’ social and cultural freedom and resolve cases of Kurdish citizens wanted by state security. After her party failed to win any seats in the 2020 parliamentary elections, she and two other party members were briefly arrested for protesting in Damascus.

Activist organizations

Kurdish Tribal Council in Syrian Jazira (مجلس العشائر الكردية في الجزيرة السورية)

Formed in March 2013 in Jazira Canton. It places an emphasis on inter-tribal and inter-ethnic harmony and has played a role in reconciling tribal disputes. It also strongly supports reconciliation between TEV-DEM and KNC. In June 2018 then-chairman Fahad Dagouri was arrested by the Asayish, an incident which the Council described as “politically motivated” following Dagouri’s suggestion that PYD policy blunders played a role in the Turkish invasion of Afrin.

Kongreya Star (مؤتمر ستار)

Founded in 2005 as Yekîtiya Star (“Star Union”); it changed its name to Kongreya Star (“Star Congress”) in 2016. Sometimes spelled Kongra Star. Serves as the branch of the PYD specializing in feminism and women’s affairs, specifically the theories of women’s liberation formulated by Abdullah Öcalan and known as Jineology. Formally it is separate from the PYD and enjoys its own representation in TEV-DEM, the SDC, etc.

Kurdish Women’s Union in Syria (الاتحاد النسائي الكردي في سوريا / Hevgirtina Jinên Kurd li Sûrîyê)

Formed in 2012. Affiliated with the KNC. A number of splits and offshoots have formed, some of which also enjoy recognition by the KNC.

Rojava Youth Union (إتحاد شبيبة روج آڤا / Yekîtiya Ciwanên Rojava)

The official youth wing of the PYD.

Syrian Revolutionary Youth Movement (حركة الشبيبة الثورية السورية / Tevgera Ciwanên Şoreşger ê Suriyê)

A youth movement very supportive of the PYD, although it does not seem to be officially affiliated. Appears to be the Rojava affiliate of the PKK’s Revolutionary Youth Movement. Critics of the PYD have accused the RYM of attacking anti-PYD activists and vandalizing their property, while allowing the PYD plausible deniability.

Kurdish Youth Movement (حركة الشباب الكورد / Tevgera Ciwanên Kurd)

Formed in 2005 following the first anniversary of the failed Qamishli uprising. Considers the traditional Kurdish political parties out of touch with the younger generations; hopes to bridge the gap between the two. Some of its members secretly established the Kurdish Freedom Movement (not to be confused with Siamand Hajo’s Kurdistan Freedom Movement), an underground organization that conducted assassinations of Mukhabarat officers in the late 2000s. The KFM fell apart due to government infiltration, but the KYM remained active. It participated in the 2011 protests. It supported the creation of the Kurdish National Council and was one of its non-party affiliates. It was also an initial member of the Kurdish Youth Coordination Union in Syria, though it later left. In 2014 the movement split for unknown reasons; the smaller faction appears to have disappeared or merged back into the larger faction after a year or two. The movement severed its relationship with the KNC in March 2018 after the Turkish invasion of Afrin; however some members disputed this. The official Facebook page and website backed the separation, but the former is inactive and the latter is offline; a new Facebook page appears to identify with the KNC.

Islamic Democratic Society Conference (مؤتمر المجتمع الإسلامي الديمقراطي / Konqira Civaka Islama Demoqratik)

A pro-PYD religious association formed in April 2019. Focuses on non-sectarianism and feminism. [Note: the link above is for the group’s female branch, as its main website is offline.]

Defunct groups

People’s Council of West Kurdistan (مجلس شعب غرب كردستان / Meclîsa Gel a Rojavayê Kurdistanê)

A government body formed by the PYD in December 2011 in the areas under its control. The People’s Council was composed only of the PYD itself and PYD-affiliated groups, including Yekîtiya Star (later renamed Kongreya Star) and TEV-DEM, although some smaller parties would declare support for it. Although it declared support for the revolution, the PCWK in effect formed a third, neutral side in the rapidly conflagrating civil war. In June 2012 the PCWK signed an agreement with the KNC to create the Kurdish Supreme Committee (see below). After the KSC collapsed, the PCWK was effectively succeeded by an expanded TEV-DEM.

Kurdish Supreme Committee (الهيئة الكردية العليا / Desteya Bilind a Kurd)

A government body for Rojava formed in June 2012. It was a coalition between the PYD’s People’s Council of West Kurdistan and the KNC, created with the encouragement of then-Iraqi Kurdish President Massoud Barzani. Starting in 2013, the government was sometimes called the Interim Transitional Administration. Although both sides had equal seats in the Committee, the PYD increasingly dominated politics on the ground, leading to the collapse of the KSC in November 2013. De-facto governance then fell to TEV-DEM, the PYD’s mass movement, which was expanded to include allied parties.

Kurdish Democratic Party – Syria (Abdul Rahman Alluji) (بارتي الديمقراطي الكوردي – سوريا / Partî Demuqratî Kurdî – Sûrya)

Split from the KDPS of Nasreddin Ibrahim in 1998, soon after Ibrahim had split from the main KDPS. Led by Abdulrahman Alluji. At some point it joined the main KDPS, then split again in 2007. After Alluji died in 2012, a faction under Abdul Karim Sko split to form a pro-PYD party, and the rest of the party rejoined the main KDPS in 2013.

Kurdish Freedom Party in Syria (Azadî) (حزب آزادي الكردي في سوريا / Partiya Azadî ya Kurd li li Sûriyê)

Founded in 2005 as a merger between ex-members of the Kurdish Left Party led by Khair al-Din Murad and most of Salah Badreddine’s Kurdish Popular Union Party in Syria.  Azadî, as it was commonly known, was one of the major parties involved in Kurdish protests during the Syrian Revolution, along with Yekîtî and the Kurdish Future Movement. In 2011 old rivalries between former members of the Kurdish Left and former members of the Popular Union resurfaced and led to a split, with each faction using the Azadî name. The faction led by Mustafa Osso (first of the two logos above) represented the old Kurdish Left members, while Mustafa Cumma led the old Popular Union members. Cumma’s faction was more sympathetic to the rebels and was linked to a Free Syrian Army group called the Salah al-Din Ayyubi Brigade, which was defeated and dissolved after clashes with the YPG in 2013. Both factions merged into the main KDPS in 2014, but many members of Osso’s faction became dissatisfied with KDPS policy and left to help form the Unified Kurdistan Azadî Party in January 2017, though Osso himself declined to go with them and eventually retired from politics. Some of these same members would eventually end up as part of Siamand Hajo’s Kurdistan Freedom Movement.

Unified Kurdistan Freedom Party (Unified Azadî) (حزب آزادي الكوردستاني الموحد)

Formed in January 2017 as a merger of three parties, two of which were remants of the original Kurdish Freedom Party in Syria (aka Azadî). It placed emphasis on unity between various ethnic, religious, and political forces; it also desired an autonomous Syrian Kurdistan, with the right to proclaim independence. The party supported reconciliation between TEV-DEM and KNC and had applied to join the KNC, but was denied. It fell apart later in the year.

Kurdistan Unity Party (Kurdistan Yekîtî) (حزب يكيتي الكوردستاني / Partiya Yekîtî Kurdistanî)

Split from the main Yekîtî party in 2009. This group’s leader, Abdul Baset Hamo, wanted to take a more overtly Kurdish nationalist stance by changing “Kurdish” in the party’s name to “Kurdistan”. The Yekîtî leadership around Ibrahim Biro disagreed and Hamo split; his organization became known as Kurdistan Yekîtî. (Ironically, Biro’s Yekîtî would make this name change in 2018). After Biro’s Yekîtî left the Kurdish Democratic Political Union (a unity project within the KNC led by the KDPS) in mid-2013, Hamo’s Kurdistan Yekîtî took its place. In April 2014, the KDPS absorbed the other members of the KDPU, namely Kurdistan Yekîtî and the two Azadî factions. The Kobanî section of Kurdistan Yekîtî refused the merger and instead announced its support for the PYD-led government; some other disgruntled members later left the KDPS and (possibly together with the Kobanî section) helped to form the Kurdistan Freedom Party – Syria (aka Kurdistan Azadî).

Kurdistan People’s Party (حزب الشعب الكوردستاني / Partiya Gelê Kurdistanê)

Formed in 2001 as the Kurdish Intellectual Movement in Syria. Most of the party disolved in 2008, with members joining either the Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria or the Kurdish Future Movement, but a few members remained. In 2012 it absorbed some smaller groups and became the Kurdistan People’s Movement – Syria. The most recent name was adopted in 2016. The party strongly supported the 2011 revolution and for a time favored cooperation between the KNC and the Turkish-based opposition, but by 2015 it had come to oppose Turkey and the rebels. It also harshly criticized the PYD and the PKK. The group appears to have been based primarily in exile. Its activity slowly dwindled, with its Facebook page’s last update in May 2019; the party’s newspaper went offline a few months later, with the Facebook page following by the end of 2020. [Note: the old page for the party’s Turkey branch is still up.]

Kurdish Leftist Party in Syria (Reform Movement) (حزب اليساري الكردي في سورية (تيار الاصلاح) / Partîya Çepa Kurdên Sûriyê (Şepola Çaksazî))

Split from the Kurdish Left Party in Syria in late 2012, acussing the leadership of mishandling various duties as well as alleged indifference to the Syrian revolution. Seems to be based in Lebanon. The party supported the FSA and other rebel groups in the first years of the war, and it was initially a member of the pro-opposition Syrian Democratic Gathering, but it opposed the Turkish intervention. It also supported eventual Kurdish independence and identified strongly with the Iraqi KDP. It views the PYD as an agent of the Assad regime. Its most recent post was in May 2019.

Kurdish Youth Coordination Union in Syria (اتحاد تنسيقيات شباب الكورد في سوريا / Hevgirtina Hevrêzên Ciwanên Kurd li Sûrî)

Formed in July 2011 as a merger of several Kurdish youth groups. It was very active in the 2011 protests. It was critical of the KNC, accusing it of trying to appropriate Kurdish youth activists. Factionalism became a problem and in November 2013 many of its members left to form the  Kurdish National Youth Organization (Soz). Several of its social media pages remained active for a few years.

Kurdish National Youth Organization (Soz) (المنظمة الوطنية الشباب الكورد (سوز) / Rêxistina Niştimanî ya Ciwanên Kurd (Soz))

Formed in October 2013. It was close to the KNC but was never affiliated with it. Soz focused much of its activity on protesting the detainment (and in some cases, “disappearance”) of Kurdish activists, including some of its own members, by the PYD-controlled Asayish and by the Assad government. Its last statement was in April 2019.

Syrian Kurdistan Movement (حركة كوردستان سوريا / Tevgera Kurdistana Sûriyê)

Founded in 2011 with the name “Qamishli Youth Revolution for Freedom”. It was one of the more prominent Kurdish youth groups supporting the revolution. Politically, it usually supported the KNC, although it also seemed somewhat supportive of the PYD. For the past few years its activity has been limited to sharing videos from other sources. Its last Facebook activity was in October 2018.

National Action Front of the Syrian Kurds (جبهة العمل الوطني لكرد سورية / Yek Xebata Niştimani Kurdê Sûriyê)

A religious association formed in 2012. It supported the Syrian National Council and the FSA and was critical of the PYD; it also praised the formation of the Islamic Front. As the rebels increasingly came into conflict with the YPG and the latter cracked down on pro-rebel Kurdish groups, the National Action Front’s activity dwindled. Its last statement was made in May 2014.

Kurdish Brotherhood Coordination (تنسيقية التآخي الكوردية / Hevrêza Biratî ya Kurdî)

Formed in November 2011 as a merger of several Aleppo-based activist organizations. Sometimes known simply as “Biratî” (“Brotherhood”), it supported Kurdish rights within a unified Syria. It was harshly critical of the PYD, which it accused of being an agent of the Assad regime. It also criticized the KNC for trying to impose itself on the grassroots Kurdish opposition. Biratî generally supported the armed opposition but opposed jihadis and criticized more mainstream rebels for failing to support Kurds. The group was defunct by 2017.

Independent Kurdish Movement in Syria (حركة المستقلين الكورد في سوريا / Tevgera Serbixwin Kurd li Sûriyê)

Another Kurdish opposition group. Seems to have been formed in early 2013. Focused mainly on activism, though it may have had a small armed contingent. It was close to the KNC, particularly the KDPS, and was fiercely opposed to the PYD. It appeared moribund by 2015 and defunct by 2016, though in April of that year the PYD accused it of being behind a shooting in Qamishli.

Teyar al-Qameh (تيار قمح)

Formed in March 2015; officially known as the “Law – Citizenship – Rights Movement”, but “Teyar al-Qameh” (“Wheat Stream”) is more common. A secular, mainly Arab group led by Haytham Manna, prominent Syrian writer and activist. He and his party were initially part of the National Coordination Committee and the Cairo Platform (an informal gathering of mainly secular opposition parties that rejected armed confrontation with the Assad government). He later participated in the formation of the Syrian Democratic Council in late 2015. Manna served as the SDC’s first chairman but resigned and took his party out of the SDC in March 2016 in protest of the SDC’s declaration of federalism and the formation of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria – Rojava (currently AANES). Manna criticized the annoucement as “unilateral”, allegedly taken by the PYD and TEV-DEM without consulting other parties in the SDC. Although he welcomed de-centralization as a temporary solution to the war, he saw TEV-DEM’s federalist project as going too far, too fast. In April 2017 Manna helped to from the Syrian National Democratic Convention, which opposes both the SDF and Turkey and its allied rebel groups. Teyar al-Qameh has now largely been absorbed by the SNDC.

Honor and Rights Convention (تجمع عهد الكرامة والحقوق)

Formed in September 2011. A secular, mainly Arab group. Possibly left-wing. Like Teyar al-Qameh, it participated in both the Cairo Platform and the Syrian Democratic Council; it also left the SDC in protest of the federalism declaration in March 2016. The group seems to have gone defunct sometime after that.

Syrian National Resistance (المقاومة الوطنية السورية)

Formed in 2016. Claiming membership from across northern Syria’s ethnic spectrum, the SNR advocated for reconciliation between the Syrian government and the SDF and cooperation against Turkey and the rebels. Very anti-Turkish, at times delving into racism. It was linked to the Kafr Saghir Martyrs Brigade, a small group of mostly Kurds and Arabized Kurds that fought under Syrian government control. The SNR’s leader, Rezan Hedo, announced the group’s dissolution in Feburary 2017, citing a lack of understanding between the government and the SDF, but the party may have reactivated, with Hedo releasing a statement on the group’s behalf in February 2020 saying that they were putting themselves “at the disposal” of the Syrian Arab Army to fight Turkey and its allied rebels.

Appendix: Visual History of the KDPS


Recommended Reading

Abdi, Mustafa. “Kurdish National Council, the difficult task.” KurdStreet, Jul. 11, 2016. https://www.kurdstreet.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%8C-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A9/

Joseph, Daher. Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Syria: Origins and Development. University of Lausanne, 2018. https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_27632B4295FC.P001/REF.pdf “Handbook of Political Organizations.” Mirqab, 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20180123153638/http://www.merqab.org/%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%B3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA/

Kajjo, Sirwan and Christian Sinclair. “The Evolution of Kurdish Politics in Syria.” Middle East Research and Information Project, Aug. 31, 2011. https://merip.org/2011/08/the-evolution-of-kurdish-politics-in-syria/

Khalil, Rodi. “List of Kurdish parties in Syria, for journalists and researchers.” Jul. 1, 2013. http://rodikhalil.blogspot.com/2013/07/a-short-guide-about-kurds-in-syria-for.html

Khorshid, Ahmed. “Kurdish parties and their interactions in the Syrian scene.” Syria Inside, Feb. 18, 2016. http://www.syriainside.com/articles/view.php?id=76

Koontz, Kayla. Borders Beyond Borders: The Many (Many) Kurdish Political Parties in Syria. Middle East Institute, Oct. 2019. https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2019-10/Borders%20Beyond%20Borders_Oct.%2025%2C%202019.pdf

Nouraddine, Riadin. “The Kurdish political movement between 1980-2010.” Feb. 22, 2016. http://falassttiinne.blogspot.com/2016/02/1980-2010.html

Ossi, Hushink. Kurdish Civil and Political Life in Syria: Between 1898 and 2017. Syrian Society for Social Sciences, Aug. 2017. https://syrian-sfss.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9.pdf

Qassem, Viman. “Kurdish women’s organizations and challenges of civil society in Syria.” In The Predicament of the Invididual in the Middle East, edited by Hazim Saghie. Saqi Books, 2001. https://www.medaratkurd.com/2018/10/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7/

“Religious Movements in the Kurdish Political Scene in Syria.” Jusoor for Studies, May 29, 2017. https://jusoor.co/details/Suriye’deki%20Siyasi%20K%C3%BCrt%20Tablosunda%20Dini%20Hareketler/283/ar

Rog, Jihad. “The influence of political forces in Bashur Kurdistan on in Rojava – part 7.” ANHA, Feb. 24, 2016. https://web.archive.org/web/20160614105029/http://www.hawarnews.com/%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AC-%D8%A2%D9%81%D8%A7-7/

“The Kurdish National Council… without weapons in the battle of Syrian politics.” Enab Baladi, Sep. 17, 2017. https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/173154

“The political and organizational map in Syrian Kurdistan in 2008 (Part One).” Welatê Me, Feb. 15, 2009. http://welateme.info/erebi/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=5125

Tugdar, Emel Elif and Serhun Al. Comparative Kurdish Politics in the Middle East: Actors, Ideas, and Interests. Springer, Sep. 12, 2017. https://books.google.com/books?id=5V81DwAAQBAJ

“Who makes up the Democratic Nation List (Lîsta Netewa Demokratîk)?” KurdisCat, Nov. 23, 2017. http://kurdiscat.blogspot.com/2017/11/qui-conforma-la-llista-nacio.html

Who is the Syrian-Kurdish Opposition? The Development of Kurdish Parties, 1956-2011. KurdWatch, Dec. 2011. https://web.archive.org/web/20190328214958/http://kurdwatch.org/pdf/kurdwatch_parteien_en.pdf


The CIA’s TOW Program: A List of Rebel Groups Involved

Note: This list was first published by Hasan Mustafa on the NotGeorgeSabra blog in 2014. He published an updated version on his own blog in 2015. With Hasan’s permission, I have compiled the third (and evidently final) version. Much of the credit for the information gathered here must go to Hasan. Additional input has been provided by the Syria Research Group, consisting of (as of 1/2/18): Cody Roche, Šerif Imamagić, Ryan O’Farrell, Alexander Killian, Ömer Özkizilcik, Noor Nahas, Vince Beshara, Abdulelah of Arabia, Hampton Stall, Yazid Umayya, shaikh, Abdulrahman al-Masri, Syria Revolution News, ASSBW, LaLaKdaho, Abu Omar al-Shami, Tristan Sloughter, Ayman al-Das, Fox Reporting, Wyvern, Omar al-Addem, john_locke_next_02, Hasan, and myself. Any subjective observations or opinions offered below are my own alone.


The United States Department of Defense’s coordination with the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against the Islamic State has been the most visible form of American involvement in the Syrian civil war. This alliance overlaps with the DoD’s Train & Equip program involving the SDF and a few rebel groups. The first direct American intervention in the war was less public, coordinated by the CIA rather than the DoD. The CIA first began routing weapons to Syrian rebels in late 2012 or early 2013 through the covert Timber Sycamore program. Starting in 2014, the CIA deepened its involvement by providing select rebels with BGM-71 TOWs. These weapons, American-made but likely coming from Saudi Arabia’s stockpile, are wire-guided anti-tank missiles. The operator guides the missile with electronic impulses sent through a thin wire trailing behind the rocket. Only a few missiles were provided at a time; in order to prove that the weapons were not being misused, the rebels were required to film themselves firing the missile and return the spent casings to the appropriate Military Operations Command in Turkey or Jordan. Only after “good behavior” would more missiles come. Officially, the program remained covert, but the first videos of rebels firing the TOWs brought the program to light.

With a relatively small size and a range of over 3,000 meters, TOWs are handy weapons that can be used against tanks, trucks, and even infantry placements. The CIA’s TOW program has allowed rebel groups, the number of which involved in the program has swelled over the years, to counter the armor of the generally better-equipped Syrian Arab Army, influencing several key battles. The TOWs have also given rebels deemed “moderate” enough to be vetted for them a certain edge over the hardline Islamists and jihadis who have come to dominate much of the rebellion. However, the program was not enough to propel the rebels, moderate or not, to victory over the Assad government and its allies. Although the vast majority of TOWs supplied as part of the program have not, as was initially feared, fallen into the hands of extremists, the few that have are not insignificant. Several times the al-Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (known in the past as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra) has attacked TOW-possessing groups, sometimes capturing TOWs and using them in later battles. HTS has also been known to “tolerate” TOW-possessing groups only as long as they provide useful anti-vehicle support in jihadist-led battles against the regime. Additionally, some of the groups vetted to receive TOWs have demonstrated a lack of respect for human rights and values. It was the beheading of a boy by vetted faction Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki that President Trump cited in his July 2017 decision to end the CIA’s TOW program. Since then, groups vetted as part of the program have continued to deploy their leftover TOWs on occasion, but (presumably) no new missiles have been provided.

This post will give a brief profile of each rebel group known to have been vetted. Most have identified as part of the Free Syrian Army, which is more of a label than an actual organization despite unification attempts by rebel leaders and their backers. Many also have Islamism in their platforms, though the exact degree of Islamism varies widely and is often hard to tell. I will use the term “Sunni Islamism” to denote groups that are solidly Islamist in the presentation and/or call for the establishment of an Islamic state, though falling short of blatant sectarianism and Salafist jihadism. “Moderate Sunni Islamism” will refer to groups that identify as Sunni but do not appear to have a solidly religious agenda.

Active Groups

Northern Syria (Idlib, Aleppo, Latakia, and Hama governorates)

free idlib army

Free Idlib Army (جيش إدلب الحر)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: primarily Idlib; also Aleppo, Hama. Ideology: mix of secularism and moderate Sunni Islamism. A union of three prominent FSA groups formed in September 2016. All three had previously been involved in the similar 5th Corps in 2014. They had also been among the first rebel units to be vetted to receive TOWs. Their prominent status among northern FSA brigades, combined with their relationship with the United States, made them targets for elimination by al-Nusra/JFS/HTS. Clashes with the jihadis have greatly reduced the potency of the Free Idlib Army.


  • 13th Division (13 الفرقة)

Based in the town of Maarrat al-Nu’man. Originally founded as the Slaves of Mercy Brigade in late 2012 by defected army officer Lt. Col. Ahmad al-Saud. Enlarged and reformed as the 13th Division a year later. The 13th Division has been one of the least Islamist rebel groups still in existence (besides those working in the SDF) and has consistently called for the building of a civil Syrian state, meaning jihadist groups are particularly inclined to view it with hostility. Al-Nusra and the even more extreme Jund al-Aqsa attacked and captured the 13th Division’s headquarters in Maarrat al-Nu’man on March 13, 2016, seizing a few TOW missiles in the process. The trigger for the attack seems to have been the town’s continued use of FSA flags (rather than black Islamist banners preferred by jihadis), though the fact that the 13th Division had arranged a local truce with the Syrian Arab Army the month before probably also played a role. Maarrat al-Nu’man’s residents rallied to support the 13th Division and denounce al-Nusra. Protests emphasizing the goals of the original Syrian revolution have been held regularly since then, despite attempts by al-Nusra/JFS to violently suppress the protests. Al-Nusra/JFS and later HTS have attacked 13th Division positions and personnel, as well as those of the wider Free Idlib Army, a number of times. The most recent round of clashes in June 2017 resulted in HTS claiming full control of Maarrat al-Nu’man. As part of the ceasefire agreement, the Free Idlib Army’s leadership was pressured into ordering the 13th Division to dissolve. That order does not seem to have been fully carried out; the Division’s current status is unclear.


  • Northern Division (الفرقة الشمالية)

Based in the town of Kafranbel, which is known for its iconic weekly protests against the Assad regime. Originally founded as the Knights of Justice Battalion in February 2012 by defected officer 1st Lt. Mohammed Khaled Bayoush. The group renamed to the Knights of Justice Brigade in September, at which point defected Air Force officer Lt. Col. Fares Bayoush took command. The group was involved in the founding of the 13th Division in 2013 but left soon after. The Knights of Justice were one of the few rebel groups to publicly acknowledge the authority of the Syrian National Council and National Coalition. When the brigade helped form the 5th Corps in September 2014, Fares Bayoush was appointed overall commander; the 5th Corps fell apart a few months later. In December 2015, the Knights of Justice Brigade merged with the 101st Infantry Division (see 21st Combined Forces) to form the Northern Division, but the 101st Infantry left in June 2016, leaving the Northern Division as little more than a re-branded Knights of Justice Brigade. Fares Bayoush became the commander of the Free Idlib Army upon the FIA’s formation in September, but he resigned from both leadership positions in January 2017, citing the FIA’s inability to deal with the growing dominance of jihadist factions in Idlib. Since then the Northern Division has dwindled.


  • Mountain Hawks Brigade (لواء صقور الجبل)

Originally based in the Jabal al-Zawiya region of Idlib, though jihadist dominance in that region has forced it to focus most of its efforts on Aleppo. Formed as the Falcons of Mt. Zawiya Battalion in September 2012 as an affiliate of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades, which was a Sufi-influenced Islamist group that fell apart in late 2013 after being driven out of eastern Syria by al-Nusra, Ahrar ash-Sham, and ISIS. The Falcons of Mt. Zawiya, now known as a Brigade, was one of the founding units of the Syria Revolutionaries Front in December 2013, but it left sometime later, possibly uncomfortable with the SRF’s growing corruption. Sometime in the autumn of 2015, the group shortened its name to the Mountain Hawks Brigade. When the brigade helped to form the Free Idlib Army in September 2016, a battalion of a few dozen solders at most defected to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, though they returned in January 2017. Of the four constituents of the short-lived 5th Corps that are still active (the fifth, the 1st Infantry Brigade of Idlib, disappeared sometime after the 5th Corps’ collapse), the Mountain Hawks Brigade is generally considered to be the most Islamist and closest to Turkey. It is also the largest and most widespread at the moment. Its current leader, Capt. Hassan Haj Ali, is reportedly friendly with HTS these days.


21st Combined Force (تجمع القوة 21)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: mainly Idlib; also Aleppo, Hama. Ideology: secularism. The origins of this group lie in the Guardians of the Revolution Gathering, a secular FSA group founded in 2012 that included a number of religious minorities in its ranks. In June 2013, the Guardians participated in the formation of the 33rd Infantry Division. Both the Guardians of the Revolution and the 33rd Division as a whole experienced tensions with hardline Islamist groups like Ahrar ash-Sham. In the town of al-Dana in July, ISIS attacked both civilian protesters and 33rd Division fighters who tried to protect them, killing dozens and taking full control over the town. This was at roughly the same time that the National Unity Brigades, another secular and multi-confessional group with affiliates across the country,  were clashing with al-Nusra in the Jabal al-Wastani area to the north. The 21st Combined Force became what it is today largely due to the efforts of Col. Hassan Hamada. Hamada was a former SAAF pilot who defected to Jordan with his MiG-21 on June 21, 2012, the first defecting pilot to bring his plane with him. Syrian government “Shabiha” burned down his family’s houses in retaliation, though he had snuck them out of Syria earlier. Hamada returned to Syria in March 2014 and formed the 101st Infantry Division, which was largely an expansion of the 33rd Infantry Division. The 101st was one of the first groups to be provided with TOW missiles. It helped form the short-lived 5th Corps in September 2014. Along with the other members of the 5th Corps, the 101st Infantry Division has come into frequent conflict with al-Nusra and other jihadist groups. Parts of the Division came under attack by al-Nusra during the latter’s offensive against the Syria Revolutionaries Front in October. In December 2015, the 101st Infantry Division joined with the Knights of Justice Brigade to form the Northern Division, but in June 2016 the 101st left after disputes between Col. Hamada and Lt. Col. Bayroush. In October the 101st absorbed a few smaller groups and rebranded as the 21st Combined Force. Despite in theory becoming larger, the group has since become moribund, a shell of its former self. It has not fired any TOWs since the renaming.


Martyrs of Islam Brigade (لواء شهداء الإسلام)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: Idlib (formerly Rif Dimashq). Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Originally based in Darayya, which had been under siege by the Assad regime since November 2012. Even before the war, Darayya had been known for peaceful protests. When protests broke out across the country in 2011, Darayya became one of the icons of the revolution against Assad. Armed rebellion reached the city in the closing months of the year. In August 2012 the government, having largely abandoned the town, pushed into it and killed nearly 500 people (almost all civilians) in what became known as the Darayya Massacre. Rebels retook the town in November, leading to the government imposing a siege on Darayya and the nearby town of Muadamiyat. With regime forces pushing in, the Martyrs of Islam Brigade was formed in March 2013 as a merger of several local FSA battalions, most notably the Darayya Martyrs Battalion. It soon proved effective in fending off government advances. The Martyrs of Islam Brigade also had the distinction of being the only notable rebel group operating under the authority of the local civilian council. The brigade joined the Southern Front, a large gathering of FSA groups in southern Syria with a commitment to civil governance and non-sectarianism. It was vetted for TOWs in mid-to-late 2014. Darayya endured a devastating siege and bombardment lasting over three and a half years. Over the course of 2016, though, the government made several advances, and on August 25 the rebels finally gave in and reached an agreement with the regime. Under the terms of the agreement, the rebels in the city (the Martyrs of Islam Brigade and a small contingent of the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union) and their families would be provided safe passage to rebel-held Idlib governorate; this arrangement came to be known as the “green bus deal” and was used for several later rebel defeats. The remaining civilians would be relocated to various towns around the Damascus area. Darayya subsequently became a ghost town. After arriving in Idlib, the Martyrs of Islam Brigade announced that it would continue to operate as an independent FSA group and denounced the Southern Front for failing to come to Darayya’s aid. It has not been seen with TOW missiles since the relocation.

islamic freedom brigade

Islamic Freedom Brigade (لواء الحرية الإسلامية)

Affiliation: none. Area of operations: mainly Idlib; also Aleppo, Hama. Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Formed as the Freedom Battalion in July 2011 as one of the original units of the Free Syrian Army when the FSA was first announced. It was led by Capt. Ibrahim Majbur, who had defected from the SAA’s 14th Special Forces Division in June. Over time, the group became more Islamist, and by mid-2013 it had dropped most FSA imagery, changed its name to the Islamic Freedom Brigade, and joined the Authenticity and Development Front. The brigade left the ADF in 2014. It was one of the later recipients of TOW missiles, only beginning to deploy them in November 2016. Some of the group’s fighters reportedly sided with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in the January 2017 clashes between HTS and Ahrar ash-Sham.


Sham Legion (فيلق الشام)

Affiliation: none. Area of operations: mainly Idlib, Aleppo; also Hama. Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Formed in March 2014, mainly by fighters formerly part of the Muslim Brotherhood‘s Shields of the Revolution Council. The fighters wanted to distance themselves from the Brotherhood, which is viewed negatively by many Islamist and non-Islamist rebels alike. At the same time, the Sham Legion held a similar ideology and has been considered close to the Brotherhood. The group was originally framed as a more moderate alternative to the Islamic Front. Since then, though, its position on the Islamist spectrum has become more ambiguous. The Sham Legion was one of the seven founding members of the Idlib-based hardline Islamist alliance Jaysh al-Fatah, which was dominated by Ahrar ash-Sham and al-Nusra. It left Jaysh al-Fatah in January 2016 amid tensions with Jund al-Aqsa, which spent much of 2015 and 2016 dithering about whether Jaysh al-Fatah was sufficiently devoted to the implementation of Sharia law. Somewhere around this time, the Sham Legion began deploying TOW missiles; the supply evidently continued even after the Sham Legion rejoined Jaysh al-Fatah in May 2016. When widespread clashes between the newly-formed HTS on one side and Ahrar ash-Sham and several FSA groups on the other in January 2017, the Sham Legion initially stated its wish to remain neutral, but it ended up siding with Ahrar after being attacked by HTS forces. This incident demonstrated the Sham Legions’ relatively decentralized structure; while some parts of it are closely allied with Turkish-backed FSA groups, other parts have tried to maintain links with jihadis hostile to Turkey and the FSA. In February the group absorbed fighters from Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki (which had helped to form HTS) who wished to continue participating in the Turkish-led Hawar Kilis Operations Room. Other rebels later accused many of those fighters of being thugs and spies for HTS, and the Sham Legion ended up disowning them. In March the fighters from Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union who had been relocated from Darayya and Muadamiyat joined the Sham Legion. The famous TOW gunner Suhail Muhammad Hamoud, better known as “Abu TOW”, is currently a member of the Sham Legion. He had earlier been part of the Hazzm Movement (see defunct section), 101st Infantry Division/21st Combined Force, 13th Division, and 1st Coastal Division. Abu TOW has been noted not only for his accuracy but for his anti-jihadi attitude. After several failed attempts on his life, he was arrested by HTS in May 2017 after posing with a cigarette in front of an HTS no-smoking sign. The subsequent public outcry and pressure from fellow rebel groups forced HTS to release him after two weeks.


46th Division (46 الفرقة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > 2nd Army. Area of operations: Aleppo, Hama. Ideology: unknown. Formed in February 2015. Not to be confused with the Daraa-based 46th Infantry Division. It began deploying TOW missiles later that year during the Russian-backed regime offensive in Hama. It helped form Jaysh al-Tahrir in February 2016 but split from it in August after disputes with fellow Jaysh al-Tahrir member Jabhat al-Sham (not to be confused with the Levant Front profiled below). The 46th Division accused Jabhat al-Sham’s leader of corruption and (ironically) may have arranged for al-Nusra to kidnap him. The 46th Division and two other former Jaysh al-Tahrir affiliates (the 312th Division and Saraya al-Haqq Union 314) then formed the 2nd Army. For a time the 2nd Army was part of the Army of Conquerors in the Land of al-Sham but was independent again by early 2017. The 2nd Army has stated its support for a civil, democratic state and has endorsed international negotiations to end the war.


Sultan Murad Division (فرقة السلطان مراد)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: Aleppo. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, Turkish nationalism; “neo-Ottomanism”. Founded in March 2013 as the Sultan Murad Brigade. The most prominent affiliate of the loosely-organized Syrian Turkmen Brigades and the closest rebel group to the Turkish government. It was vetted for TOWs in mid-to-late 2014. In December 2015 the brigade absorbed a number of smaller Turkmen groups and adopted its present name. Due to its closeness with Turkey, the Sultan Murad Division has been among the rebel groups most adamantly opposed to the Kurdish-led SDF. The group has been accused of a number of human rights abuses over the years, including torturing and murdering civilians and POWs and participating in the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in the Kurdish neighboorhod of Sheikh Maqsood.


Levant Front (الجبهة الشامية)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: Aleppo. Ideology: Sunni Islamism. The Levant Front is the direct descendant of Liwa al-Tawhid, one of the major rebel groups in the war from its founding in July 2012. Liwa al-Tawhid positioned itself in between the moderate Islamists in the FSA and the hardline Salafis like Ahrar ash-Sham, and as such enjoyed good relations with most other rebel factions. It was a member of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front and later helped form the Islamic Front in November 2013. Just days previously, however, its popular leader Abdul Qader Saleh was killed in a government airstrike. Over the course of 2014 the brigade declined steadily, experiencing many defections. What was left of the group helped form the Levant Front operations room, which united the Islamic Front’s Aleppo forces (mainly Liwa al-Tawhid, with a small contingent of Ahrar ash-Sham) and four other Islamist groups in the governorate. The operations room fell apart in April 2015, but it reformed as a unified group in June. At this point the Levant Front was essentially a rebranded Liwa al-Tawhid. In 2016 the group adopted the FSA identity and began deploying TOW missiles. It has been accused of war crimes, torture, and corruption at various times.  The Levant Front has a number of subgroups; interestingly enough, a small Trotskyist brigade was affiliated between June 2015 and October 2016.


1st Regiment (الفوج الأول)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: Aleppo. Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Split from Liwa al-Tawhid in early 2015. One of the more stridently Islamist FSA groups. One of its commanders is known to be close to al-Qaeda and was responsible for kidnapping and torturing of an American journalist in 2014; despite this, the group began deploying TOW missiles in October 2015.


Al-Safwa Division (فرقة الصفوة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: Aleppo. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Formerly known as the Al-Safwa Islamic Battalions. Originally formed as part of Liwa al-Tawhid in January 2013; it split from Tawhid later that year. At some point it was also affiliated with the Army of Mujahideen. It attempted to join the Levant Front in 2015 but was rejected for being insufficiently Islamist. Possibly a Sufi-influenced group. It began deploying TOW missiles in May 2016.

northern thunder brigade

Northern Thunder Brigade (لواء رعد الشمال)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: Aleppo. Ideology: unknown. Formerly part of the Hamza Division (the Aleppo-based one, not the Daraa-based one), and before that, the short-lived 99th Division. It appears to be a special-operations style group. Members were photographed with a TOW in early 2016, possibly meaning that the group has been vetted. If this is true, Northern Thunder has the distinction of being one of only two groups vetted as part of both the CIA’s TOW program and the DoD’s Train & Equip program (the other group being Jaysh Maghawhir al-Thawra, listed further below). The brigade has been quiet in the past year and may have rejoined the Hamza Division.

23rd Division

23rd Division (23 الفرقة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: Aleppo. Ideology: unknown. Founded as the 16th Infantry Division in September 2013. The group had a reputation for being corrupt. The core unit was Liwa Shuhada Badr, led by Khaled Hayani; Hayani had been one of the most infamously corrupt warlords in the FSA until his death in 2015. The 16th Infantry Division was also known for shelling civilian areas in regime- and YPG-held territory with the infamous hell cannons. Despite having allied with the YPG in previous years, the division was the most prominent participant in the shelling of the Kurdish Aleppo neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsood from 2015-2016. The group suffered heavy losses in a July 2016 government offensive in Aleppo city and subsequently dissolved. Remnants formed the 23rd Division, sometimes known as the Rapid Intervention Force. Both the 16th Infantry Division and the 23rd Division have received TOW missiles, beginning in mid-to-late 2014, despite the reputation of the fighters.


Fastaqim Kama Umirt Union (تجمع فاستقم كما أمرت)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: Aleppo. Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Founded in December 2012. Possibly close to the Muslim Brotherhood, though never affiliated with it. It helped to form the Army of Mujahideen in January 2014 but left at the end of the year. The group began deploying TOW missiles in April 2016. In November it came into conflict with Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki, leading to defeat at the hands of Zenki and the hardline Islamist Kataeb Abu Amara. Most of its fighters then dispersed, many joining Ahrar ash-Sham for protection. Most of the remnants also merged into Ahrar in January 2017 after being attacked by Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. In May, a former Fastaqim commander was invited to a meeting in Idlib; upon his arrival, he was arrested by Ahrar, which demanded that the last remnants of Fastaqim surrender. After a brief clash, Fastaqim was defeated again. Reportedly, there is still a tiny contingent of fighters active in the Turkish-led Euphrates Shield operations room, but the Fastaqim Union is practically defunct.


Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki (حركة نور الدين الزنكي)

Affiliation: none. Area of operations: mainly Aleppo; also Idlib. Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Formed in late 2011. It has been affiliated with a number of groups over the years, including Liwa al-Tawhid, the Authenticity and Development Front, the Fastaqim Kama Umirt Union, the Army of Mujahideen, Jaysh al-Fatah, and most recently Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Zenki has been noted for its flexible form of Islamism, adapting its ideological stance depending on whether it was convenient to ally with moderates or hardliners. In 2014, it was known to have kidnapped people, including journalists and humanitarian workers, for ransom. By the next year, however, it had begun courting the West and was vetted to receive TOW missiles. Despite its shifting alliances, the group continued its corrupt practices and reportedly lost its vetted status sometime between late summer 2015 and February 2016. In July 2016, Zenki fighters beheaded a child alleged to be a fighter for the pro-government Palestinian militia Liwa al-Quds; it was later claimed that the “boy” was actually 19. Regardless of the truth, the incident caused tremendous controversy in Syria and in the West. In September, Zenki joined the hardline Jaysh al-Fatah. It was one of the founders of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in January 2017 alongside Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and three other groups, despite having clashed with al-Nusra/JFS in the past. Zenki’s contingent active in the Euphrates Shield area then defected to the Sham Legion, though as noted above, these fighters still came into conflict with other factions in the area. By July, though, Zenki had become uncomfortable with HTS’ constant clashes with other rebels and defected, leaving it as an independent group today. Many of the Turkish-led rebel factions are reportedly welcoming Zenki back into the fold of “legitimate” rebels.


1st Coastal Division (الفرقة الأولى الساحلية)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: mainly Latakia; also Idlib. Ideology: mix of secularism and moderate Sunni Islamism. The 1st Coastal Division’s core unit, the Brigade of the Chargers, was one of the first groups to be vetted for TOW missiles in early 2014. It had previously been a member of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. In October/November 2014 the Brigade of the Chargers merged with several smaller Latakia-based groups to form the 1st Coastal Division. It is the most prominent FSA unit in Latakia governorate, which contains a large number of religious and ethnic minorities and is mostly controlled by the Assad government. Most of the other rebels in Latakia are either hardline Islamists or Turkmen nationalists. The 1st Coastal Division has been among the most prolific of TOW-using groups. One of their TOW gunners, “Abu Hamza”, became famous for his accuracy.

2nd coastal division

2nd Coastal Division (الفرقة الثانية الساحلية)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: Latakia. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, Turkish nationalism. Formed in early 2015. Part of the very loosely-organized Syrian Turkmen Brigades. The 2nd Coastal Division is linked to at least two ultranationalist groups in Turkey: the Idealist Youth, which is the youth wing of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party, and the Grey Wolves, which is unofficially linked to the Nationalist Movement Party and has conducted several terrorist attacks over the years. In November 2015, after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet that allegedly violated its territory during a bombing campaign in Latakia, one of the 2nd Coastal Division’s commanders fired on one of the ejected pilots as he was parachuting in mid-air, killing him. The commander, Alparslan Çelik, is a Turkish citizen and a member of both the Grey Wolves and the Great Unity Party, another far-right party in Turkey. Despite links to the far right, the 2nd Coastal Division was vetted for TOW missiles and first deployed them in July 2016.


Central Division (الفرقة الوسطى)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: mainly Hama; also Aleppo. Ideology: unknown. Formed in September 2015 as a merger of the Sword of God Brigade and the Army of Conquerors in the Land of al-Sham. The Sword of God Brigade had deployed TOWs a few months prior to the formation. The Army of Conquerors left sometime later.


Jaysh al-Nasr (جيش النص)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: mainly Hama; also Idlib, Latakia. Ideology: mix of secularism and moderate Sunni Islamism. Originally formed in August 2015 as an operations room of several FSA groups in Hama seeking to emulate the success of the Jaysh al-Fatah alliance in Idlib. By October, however, the operations room fell apart and three of its members – the Falcons of al-Ghab Gathering, the 111th Regiment, and the Fighting Salvation Front – reformed Jaysh al-Nasr as a single faction. The group is the most prominent FSA brigade in Hama governorate. A few minor factions have joined over time, including Liwa Ahrar Darayya, consisting of fighters who were evacuated from the defeated city of Darayya in Rif Dimashq. The 111th Regiment changed its name to the 5th Infantry Division at some point. Although Jaysh al-Nasr and its component groups have come into conflict with al-Nusra/JFS before, the group’s ability and willingness to fight against jihadists has been hampered by the leading role that jihadist groups often play in offensives against the government in Hama governorate. Liwa al-Aqsa (an openly pro-IS split from Jund al-Aqsa) attacked a Jaysh al-Nasr camp and captured 250 fighters, roughly 80 of whom were executed before Liwa al-Aqsa fled, eventually working out a deal with HTS and the Turkestan Islamic Party to be transferred to IS territory.


  • Falcons of al-Ghab Gathering (تجمع صقور الغاب)

The core component of Jaysh al-Nasr. Based in the town of Qalaat al-Maqid in the Ghab plan area. It was founded in February 2012 by Lt. Jamil Raadoun, who defected from the Syrian Arab Air Defense Force. The Falcons of al-Ghab were one of the first groups to be vetted for TOW missiles. Lt. Raadoun was assassinated in a car bomb attack in Turkey shortly after the formation of the Jaysh al-Nasr operations room; the most likely culprit was al-Nusra, although it may have been the pro-government Syrian Resistance militia.


Jaysh al-Izza (جيش العزة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: mainly Hama; also Idlib, Latakia. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Founded as the al-Tamanah Martyrs Brigade in early 2012 and based in the town of al-Tamanah, Hama, near the border with Idlib. It absorbed a number of other groups and renamed to Tajammu al-Izza in 2013. The group came to prominence in October 2015 when it was one of the first rebel groups targeted by the Russian Air Force during at the beginning of Russia’s intervention in Syria; it had begun deploying TOW missiles sometime earlier. The group adopted its current name later that year. Jaysh al-Izza is led by defected Maj. Jamil al-Saleh, who has reportedly been close to al-Nusra in the past. Despite this, the group has included several Alawite defectors, especially from the anti-regime Alawite town of al-Talisah.

Southern Syria (Damascus, Rif Dimashq, Daraa, and Quneitra governorates)

al-rahman legion

Al-Rahman Legion (فيلق الرحمن)

Affiliation: none (sometimes considered part of FSA). Area of operations: Damascus, Rif Dimashq. Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Formed in November 2013 by Cpt. Abdul al-Nasir Shamir, who had defected from the Syrian Arab Army the previous year. It operates in Damascus city, the Eastern Ghouta rebel pocket, and the Eastern Qalamoun region. The al-Rahman Legion is Sufi-influenced, as opposed to the more Salafi Jaysh al-Islam, and is sometimes considered part of the FSA. Jaysh al-Islam has never had much tolerance for rivals, but al-Rahman managed to become the second-largest rebel group in the Damascus region after Jaysh al-Islam. The two groups formed part of the Unified Military Command of Eastern Ghouta. JaI’s charismatic and fiercely controversial leader, Zahran Alloush, was killed in December 2015 by a Russian airstrike; the relative peace that had existed between JaI and al-Rahman soon came apart. The two groups have spent much of the time since then fighting each other. Although JaI is more notorious for strong-arming civilians and other rebels, al-Rahman has proved little better. In October 2016 the group fired on demonstrators calling for an end to the infighting in Eastern Ghouta; many of its fighters then left and formed Alwiya al-Majd, the latest in several groups to defect from the al-Rahman Legion. In May 2017 al-Rahman surrounded Alwiya al-Majd’s headquarters and forced it to rejoin. Despite al-Rahman’s ideological moderation compared to Jaysh al-Islam, the group has found no qualms about allying itself with al-Nusra/JFS to fight Jaysh al-Islam. This alliance did also not stop the CIA from providing al-Rahman with TOWs, although it is possible that TOWS fired by al-Rahman in the past two years were leftover from its initial stock provided in early 2015.

Jaysh al-Ababil

Jaysh al-Ababil (جيش الأبابيل)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Southern Alliance. Area of operations: mainly Rif Dimashq; also Damascus, Daraa. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Based in the southern Damascus countrysideFormerly known as the Ababil Houran Brigade. In December 2015 the group imprisoned and tortured a journalist for purportedly working for the government. Jaysh al-Ababil first deployed TOW missiles in May 2016; it has clashed with al-Nusra at least once over the years. It joined with the southern sector of the Syria Revolutionaries Front to form the Southern Alliance in August 2017.


Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo (قوات الشهيد أحمد العبدو)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: Rif Dimashq; also Homs. Ideology: secularism. Formed in August 2013 by defected Col. Bakur Salim al-Salim. There are two possible sources of the name Ahmad al-Abdo: it could refer to 1st Lt. Ahmad al-Abdo, a commander of a previous group who was killed in action, or to Ahmad al-Abdo al-Saeed, a civilian protester killed in early 2011. The Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo have been one of the most consistently moderate rebel groups of the war and was one of the first groups to be vetted for TOW missiles. Initially, it refused to fight alongside Islamists, though that insistence was later dropped. It has been mainly active in the Eastern Qalamoun region fighting IS; it has respected a ceasefire with the regime signed by the local civilian councils in 2016. Col. Salim died in an IS suicide bombing in June of that year. By early 2017 Ahmad al-Abdo and its allies – Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya, Liwa Shuhada al-Qaryatayn, the Army of Free Tribes, and Jaysh Maghawir al-Thawra – had captured a swath of territory in southeastern Syria from IS. These advances were made possible in part by the US Special Forces base in al-Tanf on the Iraqi border; the US provided arms and air support to their rebel allies, although only Jaysh Maghawhir al-Thawra was part of the DoD’s Train & Equip program. In May, the Syrian government launched an offensive aimed primarily at cutting US-backed rebels off from access to southern Deir ez-Zor governorate. The rebels appealed for more American support, with Ahmad al-Abdo even sending a delegation to Washington, but at this stage the US was becoming more reluctant to actively engage the Syrian government and its allies. Despite the occasional US retaliatory airstrike, the government’s offensive was successful, encircling rebel-held Eastern Qalamoun pocket and squeezing rebels in the Badia region of eastern Suweida and Rif Dimashq against the Jordanian border. In late August the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo announced that it would merge with Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya, but a few days later the situation proved so desperate that Ahmad al-Abdo decided to retreat across the border in Jordan. Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya disagreed and the merger never took place. Since relations between Jordan and the Assad government are thawing, it is uncertain if Ahmad al-Abdo will be allowed to redeploy somewhere else. The branch in Eastern Qalamoun is still active, though the rebels there no longer have a frontline with IS and the ceasefire with the regime has held so far.


Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya (جيش أسود الشرقية)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: mainly Rif Dimashq; also Homs. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Formed in August 2014 largely by fighters from Deir ez-Zor who had been pushed out by IS, although by January 2016 a majority of fighters were reportedly Eastern Qalamoun locals. Part of the Authenticity and Development Front from its formation to December 2015. Like the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo, it has been mostly focused on fighting IS. In early 2015 Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya captured and deployed TOW missiles from IS that had originally been captured from either the al-Rahman Legion or Ahmad al-Abdo. The group was vetted to receive more TOWs in early 2016. In August 2017 it announced a merger with Ahmad al-Abdo, but the merger fell apart a few days later after disagreements on whether to stay and fight the advancing Assad regime in the Badia region. Usoud al-Sharqiya chose to stay; since then it has largely been pushed out of the Badia.


Jaysh Maghawhir al-Thawra (جيش مغاوير الثورة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: Homs; formerly Rif Dimashq, Deir ez-Zor. Ideology: unknown. Formed in May 2015 as the New Syrian Army, an affiliate of the Authenticity and Development Front that was solely devoted to fighting IS. It was mostly made up of Deir ez-Zor natives, especially former fighters of Kata’ib Allahu Akbar. The New Syrian Army was part of the US DoD’s Train & Equip program. Deployed in the south instead of the north like the other Train & Equip affiliates, the NSyA operated in an area with negligible al-Nusra presence, thus avoiding being crushed like the 30th Division. Deploying from Jordan, the group raided IS positions around the al-Tanf border crossing until finally capturing it in March 2016 alongside the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo. The US subsequently built a base there and used that base to coordinate anti-IS offensives in the southeastern region. After making inroads against IS in southern Deir ez-Zor governorate, the NSyA attempted to capture Abu Kamal in June. Despite having US training and supplies and coordinating with US special forces, the NSyA failed spectacularly and retreated from Abu Kamal in tatters. Although part of the blame lay with the US for withdrawing air support in the middle of the battle, the New Syrian Army attracted much ridicule for its weakness. The ADF dropped the group from its ranks in August as a result of the incident. The NSyA remained quiet for months before dissolving in December. Some of its members reformed as Jaysh Maghawhir al-Thawra (“Revolutionary Commando Army”). Over the next few months, this group worked closely with the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo, Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya, and Liwa Shuhada al-Qaryatayn to drive IS from a swath of territory in southeastern Syria. Much of this territory then fell to the Assad government in mid-2017; after this there were reports of “decommissions” and desertions from JMaT as the US showed signs of giving up on the area. By December 2017 regime and allied forces had surrounded the area around al-Tanf and demanded that the US leave; it is currently unclear whether the US will comply, and thus Jaysh Maghawhir al-Thawra’s existence in the near future is also unclear. The group was reportedly supplied with TOW missiles at some point in 2016-2017, but no video confirmation exists.


Sword of al-Sham Brigades (ألوية سيف الشام)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: mainly Rif Dimashq; also Daraa, Quneitra. Ideology: mix of secularism and moderate Sunni Islamism. Formed in 2012 in the Damascus area, though since 2013 it has focused mostly on Daraa and Quneitra. It is one of the larger and more widespread Southern Front factions. The Sword of al-Sham Brigades first deployed TOWs in mid-to-late 2014. One of the subunits to receive TOWs is called the Jesus Christ Brigade, named in deference to the Christian-majority villages in the area it operates.

Yarmouk Army

Yarmouk Army (جيش اليرموك)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Revolutionary Army . Area of operations: mainly Daraa; also Quneitra. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Founded in December 2012 as the Yarmouk Brigade. It was one of the first groups to be vetted for TOW missiles in early 2014. Its founder and former leader, Bashar al-Zoubi, was the driving force behind the creation of the Southern Front in February 2014. Zoubi, a successful businessman who hailed from an influential family, was recognized as one of the leading moderate voices in the rebellion in 2013, at a time when Islamism and jihadism were coming to dominate the opposition to Assad. The Southern Front supports the creation of a civil, non-sectarian, and democratic state. The Yarmouk Army helped form the Hawks of the South Alliance within the Southern Front in December 2014; that coalition fell apart in the aftermath of the failed offensive on Daraa city in mid-2015. In December 2016, Yarmouk helped form another intra-Southern Front alliance, the Revolutionary Army (“Jaysh al-Thawra” in Arabic; not to be confused with the SDF’s Jaysh al-Thuwar in northern Syria). Four of the six current members of the Revolutionary Army, including Yarmouk, were vetted for TOWs. The Yarmouk Army is still one of the most powerful Southern Front factions, although the Southern Front as a whole has weakened, constantly under pressure by its Western and Jordanian backers to avoid confrontation with the Assad regime.

emigrants and helpers

Emigrants and Helpers Brigade (لواء المهاجرين والانصار)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Revolutionary Army. Area of operations: Daraa. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. One of the earliest FSA groups formed in Daraa governorate. Founded in February 2012 as the Emigrants and Helpers Battalion by Capt. Iyad Qaddour and Capt. Khalid Fathalla, both military defectors. Despite its name, it is comprised of local Syrians, not foreigners, and is not to be confused with jihadi groups with similar names. It was vetted to receive TOW missiles in mid-to-late 2014. When the Revolutionary Army was formed in December 2016, Capt. Qaddour was named the overall commander.


Mutaaz Billah Army (جيش المعتز بالله)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Revolutionary Army. Area of operations: Daraa. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Another old FSA formation in Daraa. Founded in January 2012 as the Mutaaz Billah Battalion. It was vetted to receive TOWs in late 2014-early 2015. The Mutaaz Billah Army was one of the four original founders of the Revolutionary Army in December 2016 (the others being the Yarmouk Army, the Emigrants and Helpers Brigade, the Mutaaz Billah Army, and the Hassan ibn Ali Brigade).


Dawn of Islam Division (فرقة فجر الإسلام)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Revolutionary Army. Area of operations: mainly Daraa; also Quneitra. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Formed as the Dawn of Islam Battalions in December 2012 by defected SAA officer Lt. Col. Mohammad Hassan Salama. It was vetted to receive TOWs in mid-late 2014 and joined the Revolutionary Army in June 2017.


March 18 Division (فرقة 18 آذار)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Southern Forces Coalition. Area of operations: Daraa. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Formed in April 2013 by defected Col. Muhammad Khaled al-Duhni. Its name refers to the day in 2011 when four protesters were killed in Daraa. The Division was vetted for TOW missiles in late 2014-early 2015 and helped form the Hawks of the South Alliance in December of that year. In late 2015 it was accused by doctors and other civilians of raiding hospital equipment in Daraa city. The Division helped to form the Southern Forces Coalition within the Southern Front in February 2017. One of the notable subgroups:


  • Southern Tawhid Brigade (لواء توحيد الجنوب)

Formed in October 2012 by Ismael Mahmoud al-Masri. Its core founding unit was the Rayat al-Haqq Battalion, one of the earliest FSA groups formed in Daraa. Split from the March 18 Division in July 2013, but it rejoined in February 2016. It was vetted for TOWs in late 2014-early 2015. Not related to the Aleppo-based Tawhid Brigade (see Levant Front above).


Omari Brigades (الوية العمري)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Southern Forces Coalition. Area of operations: Daraa. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. The very first FSA brigade formed in Daraa, founded in September 2011 as the Omari Battalion. It was led by Capt. Qais al-Qataneh, who defected in July, the first Daraa officer to do so. Based mainly in the Lajat region of eastern Daraa. The Omari Brigades were part of the southern sector of the Syria Revolutionaries Front. They became one of the first groups to be vetted for TOW missiles. In August 2014 Capt. Qataneh was involved in a heated argument with an activist; the argument turned into a gunbattle that left Qataneh dead and the activist badly wounded. Omari Brigades fighters subsequently forced their way into the hospital that was treating the activist and killed him. The murder brought tribal rivalries into play and caused quite a stir in the heavily tribal-oriented Lajat community. The Omari Brigades left the SRF in late 2014. 


Salah al-Din Division (فرقة صلاح الدين)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Southern Forces Coalition. Area of operations: Daraa. Ideology: unknown. Named after the famed Muslim leader Saladin. The Salah al-Din Division was vetted for TOWs in mid-to-late 2014 while it was known as the Salah al-Din Brigade and was part of the 1st Corps. The 1st Corps was an alliance of roughly 45 small Daraa-based groups, but it was beset by internal tensions. It fell apart in the aftermath of the failed rebel assault on Daraa city in the summer of 2015. The Salah al-Din Brigade was one of the first to break away and then became a Division.


69th Special Forces Division (الفرقة 69 قوات خاصة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Southern Forces Coalition > 46th Infantry Division. Area of operations: mainly Daraa; also Quneitra. Ideology: unknown. Formed in April 2014. Based in northwestern Daraa. It was vetted for TOW missiles in late 2014-early 2015. The 69th Special Forces Division helped form the 46th Infantry Division in April 2016 as part of a series of mergers to strengthen the Southern Front.

Dawn of Unity Division

Dawn of Tawhid Division (فرقة فجر التوحيد)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Southern Forces Coalition > Decisiveness Division. Area of operations: Daraa. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. The Dawn of Tawhid Division was vetted for TOWs in mid-to-late 2014 while part of the 1st Corps; at the time, it was known as the Dawn of Tawhid Brigade. Much like the Salah al-Din Division, Dawn of Tawhid broke away from the collapsing 1st Corps in mid-2015, subsequently becoming a Division. It participated in the creation of the Decisiveness Division in April 2016.


Amoud Horan Division (فرقة عمود حوران)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Southern Forces Coalition > Decisiveness Division. Area of operations: mainly Daraa; also Quneitra. Ideology: unknown. Founded as the Shield of al-Lajat Brigade in October 2012 by Col. Ahmed al-Omar and Col. Jihad Saad al-Din. By June 2013 it was known as the Amoud Horan Brigade. It was vetted to receive TOWs in mid-to-late 2014. In April 2016 the Amoud Horan Division participated in the creation of the Decisiveness Division.

dignity brigade

Dignity Brigade (لواء الكرامة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Southern Forces Coalition. Area of operations: Daraa. Ideology: unknown. The Dignity Brigade’s leader, Ziad al-Hariri, was the leader of the 1st Corps. It first deployed TOW missiles in September 2014.


Syria Revolutionaries Front (southern sector) (جبهة ثوار سوريا)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > Southern Alliance. Area of operations: Daraa, Quneitra; also Rif Dimashq. Ideology: mainly moderate Sunni Islamism. The southern branch of the Syria Revolutionaries Front was formed in May 2014, several months after the original northern branch. Despite nominally being part of the same organization, Capt. Abu Hamza al-Naimi’s southern branch never really had much to do with Jamal Maarouf’s infamously corrupt northern branch. As a result, the southern branch was unaffected by al-Nusra’s attack on the northern branch in October 2014. Capt. Naimi was eventually replaced by Maj. Abu Osama al-Jolani after accusations of corruption. The southern SRF helped to form the 1st Army in January 2015 alongside the 1st Artillery Regiment and the Hamza Division, but this formation fell apart in the wake of the failed Daraa offensive that summer. In August 2017 the southern SRF and Jaysh al-Ababil created the Southern Alliance within the Southern Front. The southern SRF is one of the stronger units in the Southern Front and has multiple units and subunits under its structure. Units that fielded TOWs have included the Omari Brigades, the Helpers of Sunna Brigade, and the al-Anfal Brigade; the first two are no longer part of the SRF and the third is defunct. Only one current unit has fielded TOWs:

union of the martyr

  • Union of the Martyr Captain Abu Hamza al-Naimi (تجمع الشهيد أبو حمزة النعيمي)

Named after the original commander of the southern SRF. Capt. Naimi was assassinated via a car bomb in March 2016 along with several other SRF leaders. No group has claimed responsibility. The Union first deployed TOW missiles in December 2016.


Lions of Sunna Division (فرقة أسود السنة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: mainly Daraa; also Quneitra. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Formerly known as the Lions of Sunna Brigade. It was vetted for TOWs in late 2014-early 2015. The group helped to form the Hawks of the South Alliance in December 2014, thought that formation fell apart the next year.

fallujah of houran division

Fallujah of Horan Division (فرقة فلوجة حوران)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: Daraa. Ideology: unknown. Based in the outskirts of Daraa city, especially the town of Naima. Formed in December 2012 as the Fallujah of Horan Brigade. One of its founding members was the Mutasim Battalion, the third FSA group formed in Daraa (founded in December 2011). One of the group’s leaders, Lt. Col. Yasser Abboud, was involved in leadership struggles plaguing the FSA in Daraa in 2012. He was killed in clashes with the government in October 2013. The brigade helped to form the Hawks of the South Alliance in December 2014; it experienced occasional tensions with the Yarmouk Army. The Fallujah of Horan Division was vetted for TOWs in January 2017, making it the last group to be vetted.


Hamza Division (فرقة الحمزة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front > 1st Army. Area of operations: Daraa. Ideology: mix of secularism and moderate Sunni Islamism. Not to be confused with the Aleppo-based Hamza Division. Formed in February 2013 as the Hamza Asad Allah Brigade, led by Col. Saber Safar. Col. Safar has been one of the most visible Southern Front leaders, routinely appearing in statements supporting the formation of a civil, non-sectarian state. The Hamza Division is based in the northern Daraa town of Inkhil, which was one of the first towns to rise up against the Assad regime. It was vetted for TOWs in mid-to-late 2014. The group joined with the 1st Artillery Regiment and the southern branch of the Syria Revolutionaries Front to form the 1st Army in January 2015, but the 1st Artillery and the southern SRF left after the failed Daraa offensive that summer, leaving the 1st Army as essentially a rebranded Hamza Division. A new group called the 1st Gathering formed in November 2015 and helped keep the 1st Army alive. One of the Hamza Division’s constituent units is worth mentioning:

mujahideen of horan brigade

  • Mujahideen of Horan Brigade (لواء مجاهدي حوران)

Split from the Hamza Division in mid-2015. During  its time as an independent group, the Mujahideen of Horan Brigade fielded TOWs; whether the CIA continued to provide them with TOWs during this time or whether these were simply carried over from its time in the Hamza Division is uncertain. The group had rejoined the Hamza Division by mid-2017. In August 2017 its commander was accused of murdering a man for refusing to marry his daughter.

1st artillery regiment

1st Artillery Regiment (الفوج الاول مدفعية)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: Daraa. Ideology: secularism. Founded in May 2013 by Maj. Abd al-Latif al-Hawrani. As its name implies, the 1st Artillery Regiment mostly provides rocket, missile, and artillery support. It was vetted for TOWs in late 2014-early 2015. The group was one of the three founding members of the 1st Army in January 2015 but left later that year.


Helpers of Sunna Brigade (لواء انصار السنة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: mainly Daraa; also Quneitra. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Formerly part of the southern branch of the Syria Revolutionaries Front. It was vetted for TOWs in mid-to-late 2014.

youth of sunna forces

Youth of Sunna Forces (قوات شباب السنة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: mainly Daraa; also Quneitra. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Based in the eastern Daraa town of Bosra. This group was vetted for TOW missiles in mid-to-late 2014; at this time it was known as the Youth of Sunna Brigade. It had something of a reputation for imprisoning and torturing dissidents. In February 2016 the group (then known as the Youth of Sunna Division) abducted and tortured to death a former FSA colonel for attempting to negotiate with the Assad government on behalf of his town. In August fighters loyal to the Division’s commander, Ahmed al-Auda, raided the home of deputy leader Muhammad Tohme, beat his father, and shot his brother. Fighters loyal to Tohme then raided the group’s headquarters and deposed Auda. Reaction to the change of leadership was mixed; some activists called it a coup, while others praised the action, accusing Auda of much corruption over the years. Later that month the group absorbed several other factions and became the Youth of Sunna Forces (note that the logo above still says “Division”, since the group has not released a clearly visible updated logo) . One of these groups had also received TOW missiles:


  • Unity Battalions of Horan Brigade (لواء توحيد كتائب حوران)

Founded in April 2013 by Maj. Muhammad al-Turkmani, who was later killed in action. It was vetted for TOWs in mid-to-late 2014. It was part of the now-defunct southeast Daraa-based Lions of War Operations Room along with the Mutaaz Billah Army, Omari Brigades, and the Youth of Sunna Division.

Partisans of Islam Front

Partisans of Islam Front (جبهة انصار الاسلام)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > National Front for the Liberation of Syria. Area of operations: mainly Quneitra; also Daraa. Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Not to be confused with the Iraq-based Ansar al-Islam, whose full Arabic name (Jamaat Ansar al-Islam) is similar to the Partisans’ Arabic name (Jabhat Ansar al-Islam). Led by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani (not to be confused with the leader of al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham). Despite being based in southern Syria, the group has deployed troops to Idlib and Hama in the past. Unlike most of the other groups on this list, the Partisans of Islam Front did not identify as part of the FSA until recently; for most of its existence, it has been an independent Islamist group. It was among the most solidly Islamist groups in the TOW program. It was probably chosen for its lack of reliance on al-Nusra. The group was part of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, one of the major rebel coalitions from 2012-2013. It was vetted in late 2014-early 2015. By early 2017 the Partisans of Islam Front was identified as part of the Southern Front, with which it had long worked closely. In July 2017 it helped form the National Front for the Liberation of Syria, an FSA coalition formed in reaction to receding support for the rebels from the West and the Gulf. The NFLS overlaps with the Southern Front and includes, among others, the Dawn of Unity Division, 16th Special Forces Division, Salah al-Din Division, and Unity Battalions of Horan Brigade.


Alwiya al-Furqan (ألوية الفرقان)

Affiliation: none. Area of operations: mainly Quneitra, Daraa; also Rif Dimashq. Ideology: Sunni Islamism. An independent Islamist group led by Muhammad Majid al-Khatib. Khatib had hoped for his group to be included in the Islamic Front; when it was not, he was bitterly disappointed and subsequently grew closer to more moderate FSA groups. The group works very closely with the Southern Front and is sometimes counted as part of it. Like the Partisans of Islam Front, it has deployed troops to Idlib in the past. It was vetted for TOW missiles in late 2014-early 2015.


Quneitra Military Council (المجلس العسكري في القنيطرة والجولان)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: Quneitra. Ideology: mix of secularism and moderate Sunni Islamism. In the early days of the war, there were many attempts to organize the various FSA factions under regional military councils. The Quneitra Military Council (full name: Military Council in Quneitra and the Golan) is one of the few surviving councils. From February to June 2014, its former leader, Abdul-Ilah al-Bashir, was appointed Chief of Staff of the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army, which was an attempt to organize the FSA at the national level. The Quneitra Military Council has been accused of corruption over the years, such as its leaders allegedly taking foreign funds for themselves. One of its former constituent groups, the Knights of the Golan Brigade, became infamous for being directly supplied by Israel. Another one of its constituent groups received TOWs:

Liwa al-Sabiteen

  • Liwa al-Sabiteen (لواء السبطين)

One of the main constituents of the Council. It was vetted for TOWs in mid-to-late 2014. It split from the QMC in January 2016, citing corruption and lack of funds, and renamed to Jaysh al-Sabiteen. The group ended up rejoining the QMC and reverting to its old name in December, ironically because it didn’t have enough funds to continue operating on its own.

Defunct Groups


Syria Revolutionaries Front (northern sector) (جبهة ثوار سوريا)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: mainly Idlib; also Hama. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. The Syria Revolutionaries Front was formed in December 2013 in reaction to the formation of the Islamic Front earlier in the same month. It served as a rival to both the Islamic Front and the leadership structure of the FSA’s Supreme Military Council. There were two separate branches, one in the north and one in the south. The northern branch played a leading role in kicking ISIS out of most of Idlib governorate in January 2014. Nonetheless, it was very corrupt, and civilians and other rebels in the region grew to despise it. In October 2014, al-Nusra, along with Jund al-Aqsa, used the northern SRF’s unpopularity as an excuse to attack it and other FSA groups in the area. The SRF was quickly defeated, with many of its leaders fleeing to Turkey, and Idlib became dominated by hardline Islamists and jihadis. Some SRF fighters joined their conquerors; others joined Jaysh al-Thuwar, and still others had escaped defeat by leaving the SRF before its demise. In December 2016, former SRF leaders released a joint statement with other groups that had been driven into exile by al-Nusra, declaring their intention to return to the battlefield. Two northern SRF affiliates were equipped with TOWs:


  • Gathering of the Syrian Martyrs’ Brigades and Battalions (تجمع كتائب و ألوية شهداء سوريا)

The lead group of the northern SRF. Formed in December 2011 as the Martyrs of Mt. Zawiya Battalion; based in the Jabal al-Zawia region of Idlib. Vetted for TOWs around August 2014. Its name is sometimes simplified to “Syrian Martyrs’ Brigades”. Led by Jamal Maarouf, who was also led the northern SRF as a whole. Although religiously conservative like many Idlibis, Maarouf’s group had a largely non-religious agenda. Maarouf was initially hailed as a construction worker-turned-revolutionary who helped to liberate the Idlib countryside from Assad’s rule, but over time he established a reputation for corruption. He fled to Turkey when al-Nusra defeated the SRF in late 2014. He later sent fighters to the Syrian Democratic Forces to fight IS.

Helpers Brigades

  • Helpers Brigades (ألوية الأنصار)

Formed in 2012 and based in the southern suburbs of Maarrat al-Nu’man in Idlib. Led by Mithqal al-Abdullah. It was vetted for TOWs in mid-2014. The Helpers Brigades were one of the first SRF units to be defeated in al-Nusra’s October 2014 offensive against the SRF. In December 2016 its exiled leadership announced their intention to return to the battlefield alongside the Syrian Martyrs’ Brigades, the Hazzm Movement, and a small SRF-allied group called Jabhat Haqq al-Muqatalia. In this statement, the Helpers Brigades were listed separately from the SRF, possibly indicating that the former wanted to distance itself from the latter.


Hazzm Movment (حركة حزم)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: mainly Aleppo and Idlib; also Hama, Homs. Ideology: mainly secularism; also moderate Sunni Islamism. Formed in January 2014 by a combination of civilians and defected military officers. Headquarted in Atarib, Aleppo. One of its leaders was Abu Abdullah al-Kholi, who had helped found the Farouq Battalions in Homs in June 2011; many of the groups merging to form the Hazzm Movement were northern Farouq affiliates. Other leading members included 1st Lt. Abdullah Awda and Bilal Atar. Supreme Military Council Chief of Staff General Salim Idris was also present at the founding. From its first days, the Hazzm Movement was closely tied to the CIA. Ideologically, it was mostly secularist and denounced the sectarianism that had begun to dominate the rebels. It also expressed support for a political solution to the conflict. Hazzm was the first group to be vetted for TOWs and some of its members received training in Qatar. The group’s closeness to the US won it many fighters as well as equipment and funds, but it also won it many enemies. Many other rebel groups looked upon Hazzm’s favored status with either jealousy or disdain. Although Hazzm did not have the infamous reputation that the SRF did, parts of it were still considered corrupt, partly stemming from the corruption of many northern Farouq fighters before they joined Hazzm. Al-Nusra saw Hazzm as a threat. When the al-Qaeda affiliate launched its offensive against the SRF in October 2014, the Hazzm Movement was also attacked and largely driven out of Idlib. Al-Nusra continued to attack Hazzm, causing the latter to appeal to other groups for mediation. No help came, and in March 2015, after losing most of its territory in Aleppo, Hazzm dissolved itself into the various factions of the Levant Front operations room, particularly the Army of Mujahideen, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki, and the Authenticity and Development Front. Hazzm fighters have shown up again in various groups. The Atarib Martyrs Brigade, which was reportedly the largest component of Hazzm, joined the YPG-friendly Jaysh al-Thuwar before merging into the Army of Mujahideen in May 2016. Another former Hazzm affiliate, the 777th Regiment, had helped to form Jaysh al-Thuwar in May 2015 before leaving sometime later. The 9th Special Forces Division, which had initially helped form the SRF but left for Hazzm in January 2014, is still active today as part of Turkey’s Euphrates Shield operations room. Hazzm’s leadership had fled to Turkey when the group dissolved; in December 2016 they released a joint statement with some other rebel groups that had been forced to dissolve by al-Nusra in which they declared their intent to return to the battlefield. It is unclear if they will do so as independent factions or as part of other groups.


Al-Anfal Brigade (لواء الأنفال)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > 1st Army > Syria Revolutionaries Front (southern sector). Area of operations: Rif Dimashq. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? A former member of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades before joining the southern SRF. It was vetted for TOWs in mid-to-late 2014. The brigade came into conflict with al-Nusra and other rebel groups. In March 2015 it defected to the government alongside Jaysh al-Ummah, a rival of Jaysh al-Islam. Its fighters joined the National Defense Forces. There is no evidence they took any TOW missiles with them.

1st brigades

1st Brigade of Damascus (اللواء الأول في دمشق)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: Damascus. Ideology: unknown. This small brigade is the only group active in Damascus itself that was vetted for TOWs apart from the al-Rahman Legion. It is active mainly in the Barzeh neighborhood. It was vetted in mid-to-late 2014. In April 2016 it left the Southern Front and joined the al-Rahman Legion, but it left al-Rahman and returned to the Southern Front sometime later. There were rumors of the brigade reconciling with the Assad government during the latter’s offensive in Damascus in mid-late 2017, and in October members were spotted fighting for the government against HTS in Hama governorate; presumably the 1st Brigade of Damascus, as such, is defunct. In December, a pro-opposition news site claimed that the group had been focused on profiteering since a 2013 truce with the government. It also accused the brigade’s leaders of torturing and murdering those who objected to its policies.

Army of Mujahideen

Army of Mujahideen (جيش المجاهدين)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Jabhat Ahl al-Sham. Area of operations: Aleppo. Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Formed in January 2014 to fight ISIS. Led by Lt. Col. Abdel Qadel Bakur. It was an independent Islamist group for most of its existence, though parts of it (particularly the 19th Division) considered themselves part of the FSA. Close to the Syrian Islamic Council. It was considered more moderate than the Islamic Front, but still too Islamist to receive Western funding. The Army of Mujahideen was often accused of corruption and abuses in its early days, especially the 19th Division. In September 2014, after many defections and splits, the group was vetted for TOW missiles. The supply of TOW missiles stopped a few months later when the Army of Mujahideen helped to form the Levant Front operations room. In 2016 the group as a whole started identifying itself as FSA, and eventually the TOW supplies resumed. In December 2016 it regrouped with Kataeb Thuwar al-Sham (which had split in 2015) and a small hardline group called the Banners of Islam Movement to form Jabhat Ahl al-Sham. This new formation came under attack and was defeated by Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in January, and the Army of Mujahideen dissolved into Ahrar ash-Sham to stand a better chance of surviving.

Kataeb Thuwar al-Sham

Kataeb Thuwar al-Sham (كتائب ثوار الشام)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Jabhat Ahl al-Sham. Area of operations: Aleppo. Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Split from the Army of Mujahideen in April 2015. Led by Capt. Naji Mustafa. Kataeb Thuwar al-Sham was one of the more frequent participants in the shelling of the YPG-held Aleppo neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsood. It merged into the Levant Front in January 2016 but by September it had left. The group helped form Jabhat Ahl al-Sham in December 2016. In January 2017, it was one of a number of groups attacked by Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. Alongside the Army of Mujahideen, Kataeb Thuwar al-Sham then dissolved into Ahrar ash-Sham to have a better chance of standing against JFS. The fate of the other Jabaht Ahl al-Sham member, the Banners of Islam Movement, is unknown.


11th Special Forces Division (الفرقة 11 قوات خاصة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: Rif Dimashq. Ideology: unknown. Based mainly in the western Qalamoun mountains of Rif Dimashq near the border with Lebanon. Led by Col. Abdullah al-Rifai. In addition to its affiliation with the Southern Front, it was also part of the Western Qalamoun Gathering. The 11th Special Forces Division was vetted for TOWs in late 2014-early 2015. By mid-2015 it appeared defunct.

United Sham Front

United Sham Front (جبهة الشام الموحدة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: Daraa, Quneitra, Rif Dimashq. Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Vetted for TOWs in mid-late 2014. It merged into the Yarmouk Army in January 2016.

Non-Vetted Groups that Deployed TOWs

2nd Infantry Division

2nd Infantry Division (الفرقة الثانية مشاة)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army > Southern Front. Area of operations: Rif Dimashq. Ideology: unknown. Formed in November 2015. Some of its components were formerly part of the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo. The group was seen with at least one TOW missile; this could mean the group was vetted, or it could mean that the ex-Ahmad al-Abdo fighters brought a TOW with them. Judging by the fact that the 2nd Infantry Division disappeared a few months after its formation, the second scenario is more likely.

Ahrar al-Sharqiya

Ahrar al-Sharqiya (حرار الشرقية)

Affiliation: Free Syrian Army. Area of operations: Aleppo. Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism? Formed in January 2016. It includes many former Ahrar ash-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra members. Despite identifying as part of the FSA, Ahrar al-Sharqiya has a hardline Salafi ideology. In September 2016 it was involved in a much-publicized confrontation with US Special Forces embedded with the Hamza Division (the Aleppo-based one, not the Daraa based one). In November it appeared with a TOW, which was likely given by one of the vetted factions. According to Charles Lister, Ahrar al-Sharqiya was vetted by the DoD’s program but lost its status after tensions with other groups in the program. Ahrar al-Sharqiya has also clashed with fellow members of Turkey’s Euphrates Shield operation and has a reputation for corruption and cruelty.


Ahrar ash-Sham (حركة أحرار الشام الإسلامية)

Affiliation: none. Area of operations: mainly Idlib, Aleppo; also Hama, Rif Dimashq, Homs, Daraa, Quneitra. Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism. Founded in January 2012 as Kataeb Ahrar ash-Sham by a number of Salafis who had been released from prison by the government. Ideologically similar to al-Qaeda, but more moderate in tactics and less internationally-focused. The group adopted its current name (in full: Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya) in January 2013. It grew quickly and by the end of 2013 Ahrar ash-Sham was one of the largest and most influential rebel groups in Syria. Although it clashed with secular-minded groups on many occasions, Ahrar maintained generally positive relations with most FSA groups regardless of ideology. It was often seen as a bridge between more moderate, nationalist-minded rebels and international jihadis like al-Nusra. Ahrar led the Syrian Islamic Front, a coalition of hardline Islamist groups. Ahrar absorbed some of the smaller SIF members, and in November Ahrar and the remaining members helped to form the Islamic Front, largely a merger between the SIF and the more moderate Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. Ahrar was the dominant player in the Islamic Front as well, and again it absorbed some smaller companion groups. The Islamic Front had effectively become defunct by 2015, though it never formally dissolved and Ahrar still uses the Islamic Front logo. Around this time, Ahrar began tentatively reaching out to the West, hoping to be seen as a reasonable and civilized Islamic group rather than “the Syrian Taliban.” In late 2016 tensions between Ahrar ash-Sham and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly al-Nusra) began to increase as a result of Ahrar’s willingness to work with Turkey and the West. Conflict was also brewing inside Ahrar itself between “moderate” and “hardline” factions. In October, clashes erupted between Jund al-Aqsa and Ahrar, with many other rebel groups declaring support for the latter. Ahrar vowed to eradicate Jund al-Aqsa, but before it could crush the unpopular extremist group, Jund al-Aqsa joined Jabhat Fatah al-Sham to avoid punishment. JFS’s acceptance of this maneuver led to a further deterioration of relations with Ahrar. In January 2017 clashes between former Jund al-Aqsa members and Ahrar again erupted, this time prompting Ahrar and JFS to engage in open warfare with each other. Several other rebel groups sided with Ahrar, with some (such as the Army of Mujahideen and Kataeb Thuwar al-Sham) joining Ahrar for protection. At the same time, Jaysh al-Ahrar, a subfaction of Ahrar ash-Sham led by hardline leader Abu Jaber, defected and allied with JFS, helping to form Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. In July 2017 clashes again broke out between HTS and Ahrar ash-Sham, this time resulting in a HTS victory, leaving them in decisive control of Idlib governorate. Ahrar remains an important player, but its potency has been sapped. Ahrar is known to have fired at least one TOW missile: in Hama in March 2017. The man operating the TOW appears to be a former member of the Army of Mujahideen.


Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Jabhat al-Nusra) (جبهة فتح الشام / جبهة النصرة)

Affiliation: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Area of operations: mainly Idlib, Aleppo, Hama; also Rif Dimashq, Homs, Daraa, Quneitra, Latakia. Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Formed in late 2011, although it officially announced its existence as Jabhat al-Nusra in January 2012. Originally a branch of the Islamic State of Iraq, which was still part of al-Qaeda at the time, Jabhat al-Nusra developed differences with its Iraqi parent organization. The Islamic State of Iraq had long had a reputation for extreme sectarian violence and a zero-tolerance policy for those who disagreed with it. Al-Nusra, as well as al-Qaeda’s leadership, wanted to take a more pragmatic approach, hoping to win the Sunni population over and gradually establish Islamic governance. In April 2013 ISI’s leader, renamed ISI to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS) and demanded that al-Nusra subsume itself into its parent organization. Al-Nusra’s leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, refused, solidifying the split that had been forming between the two groups. Al-Nusra has been less extreme in its violence and more willing to work with non-jihadi groups than ISIS (now IS); this, combined with the group’s impressive fighting record against the Assad government, has enabled al-Nusra to embed itself in the Syrian opposition. However, it is still very much a highly sectarian terrorist organization bent on establishing a harsh Salafi state. Since 2014 it has stepped up its attacks on fellow rebel groups that it perceives as threats, especially US-backed factions. Other rebels became increasingly uneasy with their alliance of convenience with the al-Qaeda faction. In July 2016, in an attempt to restablish itself in the eyes of the Syrian opposition, Jabhat al-Nusra renamed to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and formally disaffiliated with al-Qaeda, though strong links still exist and the international community still recognizes it as part of al-Qaeda. After further clashes with US-backed rebels as well as long-time ally Ahrar ash-Sham, JFS joined with four other groups in January 2017 to create Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which is widely acknowledged as dominated by JFS. As the Assad government and its allies begin to regain the upper hand and the international powers scramble to carve out areas of influence, the future of al-Nusra/JFS/HTS and its relationship with the rest of the opposition is cloudy. Al-Nusra/JFS has captured several TOW missiles from vetted groups over the years, though these missiles represent only a small percentage of all those provided in the CIA’s program.


Islamic State (الدولة الإسلامية)

Affiliation: none. Area of operations: Homs, Deir ez-Zor, al-Hasakah (previously throughout Syria), in addition to Iraq. Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Originally founded as Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in Iraq in 1999 by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In 2004 JTJ joined al-Qaeda and renamed to al-Qaeda in Iraq. Zarqawi’s emphasis on takfir – accusing other Muslims of heresy – caused friction with Osama bin Laden and his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri. AQI merged with several other Iraqi jihadi groups to form the Mujahideen Shura Council. Zarqawi was killed by US forces in June 2006, and in October of that year the MSC renamed to the Islamic State of Iraq. By 2011, the ISI had been greatly weakened by the US and its allies, including Sunni tribesmen who had previously fought alongside ISI but became alienated by its extremism. The eruption of war in Syria and the sectarian undertones that came to influence the war, as well as increasing Sunni unrest in Iraq under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki provided ISI with the opportunity for a resurgence. ISI established a branch in Syria – Jabhat al-Nusra. Tensions between these two al-Qaeda groups, as well as between ISI and other Syrian rebels, led to al-Qaeda formally expelling ISI (known as ISIS since April 2013) from its ranks. By January 2014 nearly all Syrian rebels were at war with ISIS. In June 2014 the group’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of a caliphate, a global Islamic State demanding the allegiance of all Muslims, with himself as caliph. At the same time, IS was making alarming strides in Iraq and Syria, controlling half of each (geographically) by the end of the summer. By this point, IS was fighting Syrian rebels more than the Assad government. This marked IS’ high point, though, as the world turned its guns on the rogue “caliphate”. Today, IS has been forced out of all major cities in Iraq and Syria. Just because the group’s territory is shrinking, however, does not mean that IS will soon be gone. It will likely return to its rural insurgency origins, continuing to plague the region and the world for the foreseeable future. IS has captured TOW missiles only once, in 2015 in the Eastern Qalamoun region of Rif Dimashq. The missiles were captured from either the al-Rahman Legion or the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo. Some of these missiles were recaptured by Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya, at this time still an affiliate of the Authenticity and Development Front and a non-vetted group.

Suggested Reading

These articles and resources proved particularly helpful to me in writing this article. Many of them have already been linked to above.

Individual articles:

“9 FSA Factions in Possession of TOW Missiles, as Obama Mulls Greater Involvement in Syria.” Tahrir Souri. 9 May 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20140720163537/http://tahrirsouri.com/2014/05/09/9-fsa-factions-in-possession-of-tow-missiles-as-obama-mulls-greater-involvement-in-syria/.

Abdulhaq, Ethar. “Barzeh Neighborhood: Warlords Coordinated with Assad, Betrayed Opposition.” Zaman Al Wasl. 6 Dec. 2017. https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/31541.html.

El Yassir, Ali. “The Ahrar al Sham Movement: Syria’s Local Salafists.” Wilson Center. 23 Aug. 2016. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-ahrar-al-sham-movement-syrias-local-salafists-0.

“Exclusive Interview: Former MIG Pilot Recounts Audacious Defection, Talks TOW Missiles.” Tahrir Souri. 6 June 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20140608054515/http://tahrirsouri.com/2014/06/06/exclusive-interview-former-mig-pilot-recounts-audacious-defection-talks-tow-missiles/.

“Exclusive Interview with Ahmad Al-Sa’oud, Head of Division 13, One of the 9 Factions Given Access to TOW Missiles.” Tahrir Souri. 17 May 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20140724110110/http://tahrirsouri.com:80/2014/05/17/exclusive-interview-with-ahmad-al-saoud-head-of-division-13-one-of-the-9-factions-given-access-to-tow-missiles/.

Haid, Haid. “Why Ahrar al-Sham is fighting itself – and how this impacts the battle for Syria.” Middle East Eye. 28 Dec. 2016. http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/why-ahrar-al-sham-fighting-itself-and-how-impacts-battle-syria-1997438926.

Heller, Sam. “Are Syria’s Rebels at Al Qaeda’s Mercy?” The Century Foundation. 26 July 2016. https://tcf.org/content/commentary/syrias-rebels-al-qaedas-mercy/.

Heras, Nicholas A. “Muhammad Majid al-Khatib: A Rising Leader in the Free Syrian Army.” Militant Leadership Monitor. The Jamestown Foundation. 28 Feb. 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20150713201359/http:/mlm.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42039&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=539&cHash=2bd9a9d0221d650cde1b043739bb7602#.Wj9A43lG3IW.

Killian, Alexander. “Jaysh Usud al-Sharqiya: Exiles of the Euphrates.” Bellingcat. 17 Apr. 2017. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/04/17/jaysh-usud-al-sharqiya-exiles-euphrates/.

Kodmani, Bassma. “Empowering the Democratic Resistance in Syria.” Arab Reform Initiative. 10 Oct. 2013. http://www.arab-reform.net/en/node/593.

Landis, Joshua. “Syria’s Top Five Insurgent Leaders.” Syria Comment. 1 Oct. 2013. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/biggest-powerful-militia-leaders-syria/.

Legrand, Félix. “The Resilience of Moderate Syrian Rebels.” Arab Reform Initiative. 1 Sept. 2014. http://www.arab-reform.net/en/node/485.

Lund, Aron. “The End of the Levant Front.” Syria in Crisis. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 21 Apr. 2015. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/59855?lang=en.

Mustafa, Hasan. “An Analysis of Jaish al-Thuwar (The Army of Revolutionaries) – A Component of the Syrian Democratic Forces.” WordPress.com. 16 Nov. 2015. https://hasanmustafas.wordpress.com/2015/11/16/an-analysis-of-jaish-al-thuwar-the-army-of-revolutionaries-a-component-of-the-syrian-democratic-forces/.

Roche, Cody, and Ryan O’Farrell. “Factions Fighting in the Syrian Civil War.” Bellingcat. 29 Apr. 2017. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/04/29/factions-syrian-civil-war/.

Roche, Cody. “The Trotskyist León Sedov Brigade in the Syrian Revolution.” Medium. 6 Dec. 2017. https://medium.com/@badly_xeroxed/the-trotskyist-le%C3%B3n-sedov-brigade-in-the-syrian-revolution-bf6ebf5ae851.

Rowell, Alex. “The Rebel Who Defied Jihadists by Smoking.” The Daily Beast. 6 May 2017. https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-rebel-who-defied-isis-by-smoking.

Szakola, Albin. “FSA Factions Reorganizing in Southern Syria.” NOW News. 25 Apr. 2016. https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/566891-fsa-factions-reorganizing-in-southern-syria.

“The Free Syrian Army: Southern Front – Transitional Phase.” Revolutionary Forces of Syria Media Office. 11 May 2016. https://rfsmediaoffice.com/en/2014/12/15/the-free-syrian-army-southern-front-transitional-phase/.

White, Jeffrey. “Rebels Worth Supporting: Syria’s Harakat Hazm.” The Washington Institute. 28 Apr. 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rebels-worth-supporting-syrias-harakat-hazm.

Winter, Lucas. “A Modern History of the Free Syrian Army in Daraa.” FMSO Leavensworth. Foreign Military Studies Office. 1 June 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20140812124905/http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Free-Syrian-Army-Daraa.pdf.


News sources and other websites:

Jakub on Twitter

Violations Documentation Center in Syria

Local Council of Darayya City


Syria Direct

Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi

Charles Lister on Twitter

ASSBW on Twitter

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Syrian opposition political groups: a brief look

The civil side of Syria’s opposition has largely been overshadowed by the armed rebel groups amidst the country’s devastating conflict. Aside from the Syrian National Council, the wider Syrian National Coalition, and the rival National Coordination Committee, pro-opposition parties, interest groups, and activist networks have not been widely documented since the early days of the war. In this post I hope to give the reader a sample of some of the groups still in operation after nearly six years of civil war. This is not meant to be a comprehensive or balanced view of the current Syrian civil opposition, merely a brief look. I tend to rely on Facebook a lot, so groups that don’t have Facebook pages may be underrepresented. Keep in mind that some of these groups may online exist online.

Kurdish parties and other groups operating in the Syrian Democratic Forces-controlled Rojava region will be saved for the next post, and after that I may look at pro-government parties (with which I am less familiar).

Note that I use “moderate Sunni Islamism” to denote Islamist groups that support religious freedom and equal rights for non-Muslims, as opposed to more solidly Islamist groups that support religious tolerance and limited rights for non-Muslims (or non-Sunnis).

Local Coordination Committees of Syria

Ideology: human rights, civil resistance. A decentralized network of civil councils and activist organizations that sprang up across Syria in reaction to the government’s crackdown on the initial protests in 2011. One of the most prominent and widespread opposition groups in Syria. It initially opposed armed opposition, even in late 2011 after thousands had been killed and the revolution became a civil war.

Muslim Brotherhood

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Islamic democracy. One of the main political contenders in Syria’s early years of independence; it continued to be a very influential organization despite persecution, until the 1982 Hama massacre put an end to the insurgency launched by the Brotherhood and its radical offshoot, the Fighting Vanguard. The Brotherhood has since been highly influential in the exiled opposition, at times moving in more moderate or fundamentalist directions depending on the situation, but its reputation in Syria itself was damaged by the 1979-1982 insurgency; few protest groups or armed brigades, even those sharing similar Islamic democratic platforms, have been willing to identify with the Brotherhood. The organization’s administrative arm in the country, the Commission for the Protection of Civilians, and its most prominent armed affiliate, the Shields of the Revolution Council, were both defunct by early 2015. The Sham Legion, initially formed by defectors from the Shields of the Revolution Council, maintains very informal links with the Brotherhood.

Syrian Islamic Council

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Islamic democracy. Formed in 2014 partly as a rival to the Brotherhood, though it also includes many Brotherhood members. It is more firmly based in Syria, as opposed to the more exile-oriented Brotherhood. Armed groups close to it include the Army of Mujahideen and the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union.

Syrian Revolution Network

Ideology: liberal democracy, human rights, non-sectarianism. One of the first and most prominent opposition networks on social media, founded in January 2011.

Building the Syrian State

Ideology: liberal democracy, secularism, social justice. One of the few reformist opposition parties tolerated by the Syrian government. Recently worked with the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria (aka Democratic Yekiti). Strongly supports a political solution and has been supportive of the various peace plans and ceasefires. It reportedly lost many of its members in 2015 when the group’s leader fled to Turkey. Note: the organization’s Facebook page appears more active than their website.

National Building Movement

Ideology: liberal democracy, secularism. Possibly the most opposition-leaning party tolerated by the Syrian government. Founded by former members of Building the Syrian State after that party unraveled.

Assyrian Democratic Organization

Ideology: Syriac/Assyrian interests, social democracy? Supports the Syrian National Coalition. May have ties with the Assyrian Democratic Movement in Iraq.

Syrian Turkmen Assembly

A union of Syrian Turkmen political parties. Formally, it has control over the Syrian Turkmen Brigades; in reality, the “Syrian Turkmen Brigades” is nearly as loose a label as the “Free Syrian Army“, and not all predominantly Turkmen brigades have links with the Syrian Turkmen Assembly (the most prominent exception being the Seljuqs Brigade, which is part of the SDF). Note: their Facebook page appears to be more active than their website.

Ideology: Turkmen interests, moderate Sunni Islamism? Seems to be modeled after Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey.

Ideology: Turkmen interests. Split from the Syrian Turkmen National Bloc. Originally I thought this party was more left-leaning than the National Bloc, but it may actually be more solidly Islamist and Turkish nationalist.

Ideology: Turkmen interests. Split from the Syrian Turkmen Democratic Movement. Like the STDM, I have been unable to determine this party’s ideological orientation. Note: their Facebook page appears more active than their website.

National Democratic Rally

Ideology: leftism, secularism. A dissident alliance formed by five left-wing parties in 1980. Six constituent parties today:

Ideology: social democracy (historically Leninism). Split from the Syrian Communist Party in 1973. Known as the Syrian Communist Party – Political Bureau until 2005, when it renounced communism. The party is a prominent participant in the Syrian National Coalition’s government in exile and is also a member of the Progressive Alliance, a spin-off of the Socialist International.

Ideology: Nasserism, democratic socialism. Split from the Arab Socialist Union Party of Syria (which remains pro-government) in 1980. Less stridently anti-regime than the SDPP (see above), sometimes resulting in squabbles between the two parties. The DASU was (and possibly still is) also a member of the NCCNote: the party’s Facebook page appears more active than their website.

Ideology: Marxism. Split from the Ba’ath Party in 1966. It was a member of the NCC but left a few months after its formation.

Ideology: Arab socialism. Split from the pro-government party with the same name.

Ideology: left-wing Ba’athism (i.e., opposition to neoliberal economic reforms of Hafez al-Assad), democratic socialism. Split from the Ba’ath Party in 1970. Left the NCC in 2015. It is represented in the Syrian Democratic Council, the legislative body of Rojava.

Ideology: Leninism. Split from the original Syrian Communist Party in 1976. It left the NCC in 2015. Note: the party’s Facebook page appears more active than their website.

Damascus Declaration

Ideology: human rights, democracy. An opposition alliance from 2005. Founding members included the National Democratic Rally and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Most of its affiliates have left, and the group has largely become defunct, though it is still active on social media.

Movement for Justice and Development in Syria

Ideology: centrism, economic liberalism, moderate Sunni Islamism. The party of Anas al-Abdah, who was elected president of the National Coalition in March 2016. Founded in 2006. The party itself may be defunct, as its website has long been offline.

Together for a Free and Democratic Syria Movement

Ideology: liberal democracy, secularism. It was strongly against the arming of the opposition and supports a political solution to the war.

Citizenship for Civil Action (Muwatana)

Ideology: liberal democracy, secularism. Appears supportive of the National Coalition. It was connected at one point to Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, an FSA group in Raqqa governorate that fights alongside the YPG (though not always harmoniously) as part of the Syrian Democratic Forces.

Upcoming Syria

Ideology: Alawite interests. A 2015 pro-rebel Alawite party. Supports the National Coalition.

National Unity Movement for the Liberation of Syria

Ideology: liberal democracy. At least at one point, it had links with a few small FSA groups, including Liwa Jisr Horan and the Tahrir al-Sham Division, both members of the FSA’s Southern Front.

Political Authority of the Forces of the Syrian Revolution

Ideology: liberal democracy, Arab nationalism. Identifies as Islamic but sees the war in non-religious terms.

Islamic Rally for Syria

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Arab nationalism.

Free Popular Current

Ideology: liberal democracy. Opposes the SDF’s federalist project. Supports the National Coalition.

Syrian Freedom Youth

Ideology: liberal democracy. Emphasis on non-sectarianism. Opposes the SDF.

Syrian Future Youth Movement

Ideology: liberal democracy. Focuses on Aleppo.

Syrian Youth Movement – Sun

Ideology: liberal democracy. Focuses on Deir ez-Zor. Possibly related to the Syrian Future Youth Movement.

Hasakah Youth Union

Ideology: unknown, possibly Arab nationalism? Hostile to the PYD/YPG and the SDF.

Coalition of Arab Clan and Tribal Youth

Ideology: Arab nationalism, Sunni Islamism? Opposes the SDF.

Freemen of Houran League

Ideology: unknown. Active in the Houran region of southwestern Syria, mostly in Daraa governorate.

Syrian Turkmen Development Party

Ideology: Turkmen interests, moderate Sunni Islamism, anti-Kurdish sentiment? Strongly supports Turkey.

Syrian Front

Ideology: liberal democracy, secularism, economic liberalism, women’s rights. Formerly known as the Syrian National Front. Opposes federalism, but not necessarily hostile to the SDF.

Syrian Movement for Renewal

Ideology: liberal democracy, moderate Sunni Islamism, Arab nationalism, women’s rights. Emphasis on balancing respect for Syria’s supposed Arab and Islamic character with respect and equal rights for minorities.

Syrian Popular Movement

Ideology: liberal democracy, women’s rights, secularism. Opposes federalism, but not necessarily the SDF itself.

Syrian Revolution Coordinators

Ideology: liberal democracy? Opposes the SDF.

Free Scholars, Preachers, and Advocates for Syria

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. A group of religious clerics that emphasizes freedom of religion and interfaith dialogue. Note: the group’s Facebook page appears more active than their website.

Ulama Front of the Levant

Ideology: (moderate?) Sunni Islamism. Note: the link above is to the Aleppo branch, which appears to be the main branch and is more popular and more active than the central organization’s page.

National Movement of Free Officers

Ideology: Arab nationalism, anti-Alawite sentiment, anti-Shia sentiment? Sunni Islamism? Opposes the National Coalition.

Syrian Revolutionary Movement

Ideology: Arab nationalism, moderate Sunni Islamism, anti-Shia sentiment?

Syrian Revolutionaries’ Gathering

Ideology: liberal democracy. Focuses on reporting casualties, especially civilians.

Syrian Revolutionaries’ Union

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Opposes the SDF.

Syrian Promise Current

Ideology: liberal democracy, secularism, women’s rights. Opposes federalism.

Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Research

Ideology: human rights, minority interests, prisoner rights. A legal advocacy and monitoring group established in 2004. Note: the organization’s Facebook page appears more active than its website.

Working Group for Syrian Detainees

Ideology: human rights, prisoner rights. Reports on the detention of activists and other civilians by rebel groups as well as government forces.

International Campaign to Save the Syrian Detainees

Ideology: human rights, prisoner rights. Similar to the Working Group for Syrian Detainees.

National Collective Mass in Syria

Ideology: liberal democracy, Arab nationalism, moderate Sunni Islamism, left-leaning economics, social liberalism. Founded in 2012.

Gathering of National Action

Ideology: Arab nationalism? Opposes the SDF.

Syrian Democratic Gathering

Ideology: liberal democracy. Opposes the SDF, but not as solidly opposed as some other rebel parties.

Syrian Democratic Union

Ideology: liberal democracy, ethnic/religious pluralism. Opposes the SDF. Founded in 2013; human rights activist Michel Kilo was its leader at least at first.

Syrian National Dialogue Forum

Ideology: secularism, non-sectarianism. Critical of the SDF but not entirely opposed. Hosts many talks and lectures by academics, analysts, and activists.

Unity Movement for the Forces of the Syrian Revolution

Ideology: Arab nationalism. Supports Turkey and opposes the SDF.

National Commission to Support the Syrian Revolution

Ideology: Arab nationalism? Appears to be affiliated with former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, who fled the country in 2005, protesting the Syrian government’s alleged role in the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was close to Khaddam. Khaddam has previously led a group called the National Salvation Front in Syria, which may or may not still be active.

Support the Syrian Revolution Foundation

Ideology: unknown. Particularly critical of jihadist groups.

Spectra Movement for Syria

Ideology: liberal democracy, social justice, minority rights, women’s rights. Possibly inactive, as it has only made two posts in the last two years.

Revolutionary Resistance for the Liberation of Syria

Ideology: secularism, Arab nationalism?

National Fraternity Party of Free Syria

Ideology: liberal democracy, non-sectarianism.

Syrian Dialogues

Ideology: human rights, non-sectarianism, secularism? Holds discussions on various aspects of Syria, the revolution, and the war.

Syrian Peaceful Movement

Ideology: non-violence, civil resistance. Particularly focuses on the protection and raising of Syrian children. Note: the organization’s Facebook page appears more active than their website.

Syrian Organization for the Defense of Human Rights

Ideology: human rights. Focuses on the suffering of civilians under the government’s bombing, particularly in Aleppo.

Federation of Syrian Youth Organizations

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Aims to unite pro-opposition youth groups.

Syrian National Assembly

Ideology: liberal democracy. Supports an internationally-mediated political solution to the war.

Syrian General Authority

Ideology: liberal democracy, non-sectarianism. Emphasizes the importance of a transition period following a theoretical rebel victory over the government, aiming to preserve the government’s key functions and prevent societal collapse.

National Bloc in Syria

Ideology: liberal democracy, secularism. Emphasis on equality and unity.

Call of the Syrian Homeland

Ideology: liberal democracy. Emphasis on opposition unity across ideological divides.

The Syrian Nation

Ideology: secularism. Kind of like a pro-opposition version of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party – emphasis on Syrian identity over all other religious or ethnic identities; very critical of Arab nationalism. Wants to reincorporate not only the Golan Heights (a common view among Syrians on all sides) but also the Hatay province disputed with Turkey, provided the local population assents. Distrusts Turkey.

Syrian Revolution Coordinating Calvary

Ideology: Christian interests, Christian-Islamic unity, secularism.

Network of Christians in Syria to Support the Syrian Revolution

Ideology: Christian interests, especially those of Assyrians/Syriacs. Opposes federalism and is critical of the PYD.

Syrian Christians for Peace

Ideology: Christian interests, non-sectarianism, humanitarianism. Based in the United States. Opposes federalism and is critical of the PYD.

Syrian Feminist Lobby

Ideology: feminism/women’s rights, liberal democracy. Note: the organization’s Facebook page appears more active than its website.

Syrian Women’s Network

Ideology: feminism/women’s rights, liberal democracy.

Syrian Leftist Coalition

Ideology: Marxism, secularism, women’s rights, minority rights. Opposes Arab nationalism.

Syrian Communist Party

Ideology: secularism, Leninism, Stalinism? Presumably a split from one or both of the two “official” Syrian Communist Parties, SCP-Bakdash and SCP-Unified (both are pro-government).

Revolutionary Left Current in Syria

Ideology: secularism, leftism (mainly Trotskyism and anarchism). Maintains links with the Fourth International, an international Trotskyist organization. It established a small armed wing called the People’s Liberation Faction in 2014, which dissolved later that year due to harassment by Islamist and jihadist groups, especially al-Nusra. It has been critical of the PYD but is not opposed to the SDF and has even worked with pro-SDF parties, such as the Syrian National Democratic Alliance.

National Alliance for the Forces of the Syrian Revolution

Ideology: liberal democracy. A broad group of political parties, societies, and NGOs. Opposes the SDF. Although some of the founding signatory groups stress religious pluralism, the NAFSR’s Facebook page exhibits some anti-Shia and anti-Alawite sentiment, as do some of the groups listed as signatories. Some of the organizations represented at the 2014 founding include:

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, centrism. Critical 0f Saudi Arabia; opposes Wahhabism as “takfiri” and sectarian. Supports Turkey and condemns opposition activists like Haytham Manna for working with the SDF.

Ideology: liberal democracy, ethnic/religious pluralism.

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Trains judges. Seems to recognize the National Coalition.

Ideology: conservatism, moderate Sunni Islamism, Syrian Turkmen interests? Emulates Erdogan‘s Justice and Development Party; strongly supportive of Turkey.

Ideology: conservatism, moderate Sunni Islamism, Syrian Turkmen interests. Appears to be newer and more active than the above party of the same name; unknown if the two are linked. Proclaims to be “tolerant” and “respectful” of all people, but opposes Alawites and calls them “Nusayris“.

Ideology: unknown. Opposes the SDF.

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, anti-Shia sentiment? Opposes the SDF. Note: the party’s Facebook page appears more active than their website.

Appeal for Syria

Ideology: mixed. Launched in late 2015 in preparation for international negotiations. Critical of the National Coalition; wants to reorganize and relaunch it in order to better represent the Syrian people and the revolution’s ideals. Signatories include a number of individuals and groups in Syria and abroad, such as:

Ideology: liberal democracy.

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Arab nationalism? Particularly critical of external intervention in the revolution and subsequent war.

Ideology: leftism, secularism. Especially critical of fundamentalist and jihadist rebels like Jaysh al-Islam and Jabhat al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. Supportive of humanitarian negotiations and ceasefire attempts. Opposes the SDF.

Ideology: liberal democracy, women’s rights, secularism, Arab nationalism. Centered around Dr. Imad Eddin Mahmoud Khatib, an academic and former member of the National Coalition. Appears to be related to (possibly a split from?) a pro-government party of the same name. Opposes the SDF’s federalist project, but also appears critical of Turkey. Heavily critical of the current state of the rebellion.

Ideology: liberal democracy, Arab nationalism. Appears to identify as Sunni, but sees the war in non-religious terms. Hostile to the National Coalition.

Syrian Commission for Justice and National Salvation

Ideology: liberal democracy. A gathering of opposition groups and figures with a plan for a post-Assad transition, particularly emphasizing law and order. Opposes the SDF. Among the signatories are several parties I have already listed above: the Solidarity Party, Center Party of Syria, the Damascus Declaration, the Syrian Communist Party, and the Justice and Development Party in Syria (one of them, I don’t know which). Note: the organization’s Facebook page appears to be more active than its website.

Leftist Groups on the Syrian Civil War


Update August 2020: This article was originally published in 2016. New updates include: 13 new organizations, changes to party stances, and additional sources listed. Some of the parties I originally listed have disappeared or dissolved; I’m still listing them, but have noted their defunct status. Some of the changes can be credited to people who took the time to comment on the article.

You’ll note that for some groups I’ve listed sources published throughout the war, while other groups have sources only from the early years. In the latter case, I have determined that the party in question has not changed its original stance significantly. Please also note that due to the prominent role of the United States in the creation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), many leftist groups who support the YPG are reluctant to mention the SDF. This is why in the “Stance on Syria” sections I primarily refer to the YPG rather than the broader SDF.

As always, feedback and corrections are welcome.

This is a survey of various left-wing and far left groups around the world regarding their stances on the Syrian civil war. I have searched the websites of just over 60 parties, networks, and international tendencies to the left of democratic socialism for any articles, blurbs, statements, etc. regarding Syria since 2011. You’ll notice that I tend to focus on American leftist groups, with which I have the most familiarity. Also note that some of the international organizations overlap with each other.

I have found that leftists have incredibly diverse attitudes toward Syria, even within ideological tendencies. All the groups profiled below support secularism and socialism (or, in the case of some anarchists, socialist-like systems) and oppose intervention by Western powers, but their attitudes towards the Assad regime, the Kurdish PYD/YPG-led Rojava, the vast and multi-colored opposition, and the so-called Islamic State vary greatly.

The organizations are grouped by ideology. A couple of notes regarding ideological nuances:

  • I use “Leninists” to refer to communists who are pro-Lenin but neither pro-Stalin nor pro-Trotsky. “Leninists” usually call themselves Marxist-Leninists, but that same label is also used by those who support Stalin (“anti-revisionists”), so I find use of the term “Marxist-Leninist” problematic.
  • “Stalinists” seldomly use this term to describe themselves; as said above, they prefer “Marxist-Leninist”. Nevertheless, I call them “Stalinists” to distinguish them from Maoists, who branched off into their own ideology, and Hoxhaists, who support Stalinism as specifically applied under Albania’s communist leader Enver Hoxha.
  • Trotskyists are somewhat notorious for splitting and quarreling with each other over relatively small things. You’ll see that I’ve split the multitude of Trotskyist groups into three tendencies: “post-Pablo”, “anti-Pablo”, and “other”. This refers to the most prominent split in the Trotskyist movement: in 1953, the Fourth International (the original Trotskyist political international) split over the policies of its leader Michel Pablo. Many of the groups that split away, including the Socialist Workers Party in the US, eventually rejoined in 1963 after Pablo had become marginalized and expelled from the FI; the resulting “re-unified” Fourth International is sometimes known as the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, or USFI. I refer to Trotskyists who support this reconciliation as “post-Pablo”. Some of the dissidents continued to see the FI as “Pabloite”; I refer to these as “anti-Pablo” (often they will refer to themselves as “orthodox Trotskyists”). Although there is very little ideological substance to the current divide between post-Pablo and anti-Pablo, relations between the two tendencies are often hostile, so I find it helpful to retain the distinction. The third major Trotskyist tendency is the Third Camp, which had split from the mainstream Trotskyist movement in 1940, having become dissatisfied with the latter’s allegedly too-sympathetic view of the USSR under Stalin. Third Camp Trotskyists, as well as mainstream Trotskyists who do not fall into either category regarding the Pablo split, are grouped under “other Trotskyists”.


V. I. Lenin expanded on the work of Marx and Engels, arguing that an elite vanguard party would be needed to lead the working class to overthrow the capitalist order and establish a socialist dictatorship of the proletariat in order to lead to the achievement of communism. The vanguard party was to be organized along democratic centralist lines: debate within the party was encouraged, but once a majority decision had been reached, party members were expected to comply. This highly centralized mode of organization was opposed by the Mensheviks, the rivals of Lenin’s Bolsheviks. Both the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks held that Russia, as a relatively underdeveloped country, would need to undergo a bourgeois democratic revolution before a socialist revolution could succeed. But whereas the Mensheviks were relatively supportive of the provisional government that came to power in the February Revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks called for the overthrow of this government and the immediate transition to socialist rule. In the October Revolution later that year, the Bolsheviks seized power and spent the next few years consolidating their rule during the chaotic Russian civil war.


Stance on Syria: supported initial protests; later supported government’s reforms in 2012. Now critically supportive of government. Supports negotiations. Sources:

http://www.cpusa.org/article/communist-party-says-hands-off-syria/ (2012)

http://www.cpusa.org/article/eleventh-hour-to-prevent-catastrophe-in-syria/ (2013)

Background information: founded in 1919. The “official” (e.g., pro-Moscow) American communist party during the Cold War. After the fall of the Soviet Union, it has promoted a softer, more liberal democratic-friendly version of communism while still maintaining its official Leninist doctrine and structure – similar to the Western European Eurocommunist movements of the 70s and 80s. Although this trend has made it the target of much criticism from traditional, hardline communists, it retains links with the “official” communist parties of the world as a participant in the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, which is listed further down. This more “democratic” trend was blunted somewhat when former chairman Sam Webb defected to the Democratic Party in 2016.

Stance on Syria: supports opposition and YPG, but opposes HTS. Says original protests were led by working class; attributes failure to lack of working class leadership, harsh government response, and capitalist/Islamist opportunism. Sources:

http://www.themilitant.com/2016/8008/800802.html (2016)

http://www.themilitant.com/2016/8019/801906.html (2016)

http://themilitant.com/2020/05/16/opponents-of-assad-in-syria-protest-islamist-rule-in-idlib/ (2016)

Background information: formed in 1938. Originally the major Trotskyist party in the US, it drifted away from Trotskyism in the 80s towards a more Cuba-friendly Leninist position. It leads an informal international grouping of pro-Cuban ex-Trotskyists called the Pathfinder tendency. It remains one of the largest far left parties in the US.

Stance on Syria: supports government. Supports “bourgeois nationalist” governments against imperialism. Calls Syria “sole remaining independent secular state in the Arab world”, praises its support of Hamas and Hezbollah. Calls Syria-Iran relationship “strategic progressive alliance.” Says US fomented rebellion to serve own interests, exaggerated harsh government response, exaggerated support for opposition. Sees Assad as accommodating, able to protect Kurds. “By all accounts, the major rebel forces are all sectarian reactionaries — ISIS and Al Nusra being the largest organizations.” “The Russian strategy to support and add to the military strength of the Syrian government and its armed forces is a realistic strategy that can defeat ISIS and the other jihadi groups.” Sources:

http://www.workers.org/2011/world/syria_0519/ (2011)

http://www.workers.org/2016/01/21/syria-and-isis-some-anti-imperialist-observations-and-analysis/#.V4f_UPkrLcs (2016)

http://www.socialism.com/drupal-6.8/statements/freedom-socialist-party-recommendations-june-7-2016-california-state-san-francisco-primar (2016)

https://www.workers.org/2019/10/44136/ (2019)

Background information: split from the SWP in 1958-1959 under the leadership of Sam Marcy. Marcy had supported the controversial 1956 Warsaw Pact invasion of Hungary and admired many aspects of Mao’s China. The WWP maintains a positive – though not completely uncritical – attitude towards all  Communist regimes, from the USSR under Stalin to the USSR under Khruschev, from China under Mao to China under Deng Xiaoping, to Vietnam, Cuba, and North Korea.  It had loose links with the now-defunct International Communist Seminar, which is listed further down.

Stance on Syria: supports government. Acknowledges mass scale of 2011 protests, but implies there were just as many calls for sectarian Islamism as for democratic reforms. Supports government’s reforms in 2011-2012. Very supportive of Russia’s military intervention and efforts at negotiation. Says US intervention is the main source of chaos. “The dominant ideology of the various rebel groups in Syria is that of reactionary sectarian Islamists, the two main poles being the Islamic State and the Nusra Front.” “Under the current balance of forces in Syria, it is obvious that the only real alternative to ISIS and Al Qaeda is the Syrian state in Damascus.” “If the U.S. priority were to fight ISIS, it would throw its support behind Syria’s government, by far the most significant force fighting against ISIS on the ground.” Sources:

https://www.liberationnews.org/u-s-role-in-syrias-civil-war/ (2015)

https://www.liberationnews.org/u-s-special-ops-forces-to-fight-against-isis-or-damascus/ (2016)

https://www.liberationnews.org/russia-enters-syria-war-exposing-hypocrisy-contradictions-u-s-policy/ (2015)

Background Information: split from the Workers World Party in 2004 for reasons that are still unclear. Like the WWP, it is largely supportive of the various communist regimes of past and present. Along with the Socialist Workers Party, it is one of the more visible far left groups in the US, regularly running candidates for election. Like the WWP, it also maintained loose links with the International Communist Seminar.

Stance on Syria:  – supported initial protests, but now only supports YPG. Says Assad is brutal, but that opposition is fractious and dominated by sectarian Islamists. Supportive of PKK/PYD ideology, though somewhat critical of practices. Sources:

http://freedomroad.org/2013/09/the-war-drive-against-syria-has-been-stalled-lets-stop-it-cold/ (2013)

http://freedomroad.org/2014/05/the-revolution-in-rojava/ (2014)

Background information: Formed in 1999 as a split in the Freedom Road Socialist Organization (see Maoist section). Both factions continued using the FRSO name until 2019, when this faction adopted its current name. It has largely abandoned the Maoism of the original FRSO, arguing that a more open-minded Leninist approach (e.g., less focused on fighting revisionism) was necessary. Black Liberation and self-determination for other “oppressed nations” continue to play a prominent role in both factions’ platforms.

Stance on Syria: supports government. Says “US-vetted militia” began operating in 2011. “U.S.-sponsored ‘dissident organizations’ devoted to overthrowing the constitutional government of Syria have been launching attacks on Syrian security forces since March [2011].” “The Syrian foreign ministry continues to demand that all States guilty of supporting terrorism inside of Syria withdraw their support immediately. So too, the people of Syria continue to organize demonstrations and other mass actions to demand the liberation of the areas occupied by the insurgents.” “In Syria the struggle against foreign aggression and interference is uniting the overwhelming majority of people.” Opposed Geneva talks as “imposed” on Syria by US. Sources:

http://www.workersparty.org/pentagon-refuses-to-cut-and-run-from-syria_11-2-15.htm (2015)

http://www.workersparty.org/geneva-talks-an-attack-on-edifice-of-intl-law_1-9-14.htm (2014)

http://www.workersparty.org/syria-u.s.-imperialism-hands-off_12-19-11.htm (2011)

Background information: an ex-Hoxhaist party formed in 1992. Opposition to alleged American imperialism and defense of alleged US targets (e.g., North Korea) are its most prominent themes.

Stance on Syria: vaguely supports government. “Regarding Syria it should be clear by now that ‘ISIS’ has been funded and set in motion by the U.S., and that U.S., British and French special forces have been on the ground in Syria from the beginning.” Sources:

http://rallycomrades.lrna.org/2014/11/implications-war-syria-iraq/ (2014)

Background information: formed in 1993, though its roots lie in a 1958 anti-revisionist split from the Communist Party USA. Its predecessor organizations were Maoist and Black Liberationist.

Stance on Syria: supports opposition. Stresses positive role of democratic revolutions even if they are not socialist. “One excuse given for non-support [of the rebels] is that the Syrian fighters accepted weapons from the US and were somehow pawns of the CIA. But an oppressed people has a right to get its weapons from anywhere.” Opposes idea of transitional government, calls for full overthrow of Assad. Says Russia and Assad don’t distinguish between legitimate opposition and jihadis. Accuses Gulf monarchies of funding fundamentalism at expense of democracy advocates; accuses US of ignoring Assad and only focusing on IS. Criticizes PYD for authoritarianism and seeking accommodation with Assad. Sources:

http://strugglemagazine.net/Str27-1&2.htm (2011)

http://www.communistvoice.org/CV50.pdf (2016)

http://www.communistvoice.org/DWV-160705.html (2016)

http://www.communistvoice.org/DWV-141028.html (2014)

http://www.communistvoice.org/DSWV-191226.html (2019)

Background information: founded in 1995 from remnants of the Marxist-Leninist Party, USA, which was Hoxhaist. CVO describes itself as “anti-revisionist”, but unlike the actual anti-revisionist movement, it considers Stalinism and its ideological descendants – Maoism and Hoxhaism – as revisionist as well as Trotskyism. Instead, it advocates a “return to Lenin”.

Stance on Syria: supports government. Supports international negotiations. Sources:

http://www.usmlo.org/arch2013/2013-10/VR131008.htm#05 (2013)

http://www.usmlo.org/arch2012/2012-06/VR120626.htm#02 (2012)

http://www.usmlo.org/arch2012/2012-02/VR120210.htm#04 (2012)

Background information: split in 1981 from the Marxist-Leninist Party, USA (see Communist Voice Organization above) after the MLP-USA broke with the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist). The USMLO remains closely linked to the CPC-ML, which abandoned Hoxhaism in the late 80s in favor of a more Cuba- and North Korea-friendly stance.

Hoxhaists and Stalinists

Joseph Stalin took over from Lenin during a long intra-party struggle in the 1920s and put forth the idea of socialism in one country, the idea that socialism could be achieved in the USSR despite the failure of other communist revolutions around the world. He was most infamous, of course, for his extremely brutal suppression of dissent and extensive cult of personality. When Nikita Khrushchev secured control of the USSR in 1953 following Stalin’s death, he repudiated what he saw as Stalin’s excesses, leading those who supported Stalin to deem Khruschev “revisionist”. Mao’s China and Hoxha’s Albania led the subsequent anti-revisionist movement but split during the 70s over Mao’s alleged deviations from Stalin’s policies and the increasing détente between China and the US. Hoxhaist ideology is hard to distinguish from to Stalinism; as said above, the difference is that Hoxhaists support Stalinism as specifically applied in Hoxha’s Albania.

Stance on Syria: supported initial opposition, but now only supports YPG. “The popular movement of protest has been transformed into a destructive civil war. The bloodthirsty repression is striking the people, and since the beginning, the Assad regime has rejected any democratic reform that would satisfy the aspirations of the Syrian people. This situation is the consequence of the foreign reactionary, imperialist and Zionist intervention, through Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia…” “…there is a battle and polarization between the imperialists and reactionaries in the region on one hand, and the power and actions of the Kurds on the other hand. The Kurdish nation… has progressed towards cementing its identity, to place itself as the alternative of self-determination despite the pressure of the imperialists and their reactionary allies.” Sources:

https://theredphoenixapl.org/2012/12/18/international-conference-of-marxist-leninist-parties-and-organizations-resolution-on-the-situation-in-syria/ (2012)

http://cipoml.net/en/?p=42 (2014)

Background information: a Hoxhaist international founded in 1994; it is referred to with the name of its publication in parentheses to distinguish it from the Maoist international of the exact same name which publishes International Newsletter (see below). Leading parties include the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador, the Workers’ Party in Tunisia, and the Labour Party/Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey. The American Party of Labor is the observer US section of the ICMLPO-US.

Stance on Syria supports government. “There is no civil war in Syria, inherently a stable, secular society and republic, not divided ethnically or religiously. The war there is one of indirect aggression on the part of the US since 2011 through brutally barbaric foreign mercenary terrorists, not Syrian rebels, from over 80 countries, ostensibly seeking to impose a theocratic autocracy but serving as a purely invented rationale for intended US-Saudi-Turkish partition of Syria.” Sources:

https://partyofcommunistsusa.org/statement-of-the-pcusa-peace-and-solidarity-commission-on-global-war-april-21st-2017/ (2017)

Background information: split from the Communist Party USA in 2016, though it had existed as an internal faction since 2011. It believes that CPUSA lost its revolutionary character after World War II, when it allegedly began to advocate for the peaceful coexistence of capitalism and socialism. Devoted to the defense of the USSR under Stalin, though like the Workers World Party and the Party for Socialism and Liberation, it defends all other communist states as well. Although it has informal links with other hardline and anti-revisionist communist parties around the world, it has failed to replace CPUSA as the American section of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties.

Stance on Syria: neutral. Rejects all sides as imperialist and/or reactionary. “[The Syrian Communist Party] offer[s] little criticism of Assad’s anti-worker, neoliberal economic policies, or of the corruption and cruelty of a regime that has impoverished millions of Syrians.” “None of the leading rebel forces represent the working class in Syria.” Sources:

http://www.plp.org/challenge/2016/3/25/syria-key-to-russian-imperialism.html (2016)

http://www.plp.org/challenge/2014/1/31/syria-centuries-of-repression-division-and- exploitation.html (2014)

http://www.plp.org/challenge/2013/7/18/syria-lose-lose-lose-for-workers.html (2013)

Background information: founded as a Maoist split from CPUSA in 1962. It controlled nearly half of the well-known Vietnam-era Students for a Democratic Society activist group. It moved away from Maoism in 1971 and could now be considered Stalinist, though as noted in my introduction, they would dispute this label. Not affiliated with any international tendencies, but they claim to have several supporters across the globe.

Stance on Syria: originally supported YPG; now neutral, though focused on opposition the rebels. Says US used threat of IS to continue intervention in Iraq and launch one in Syria. “While, in our view, Assad is a reactionary misleader of the Syrian working class and masses, his political future should be in their hands.” “What’s happening in Syria today has been going on for over five years and is not a civil war. The conflict began as a US funded and supported effort to depose President Bashar Assad and install a puppet government in Damascus friendly to US interests. I am sure there are some legitimate forces in Syria who oppose the government of Assad, but the US does not care about democracy: after all Assad was elected by his people.” Sources:

http://www.cindysheehanssoapbox.com/8/post/2015/03/support-the-kurdish-women-in-fighters-against-isis-and-oppose-imperialist-war.html (2015) (note: dead link; the only version available on Internet Archive quickly redirect to spam sites)



Background information: split from the CPUSA in 1961. Formerly known as the Ray O. Light Group. A very small group with little online presence. Traditionally it has been considered Maoist, and it participates in the International Conference of Marxist-Leninist Parties and Organizations (International Newsletter), a Maoist international, but it is also critical of many key aspects of Maoism, particularly the Cultural Revolution. It is also a member of the International Coordination of Revolutionary Parties and Organizations and was a regular attendant of the now-defunct International Communist Seminar (the ICMLPO-IN, ICOR, and ICS are all listed further down).


Mao Zedong further developed Stalinism. Whereas most Marxists up to that point focused on the industrial proletariat, Mao focused on the peasantry. He emphasized rural guerrilla warfare and anti-imperialism in “Third World” countries. He also encouraged a “Cultural Revolution” to rid China of treacherous “capitalist-roaders”, “feudal” cultural practices, and other vestiges of capitalism and imperialism. This tumultuous period of Chinese history lasted from 1966 to 1976. Shortly afterward, Deng Xiaoping secured power and instituted a number of reforms, including reducing much of the cult of personality around the now-dead Mao, allowing (limited) criticism of the party, and opening the country to market reforms and privatization. Deng called his reforms “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The ideology of the Chinese Communist Party today is still officially referred to as “Mao Zedong Thought”, but “Maoists” today view the Chinese regime as revisionist.

Stance on Syria: supports YPG. Says 2011 protests began legitimately, but were hijacked. Criticizes both Syrian Communist Parties for supporting the “oppressive” Assad government; criticizes the German Communist Party for defending Russia’s role in the 2018 Turkish-led invasion of Afrin. Sources:

https://www.mlpd.de/2013/kw44/rojava-2013-brennpunkt-im-kampf-fuer-freiheit-und-demokratie (2013)

https://www.mlpd.de/2016/kw09/die-tuerkei-muss-ihre-vorwuerfe-gegen-rojava-zuruecknehmen (2016)

https://www.mlpd.de/2018/kw06/dkp-rechtfertigt-russisches-vorgehen-in-efrin (2018)

Background information: a Maoist international formed in 1989; it is referred to with the name of its publication to distinguish it from the Hoxhaist international of the exact same name which publishes Unity & Struggle. Its last conference was in 2011; it seems to have been absorbed into the International Coordination of Revolutionary Parties and Organizations (see further down), although the ICMLPO-IN is still mentioned occasionally in joint statements with the ICOR. Leading section is the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany. American section is the Revolutionary Organization of Labor (see above).

Stance on Syria: neutral. Says US is chiefly responsible for Syrian bloodbath. “It is an unfortunate fact that among the forces ‘in the field’ in Syria, none of them represent the interests of the people—including the regime and its allies and the motley collection of jihadists and more pro-U.S. forces.” Criticizes PYD/YPG for being tool of the US. Sources:

http://revcom.us/a/265/background-US-Syria-en.html (2012)

http://revcom.us/a/261/awtwns_syria-021312-en.html (2012)

http://revcom.us/a/316/more-lies-for-war-from-the-liar-in-chief-en.html (2013)

http://www.revcom.us/a/444/syria-needs-a-real-revolution-en.html (2016)

https://revcom.us/a/617/cpi-ml-the-military-offensive-of-turkeys-fascistic-army-en.html (2019)

Background information: formed in 1975. The main Maoist party in the US. Led by the charismatic Bob Avakian, it controlled the other half of the Students for a Democratic Society and battled bitterly with the Progressive Labor Party for control. It was a member of the now-defunct Revolutionary Internationalist Movement. The RIM advanced a specific type of Maoism called Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, which placed special emphasis on guerrilla-style “protracted people’s wars” and included such infamous militant groups as the Communist Party of the Philippines, the Communist Party of Peru (“Shining Path”), and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).

Stance on Syria: supports government. “Syria plays a positive role in the Middle East. Its people and government are supportive of the struggle to free Palestine and assist the patriotic forces in Lebanon. Syria opposes Zionism and imperialism. The point here is not that the government of Syria is perfect or without fault. The point is this: It would be a sad setback for the collective efforts of the Arab peoples to achieve national liberation if Syria was pushed into a civil war, or delivered into the hands of those who have sold their soul’s to Washington and the West.” “One can debate the nature of the demonstrations against the Syrian government several years ago and what led up to them, but today, right now, the opposition is bought, paid for, and acting on behalf of the U.S. and the most reactionary of Arab regimes.” Sources:

http://frso.org/about/statements/2011/syria2011.htm (2011)

http://frso.org/about/statements/2013/frso_iso_syria.htm (2013)

http://www.fightbacknews.org/2018/12/31/trump-withdrawal-troops-syria-and-strange-world-us-liberalism (2018)

Background information: formed in 1985 as a merger of several American Maoist groups. Black Liberation played a prominent role in its platform. The FRSO split in 1999 over a proposed change of direction (see Liberation Road in the Leninists section). This faction continued the original FRSO’s anti-revisionist, Maoist line. It was affiliated to now-defunct International Communist Seminar (see further down) and is arguably the most pro-North Korean of any US party.


Leon Trotsky was Stalin’s chief rival to succeed Lenin. Trotsky criticized Stalin’s bureaucracy as well as the concept of socialism in one country, instead arguing that the only way for socialism to succeed in Russia was if other revolutions occurred around the world at the same time; otherwise, the world’s capitalist forces would overwhelm the isolated Russia and reverse the revolution. Trotsky defined Stalin’s USSR as a “degenerated workers’ state” – that is, a state which had originally been truly socialist but had degraded over time through the lack of world revolution and the poisonous Stalinist bureaucracy, though it was still better than a capitalist state. Workers owned the means of production, but not political power. Trotsky was assassinated in 1940, and when Soviet satellite states began popping up in Eastern Europe following World War II, his followers called these satellites “deformed workers’ states”: similar to degenerated workers’ state, but unlike the USSR, they had been stunted from birth. See the introduction for details on the major splits within Trotskyism.


Stance on Syria: supports opposition, critically supports YPG. Linked to the Revolutionary Left Current, a Syrian multi-tendency group which operated a tiny militia called the People’s Liberation Faction from 2014-2015. Asserts that opposition is still democratic. Criticizes indiscriminate shelling by rebels. “Despite the various truces the Assad regime and its allies have indeed continued military offensives in various parts of the country. This is actually the main reason why the ‘peace’ negotiations are stalled.” Critical of PKK and PYD. “The survival of Rojava against attacks from Islamic State is undoubtedly a victory for the left. The Kurdish movement deserves concrete solidarity in its struggle for self-determination, the more so because in Rojava people are trying to construct a progressive alternative.” “However, it was the uprising against the Syrian state that gave the Kurdish movement the chance to form Rojava as the Assad regime decided to focus on fighting the rebels.” “While this achievement was unimaginable without the Syrian revolution, the PYD never extended solidarity to the revolution, preferring to consolidate their own one-party state.” Sources:

http://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article4449 (2016)

http://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article4492 (2016)

http://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article6375 (2020)

Background information: the result of the reunification of the original Fourth International in 1963. Calls itself simply the Fourth International, but it’s often called the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (referring to the name of the leadership council from 1963-2003) to distinguish it from other claimants of the “Fourth International” name.

Stance on Syria: originally supported uprising, but now critically supports government. Said in 2012 that “the economic exploitation of Syria’s workers and peasants by its ruling class, a class subservient to global capital, and the horrific oppression and murderous policies of the Syrian regime to enforce that exploitation, mean that we stand with the Syrian masses in their uprising against the regime.” Later says US took advantage of Assad’s brutality to try to set up new regime. “… in the absence of anything resembling a revolutionary leadership, the democratic and popular thrust of the anti-Assad mobilizations rapidly dissipated.” Alleges US and Gulf monarchies support IS. Critical of Assad, but says “the removal of Assad’s oppressive capitalist Syrian regime is the sole responsibility of the Syrian people, not U.S. imperialism and its reactionary allied forces.” “Syria’s right to self-determination necessarily includes the right of the Syrian government to seek and accept the support of the militia fighters that are today defending Syria against imperialist intervention in several of its manifestations.” Socialist Action sees Russia as a counterbalance to US imperialism; although in 2018 it adopted the position that Russia too is imperialist, it still maintains a positive view of the Russian intervention. It criticizes the YPG for accepting US aid. Sources:

http://socialistaction.blogspot.com/2012/02/us-hands-off-syria-victory-to-uprising_25.html (2012)

https://socialistaction.org/2016/01/18/u-s-imperialisms-syria-policy/ (2016)

https://socialistaction.org/2018/02/17/u-s-seeks-syria-partition/ (2018)

https://socialistaction.org/2019/01/07/trumps-syria-exit-provokes-washington-panic/ (2019)

https://socialistaction.org/2019/10/22/anatomy-of-the-recent-split-in-socialist-action/ (2019)

https://socialistaction.org/2020/06/16/deadly-new-sanctions-on-syria/ (2020)

Background information: split from the Socialist Workers Party in 1983 as the SWP abandoned Trotskyism. One of the four major US Trotskyist parties today. It is affiliated with the Tendency for a Revolutionary International, a minority faction within the USFI.

Stance on Syria: critically supports opposition; says radical Islamists have dominated armed rebellion since late 2013, but that the original grassroots opposition continues. Acknowledges reforms made by the PYD/YPG but criticizes them for failing to fight Assad and for allying themselves with capitalist powers. Sources:

https://socialistresurgence.org/2020/03/19/conflict-in-syria-moves-into-its-tenth-year/ (2020)

https://socialistresurgence.org/2019/10/25/turkey-invades-kurdish-lands-in-syria-after-trump-gives-the-go-ahead/ (2019)

Background information: split from Socialist Action in 2019, mainly over disputes regarding the Syrian civil war and the nature of the Chinese and Russian governments. Both groups are part of the Tendency for a Revolutionary International, despite their differences. Socialist Resurgence is also part of the Revolutionary Socialist Network (see International Socialist Organization further down).

Stance on Syria: supported opposition. Defended opposition as revolutionary, “mass popular uprising”. “… the main aim of direct U.S. intervention in Syria is to prevent the grassroots popular movement from coming to power.” Sources:

http://www.laborstandard.org/syria_in_eye_of_storm.html (2013)

http://www.laborstandard.org/syria_index.html (2013)

Background information: founded in 1988 as the publication of the Fourth Internationalist Tendency, which had been expelled from the Socialist Workers Party in 1983 during that party’s turn away from Trotskyism and towards “Castroism”. The FIT dissolved in the mid-1990s and became part of the “Fourth International Caucus” within Solidarity (see further down). The FIC was the official US section of the USFI, and Labor Standard served as its unofficial newspaper. Labor Standard disappeared sometime around 2018-2019; it is unclear whether the FIC still exists.

Stance on Syria: originally sympathetic to the opposition, but now critically supports YPG. “If initially there was a popular uprising, by the end of 2011 it had transformed itself into an armed conflict along sectarian lines.” “The role of Marxists is to support the creation of independent organizations of the working class and poor, their self-control and defence, fight against Assad’s brutal dictatorship, but without having any illusions in the bourgeois and imperialist military or in the jihadists, who have nothing to offer to the working class, except more death and misery.” Critical of PKK/PYD ideology and of PYD’s ambiguous relationship with regime and support from the West – says they’re trying to balance between two brutal capitalist powers. Highly critical of Russian intervention and motivations behind it. Sources:

http://www.socialistworld.net/doc/7384 (2015)

http://www.socialistworld.net/doc/7295 (2015)

http://www.socialistworld.net/doc/7316 (2015)

http://www.socialistworld.net/doc/6579 (2013)

https://www.socialistworld.net/2019/10/15/assad-regime-and-sdf-broker-deal-as-turkish-army-continues-invasion-of-northern-syria/ (2019)

Background information: another major Trotskyist international. Strong emphasis on the role of trade unions. Historically, it pursued the tactic of entryism (joining a larger party in the hopes of swaying that party to your position), but that was abandoned in 1991-1992. The CWI experienced a major split in 2019, which saw a majority of its affiliates leave to form the International Socialist Alternative (see below). Leading party is the Socialist Party in England and Wales. American section is the Independent Socialist Group.

Stance on Syria: essentially shares the perspective of the CWI (see above). Critically supports YPG; praises its progressive reforms and defends it against jihadis and Turkish intervention, but criticzes its alliance with the US. Also critical of the YPG-led Raqqa offensive, saying it exacerbated ethnic tensions. Sympathetic to the opposition at the beginning of the war. Sources:

https://internationalsocialist.net/en/2019/10/rojava-2 (2019)

https://internationalsocialist.net/en/2019/10/rojava (2019)

Background information: split from the Committee for a Workers’ International in 2019. A year prior, a dispute arose over several issues, mainly tacitcal/strategic. In general, a minority of members, gathered in the CWI’s International Secretariat, felt that certain CWI sections had been too bold in engaging with the wider labor and social justice movements and feared that the organization would lose its distinct identity and platform. A majority, gathered in the larger International Executive Committee, disagreed. Over the next few months the IEC accused the IS of bureaucratically enforcing its opinion and of backing out of a scheduled reconciliation conference. The split formalized in mid-2019, and the majority faction adopted its current name in February 2020. Leading sections include the Socialist Party in Ireland and the US-based Socialist Alternative, one of the four major American Trotskyist parties.

Stance on Syria: supports YPG/SDF. Sees original 2011 protests as legitimate and characterizes Assad a brutal capitalist dictator with backing from imperialist Russia. Alleges Assad intentionally radicalized the opposition to legitimize himself. On the other hand, the IRL characterizes the armed rebellion as jihadist and blames the West, the Gulf, and Turkey for most of the carnage. Says YPG are only effective anti-IS force and praises their progressive accomplishments. Very critical of internationally-sponsored peace negotiations. Sources:

https://www.izquierdarevolucionaria.net/index.php/internacional/otros-oriente-medio/9973-proceso-de-paz-en-siria (2016)

https://www.izquierdarevolucionaria.net/index.php/internacional/otros-oriente-medio/10166-guerra-en-siria-la-hipocresia-del-proceso-de-paz (2018)

https://www.izquierdarevolucionaria.net/index.php/internacional/otros-oriente-medio/11062-trump-bombardea-siria-de-nuevo-no-a-la-intervencion-imperialista (2018)

https://www.izquierdarevolucionaria.net/index.php/internacional/otros-oriente-medio/526-la-guerra-en-siria-y-la-intervencion-imperialista (2018)

https://www.izquierdarevolucionaria.net/index.php/internacional/otros-oriente-medio/11821-turquia-ataca-el-norte-de-siria-no-a-la-agresion-imperialista-contra-el-pueblo-kudo (2019)

Background information: split from the CWI in 2019, shortly before the larger split that produced the International Socialist Alternative. Most of the Spanish CWI section and a few other European and Latin American parties took the minority position, but they soon developed differences with the minority leadership in Britain (mainly over the consequences of the collapse of the pro-Soviet states in Eastern Europe and the characterization of the situation in Venezuela). The Spanish section and its allies left the CWI and eventually formed the IRL. Leading section is Revolutionary Left (Spain). No American section.

Stance on Syria: supported initial protests, but now critically supports YPG. Attributes failure of protests to regime violence and weak, unorganized state of working class. Praises PYD/YPG’s accomplishments and calls for their defense against Turkey and rebels, but criticizes them for accomodating bourgeoisie powers, including Iran in addition to the US. Says a deal between the SDF and the Assad government would be tantamount to surrendering the Kurds’ freedom. Sources:

http://socialistappeal.org/news-analysis/international/1191-the-syrian-tragedy-and-the-imperialist-farce.html (2013)

http://socialistappeal.org/news-analysis/international/1683-syria-and-the-hypocrisy-of-western-imperialism.html (2015)

http://socialistappeal.org/128-latest-news-analysis/international/1085-the-weakness-of-the-syrian-revolution.html (2012)

http://www.marxist.com/syria-which-stage-is-the-war-at.htm (2016)

https://www.marxist.com/turkey-attacks-northern-syria.htm (2019)

https://www.marxist.com/down-with-the-turkish-war-of-aggression-against-rojava.htm (2019)

Background information: split from the CWI in 1992 after upholding the tactic of entryism. Formerly known as the Committee for a Marxist International. Leading party is Socialist Appeal in the UK. US section is Socialist Revolution.

Stance on Syria: supported opposition in the first years of the war, but now neutral. Still very critical of the government. Mostly reposts other parties’ articles on Syria. Sources:

http://www.socialistviewpoint.org/marapr_12/marapr_12_32.html (2012)

http://www.socialistviewpoint.org/marapr_12/marapr_12_31.html (2011)

http://www.socialistviewpoint.org/sepoct_13/sepoct_13_08.html (2013)

http://www.socialistviewpoint.org/sepoct_12/sepoct_12_03.html (2012)

http://www.socialistviewpoint.org/mayjun_17/mayjun_17_06.html (2017)

http://www.socialistviewpoint.org/mayjun_18/mayjun_18_25.html (2018)

Background information: split from Socialist Action in 1999-2001. Like the Socialist Workers Party, it views Cuba very positively. Also known as Socialist Viewpoint after their magazine.

Stance on Syria: originally critically supportive of opposition and YPG; in recent years, now solely supportive of YPG. Critical of political solutions that would retain Assad. Opposes government offensive on Idlib. Sources:

http://www.socialism.com/drupal-6.8/articles/eleven-foreign-powers-bombing-syria-why-and-who%E2%80%99s-who (2016)

http://www.socialism.com/drupal-6.8/node/2557 (2013)

http://www.socialism.com/drupal-6.8/articles/story-behind-syrias-arab-spring-imperialist-aid-can-only-undermine-goals-revolution (2013)

http://www.socialism.com/drupal-6.8/statements/freedom-socialist-party-recommendations-june-7-2016-california-state-san-francisco-primar (2016)

https://socialism.com/fs-article/in-kurdish-rojava-syrias-imperiled-freedom-fighters/ (2019)

https://socialism.com/fs-article/imperialist-rivalry-fans-flames-of-war-and-genocide-in-syria/ (2019)

Background information: a small international established sometime in the early 2010s by the US-based Freedom Socialist Party. The FSP split from the Socialist Workers Party in 1964 over a number of differences. It places a special emphasis on radical feminism and is one of the four major Trotskyist parties in the US.

Stance on Syria: supports opposition, critically supports YPG. Opposed to internationally-sponsored negotiations. Notes PYD/YPG’s accomplishments but calls it petit-bourgeois. “There is no way out to this impasse the Arabic [sic] country is in, as long as Assad remains in power. And the only way to defeat him is supporting the groups affiliated to the Free Syrian Army, who hold a democratic, independent position; the ones who have not sold, directly or indirectly, to the different forces acting in the conflict, followed by the interest on how to increase their own influence around the region. We must provide weapons to the rebels fighting against the regime and against the self-denominated Islamist groups, with no previous conditioning.” Sources:

http://www.socialistworld.net/doc/6579 (2013)

http://litci.org/en/category/world/middle-east/syria/ (various articles)

http://litci.org/en/first-part-of-the-interview-to-joseph-daer-member-of-revolutionary-left-tendency-of-syria/ (2016)

https://litci.org/en/rojava-syrian-kurdistan-part-1-an-atypical-bourgeois-state/ (2017)

https://litci.org/en/soleimani-in-syria-a-legacy-of-death-and-devastation/ (2020)

Background information: split from the United Secretariat of the Fourth International in 1980-1982 under the leadership of Nahuel Moreno; it condemned what it saw as the USFI’s uncritical support of the Sandinista administration in Nicaragua. Leading party is the United Socialist Workers Party in Brazil. American section is Workers’ Voice.

Stance on Syria: critically supports opposition. Called the short-lived September 2016 Russian-American-sponsored truce a sham. Condemned Trump’s 2018 missile strikes. Criticizes opposition for alienating Kurds, but criticizes PYD/YPG for refusing to attack Assad and asking him for help Sources:

http://www.uit-ci.org/index.php/noticias-y-documentos/revolucion-arabe/1031–5-anos-de-revolucion-en-siria (2016)

http://www.uit-ci.org/index.php/news-a-documents/1985-we-repudiate-the-imperialist-shelling-on-syria-no-to-trumps-killer-missiles (2018)

Background information: formed in 1995, partially as a split from the International Workers League – Fourth International. Leading party is the Socialist Left in Argentina. American section is Socialist Core.

Stance on Syria: supported initial protests, but now neutral. “… Assad’s regime is neither progressive nor anti-imperialist: it is a despotic dictatorship that has, for decades, been implementing neoliberal policies… The Syrian people rose up against these conditions. However, militarization stifled the popular uprising and gave rise to a civil war, in which imperialist countries and regional powers, like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the Gulf States, that support the Sunni militias, in order to further their reactionary interests, are intervening, through the different factions in struggle.” “The aim [of US support to the rebels] was to let both sides wear themselves out and then attempt a negotiated solution between Assad’s regime and the opposition, with support from Russia.” Sources:

http://www.ft-ci.org/No-to-imperialist-intervention-in-Syria?lang=en (2013)

http://www.ft-ci.org/Down-with-Assad-s-brutal-repression-No-to-imperialist-interference-and-intervention?lang=en (2012)

Background information: split from the International Workers League – Fourth International in 1993. Formerly known as the Trotskyist Fraction – International Strategy. Leading party is the Socialist Workers’ Party in Argentina. American section is Left Voice.


Stance on Syria: unclear stance on government, but opposes rebels. Characterizes war as “CIA-backed regime change operation” in pursuit of US political-economic goals. “From the outset, the US proxy war for regime-change was launched with the aim of depriving Moscow and Tehran of their principal ally in the Arab world in preparation for direct confrontation with both countries.” Sources:

http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/19/lect-s19.html (2013)

http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/06/24/pers-j24.html (2016)

http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/03/28/syri-m28.html (2016)

http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/03/18/pers-m18.html (2016)

Background information: split from the original Fourth International in 1953 (see introduction). Leading party is the Socialist Equality Party in the US, one of the country’s major Trotskyist parties, which emerged from a 1964 split from the Socialist Workers Party after the SWP joined the re-unified FI.

Stance on Syria: critically supports government, regards Russian intervention as “progressive”. Calls PYD/YPG “anarcho-Stalinists” and criticize them for authoritarianism, but offers them critical support for them in their struggle against IS and the rebels. “The liberation of Aleppo from the clutches of the reactionary opposition and the subsequent stream of victories of the Syrian Arab Army and its allies forced the US government to put its tail between its legs and temporarily accept the reality on the ground: the defeat of its proxy armies and, along with them, the defeat of an important part of its strategy on Syria and the Middle East.” “Morally Assad, Gadhafi and Saddam were no better than imperialism, although their crimes were but a tiny fraction of the crimes of imperialism. US-dominated global imperialism is still the main, central enemy of all humanity.” “Therefore, support for Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria necessarily means support for the rulers of these lands against imperialism when and in so far as they fight imperialism. It does contradict those who say you must make a political and uncritical defence of these rulers and their politics.” “Whereas the Assad regime, for all its brutal autocracy, incorporates Alawite Shia and Christian elements of the population, and has large scale support from secularised Sunnis in preference to the Al Nusra/Al Qaeda Western funded insurgents, as well as the remnants of Islamic State. Assad, and his Russian backers are therefore clearly the lesser evil, and worthy of defence in this civil war against western proxies as well as of course in the face of outright imperialist attack.” Sources:

https://socialistfight.com/2017/04/15/defend-syria-and-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-for-the-defeat-and-expulsion-of-imperialism-and-its-agents/ (2017)

https://socialistfight.com/2018/08/11/statement-on-war-with-syria/ (2018)

https://socialistfight.com/2018/04/14/defend-syria-and-russia-imperialism-out-of-the-middle-east/ (2018)

https://socialistfight.com/2015/12/02/rojova-us-imperialism-is-the-main-enemy-critical-support-for-the-kurdish-anarchostalinists/ (2015)

https://socialistfight.com/2018/01/28/defend-afrin-defend-the-kurdish-nations-right-to-self-determination-us-and-turkish-troops-out-of-syria/ (2018)

Background information: emerged from a complex serious of splits in the UK-based Workers Revolutionary Party of Gerry Healy and Cliff Slaughter, which had ealier split from the International Committee of the Fourth International. Originally known as the International Trotskyist Committee. Leading section is Socialist Fight in the UK. American section is the Socialist Workers League.

Stance on Syria: supports YPG. “We have supported the uprising of the poor and dispossessed of Syria and will side with the revolution against the Assad regime in the future as well. But the war that is being prepared now has nothing in common with either the progressive goals or the forces of that insurrection.” Sources:

http://www.eek.gr/index.php/englishtext/1858-statement-by-the-crfi-hands-off-syria-andt-it-s-people (2013)

Background information: a minor Trotskyist international formed in 2004. It holds many positions in common with the International Committee of the Fourth International, from which most of its members split, but it also places great emphasis on building bridges with other Trotskyist and even non-Trotskyist tendencies, to the point where it invited the United Communist Party (a small Stalinist party in Russia) to its 2018 conference. In recent years the CRFI has been wracked by infighting, particularly between its leading section, the Workers’ Party in Argentina, and the Workers Revolutionary Party in Greece. In 2019 the Workers Party itself experienced a bitter factional struggle, leaving the future of the CRFI in question. The American section was Refoundation and Revolution, a faction within the multi-tendency group Solidarity (listed further down), though R&R appears defunct.

Stance on Syria: unclear. Opposes opposition. Blames NATO and Gulf monarchies for war. Sources:

https://www.socialistorganizer.org/images/TheOrganizer/TheOrganizerApril2016.pdf (2016)

Background information: a Trotskyist international founded in 1993. Also known as the Organizing Committee for the Re-constitution of the Fourth International. The last in a series of internationals formed around the leadership of French Trotskyist Pierre Lambert. Leading party is the International Communist Current in France, which operates as part of the Independent Workers’ Party. American section is Socialist Organizer.

Stance on Syria: neutral. Views YPG as US puppet, IS as anti-imperialist. “The setting up of the SDF was prepared by a year of joint operations in which the YPG served as proxies for the U.S. military. During that time, as Kurdish forces overran ISIS-controlled villages, they repeatedly carried out communalist expulsions, driving Arabs and Turkmen from their homes.” “We have no side in Syria’s squalid civil war between the butcher Assad and various rebel forces dominated by different kinds of Islamists. But we do have a side against the U.S. and other imperialist powers. Thus, while implacable opponents of everything the reactionary cutthroats of ISIS stand for, we take a military side with ISIS when it aims its fire against the imperialist armed forces and their proxies in the region, including the Kurdish nationalist forces in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, while our main opposition is to the imperialists, we also oppose the other capitalist powers, such as Russia and Turkey, involved in Syria and are for all of them to get out.” Sources:

http://www.icl-fi.org/english/wv/1091/syria.html (2016)

Background information: split from the International Committee of the Fourth International in 1966. Formerly known as the International Spartacist Tendency. Leading party is the Spartacist League in the US, which had split from the Socialist Workers Party in 1964 after the SWP joined the re-unified FI.

Stance on Syria: neutral. “In Syria’s civil war, revolutionaries do not support either the brutal Baathist dictatorship or its reactionary Islamist opponents. At the same time, it is necessary to side militarily with any indigenous forces (including Islamists) when they are attacked by the U.S. and other imperialists.” Sources:

http://www.bolshevik.org/statements/ibt_20160212_middle_east_chaos.html (2016)

Background information: split from the International Communist League – Fourth International in 1982, accusing the Spartacist League’s leader James Robertson of ruthlessly harassing anyone who posed a threat to his leadership. In 2018 the IBT experienced a major split (see Bolshevik Tendency below) and the then-minority faction gained control of the organization. Leading section is the Permanent Revolution Group in New Zealand. No American section.

Stance on Syria: neutral. Says government is capitalist dictatorship and calls for its overthrow, but only by revolutionary working class and would support government if West invaded. Says FSA serve interests of bourgeoisie and imperialists. Says the PYD is not a bourgeois party and has fought bourgeois interests at times, but criticizes it for allying with bourgeoisie and imperialists at other times and for maintaining capitalist property. Castigates the Spartacists (see ICL-FI) for siding with IS during the battle of Kobane. Sources:

http://regroupment.org/main/page_syria__portugus.html (2012)

https://rr4i.milharal.org/2016/01/19/syrian-civil-war-the-islamic-state-and-the-battle-of-kobani/ (2016)

Background information: split from the International Bolshevik Tendency in 2008, accusing its leaders of the same abuse of power that led the IBT to split from the ICL-FI. Based primarily in Brazil. It is in liason with the Australian publication Bolshevik-Leninist.

Stance on Syria: critically supports government. Characterizes rebels as US-sponsored jihadis, endorses Russian intervention in support of Syrian government. Sources:

https://bolsheviktendency.org/2020/02/18/correcting-a-serious-misrepresentation/ (2020)

https://bolsheviktendency.org/2020/02/03/the-struggle-for-the-middle-east/ (2020)

Background information: split from the International Bolshevik Tendency in 2018, partly due to a long-running debate on whether or not to call Putin’s Russia imperialist. The majority, most of whom were from the IBT’s North American section, held that Russia was not imperialist. However, in another debate on the 2013 Egyptian coup and the 2016 Turkish coup attempt, this same faction held a minority position (that it was wrong to stand with the Morsi and Erdoğan regimes against the coup forces). In October 2018 this faction left the IBT and reverted to calling themselves the Bolshevik Tendency (the original name of the North American section).

Stance on Syria: neutral. “… any blows against imperialist intervention and domination, even by ultra-reactionary forces such as the I.S., [are] in the interests of the working class and oppressed peoples of the world.” Does not consider Russia imperialist. Sources:

http://www.internationalist.org/defendraqqadriveoutimperialists1605.html (2016)

http://www.internationalist.org/flashpointsyria1510.html (2015)

Background information: a minor Trotskyist international formed in 1998. Leading party is the Internationalist Group in the US, which had split from the Spartacist League in 1996. The L4I sees the Spartacists’ ICL-FI as insufficiently devoted to three central principles: maintaining an active and distinctly Trotskyist international, remaining active in the labor movement, and defending the Soviet Union and its satellite states as the lesser evils in the face of capitalism.

Stance on Syria: neutral. Supported initial protests. Attributes failure of protests to regime brutality, dependence of minorities on Assad. Criticizes opposition as fractious, and sectarian and/or pro-imperialist. Calls SDF “Kurdish nationalists”. Sources:

https://www.union-communiste.org/en/2019-10/the-chaos-of-war-in-syria-imperialism-is-to-blame-5529 (2019)

https://the-spark.net/np1099405.html (2020)

Background information: An international grouped around the Lutte Ouvrière in France. Places special emphasis on union activity. American section is The Spark, which was formed in 1971 a few years after its members split from the Spartacist League for developing sympathies with the Lutte Ouvrière.

Stance on Syria: neutral. Very opposed to Assad’s “brutal dictatorship”, but also dismisses the rebels as either “mercenaries” or “jihadists”. Calls PYD/YPG narrow-minded Kurdish nationalists, criticizes them for authoritarianism and alliances with imperialists. Sources:

https://www.convergencesrevolutionnaires.org/La-Turquie-en-guerre-contre-les-Kurdes-de-Syrie (2018)

https://www.convergencesrevolutionnaires.org/Syrie-Poutine-Erdogan-et-Assad-manoeuvrent-les-populations-trinquent (2020)

https://www.convergencesrevolutionnaires.org/L-acharnement-d-Assad-contre-les-dernieres-zones-rebelles (2018)

Background information: a small French group that had existed as a minority tendency within Lutte Ouvrière until its expulsion in 2008. It works within the multi-tendency New Anticapitalist Party, a tactic the LO opposed. “L’ètincelle” means “the spark”; I’m using the French name in this entry to avoid confusion with the US-based The Spark. L’Étincelle operates an international network with no name as of yet; the American section is Speak Out Now/Revolutionary Workers Group.

Stance on Syria: neutral. Supported initial protests; attributes their failure to the absense of a revolutionary Trotskyist party and the government’s harsh crackdown. Blames war on foreign intervention, especially that of the United States. Skeptical of claims that the Assad government has used chemical weapons. “Syria has been dismembered according to interventionist forces. At some point, the government of the Assad family and the oligarchy that supports it will give way to another war-born bourgeois government. Fundamentally, economic backwardness, ethnic-tribal divisions will remain and imperialism will maintain its dominance.” Sources:

http://www.masas.nu/cerci%20portugues/bi%2023%20-abr%202017.pdf (2017)

Background information: a small Trotskyist international in South America. Leading parties are the Revolutionary Workers’ Party in Bolivia, which in the 1940s and 50s played a major role in the Bolivian labor movement and was one of the world’s largest Trotskyist parties, and the party of the same name in Brazil.

Other Trotskyists

Stance on Syria: supports opposition. “The Syrian Revolution is in a tragic situation. It is attacked on all sides – by the forces of the Assad regime and its regional and international allies, by the open allies of Western imperialism, and by sectarian jihadi groups. Despite their antagonisms, these different forces have a common interest in crushing the original democratic revolutionary movement, which united Syrians of all religious and ethnic backgrounds in the struggle to overthrow the regime.” Sources:

http://internationalsocialists.org/wordpress/2014/04/solidarity-with-syrian-revolutionary-socialists/ (2014)

http://internationalsocialists.org/wordpress/2015/09/no-to-akp-us-intervention-victory-to-the-syrian-revolution/ (2015)

Background information: a Third Camp Trotskyist international formed over a long period of time between the 60s and 90s. Its (now deceased) leader, Tony Cliff, championed the theory that the Stalinist states were not deformed or degenerated workers states, but rather “state capitalist”, or capitalist economies controlled by state bureaucracies with socialist trappings. Leading party is the Socialist Workers Party in the UK (not to be confused with the SWP in the US). American section is Marx21.

Stance on Syria: supported opposition. Very critical of Iran and Russia. Opposed to US-Russian-backed negotiations. Critical of YPG cooperation with government. “Overwhelmingly, these people [those killed in the war] have been slaughtered by the Assad-Iran-Russia Triple Alliance.” “True, Saudi Arabia has funded jihadis, among other militias, but the Saudis and the U.S. are only the number-three culprit in creating the Syrian disaster. Assad is clearly number one, and his allies are number two.” Sources:

https://socialistworker.org/2016/03/01/the-lefts-false-logic-on-syria (2016)

https://socialistworker.org/2016/03/31/how-did-syria-become-a-burning-country (2016)

Background information: formed in 1977. Until its demise it was one of the five major Trotskyist parties in the US. It was a member of the International Socialist Tendency until 2001, when it was expelled over disagreements on how to view the end of the Cold War. The organization collapsed in 2019 after a scandal surrounding the leadership’s handling of a sexual abuse claim. Some of its members went on to create the Revolutionary Socialist Network, a broad Trotskyist alliance that also includes Workers’ Voice (US section of the IWL-FI) and Socialist Resurgence (listed earlier).

Stance on Syria: supports opposition, critically supports YPG. Disapproves of YPG’s cooperation with government and the US. “Certainly, the choice between an IS caliphate or a restored totalitarian Baathist dictatorship is a choice between the plague and cholera.” “The fact that, despite four and a half years of struggle, Syrian revolutionaries are still fighting Bashar al-Assad is as much a testament to their resolve, and to their popular support, as it is to the utter absence of any forces assisting them for much of that time.” “…it was legitimate, indeed unavoidable, for the PYD to exploit the imperialist rivalries in the fight against ISIS for its own benefit. However, the policy of the PYD went far beyond that, making it the ally of US imperialism’s reactionary group of forces. This could only have been prevented if the PYD had pursued an internationalist course of active collaboration with the democratic forces of the Syrian Revolution and the Arab Spring, with the resistance in Turkey, Iraq or even Palestine… However, the PYD actually followed the policy of ‘noninterference’. They hoped to build a quasi-state reform project – a ‘municipality’ based on a market economy and commodity production – by keeping Rojava as far as possible from the Syrian civil war and all other major upheavals. This concept had to fail, at the latest with the defeat and degeneration of the Syrian revolution and the victory of Assad and Russian imperialism.” Sources:

http://www.workerspower.co.uk/2015/08/revolution-and-counter-revolution-in-syria/ (2015)

https://www.redflagonline.org/stop-turkey-invasion-victory-kurds/ (2019)

https://fifthinternational.org/content/syria-erdogan-putin-deal-against-rojava (2019)

Background information: a Trotskyist international formed in 1984. It argues that the original Fourth International broke with true Trotskyism in 1951 when it declared that the Stalinist parties in Eastern Europe were still capable of being reformed. Leading party is the Red Flag Platform (formerly known as Workers’ Power) in the UK, which in 2015 entered the Labour Party. Workers’ Power had split from the same group that later became the Socialist Workers Party (UK, not US; see International Socialist Tendency above) in 1974. American section is also known as Workers’ Power.

Stance on Syria: supports opposition. Opposes YPG and SDF, seeing them as imperialist tools and allied with Assad; calls PKK ideology “Stalinism”. Also opposes HTS and the Turkish intervention. Accuses both radical Islamists and pro-western high-ranking military defectors of hijacking the revolution. Opposes internationally-sponsored negotiations. Connected to the Leon Sedov Brigade, an Aleppo-based independent rebel brigade which became part of the Levant Front in 2015 before dissolving a few months later. The ILTF’s Syrian/wider Middle Eastern section, still active, publishes The Truth of the Oppressed. Sources:

http://www.flti-ci.org/siriaaldia/2017/abril/carta_medios_de_vlo.html (2017)

http://www.flti-ci.org/siriaaldia/noviembre2016/um_aleppo_29nov2016.html (2016)

http://www.flti-ci.org/columnaopinion/octubre2015/siriayanquis3oct2015_ypg_pkk.html (2015)

https://haqeqa-almaqhoureen.blogspot.com/2018/10/blog-post_36.html (2018)

http://www.flti-ci.org/ingles/Siria/2020/marzo/la-izq-diario-miente-marzo2020.html (2020)

http://www.flti-ci.org/ingles/Siria/2020/marzo/9noaniv-corresp-cortes-14-15-marzo.html (2020)

Background information: Split from the League for the Fifth International in 1995 over several international issues, mainly the L5I’s alleged support of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. The leading section seems to be the Workers Internationalist League in Argentina, which was previously the leader of a now-defunct international called the Organizing Committee of Principalist Trotskyism (Fourth International). No American section.

Stance on Syria: supports opposition. Calls PKK/PYD “pro-imperalist” and “petty-bourgeois.” Refers to rebels in Idlib (primarily HTS, the successor organization to al-Nusra) as “liberation forces”. Opposes IS but supports it in confrontations with the US. “Inspired by the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, the multinational masses of workers and peasants in Syria started to stand up against the injustices imposed on them by the Assad dictatorship and the world economic crisis. We characterize this uprising as a justified attempt to foment a democratic revolution and at the same time to fight for important social demands.” Sources:

http://www.thecommunists.net/rcit/joint-statement-syria/ (2016)

http://www.thecommunists.net/theory/resolution-daesh/ (2017)

http://www.thecommunists.net/worldwide/africa-and-middle-east/idlib-syria-martyrdom-operation-against-russian-turkish-joint-patrol-on-m4/ (2020)

Background information: split from the League for the Fifth International in 2011 over several issues, such as L5I’s allegedly passive response to the 2011 riots in England, which the RCIT characterizes as an uprising. The leading section is either RCIT Germany (as they are simply known) or RCIT UK. There was an American section known as the Revolutionary Workers Collective, but its current status is unknown.

Stance on Syria: supports opposition, especially HTS. Sees HTS as anti-imperialist and the most capable and dedicated of the rebels and that they are fighting for “basic democratic rights”, despite their Islamist ideology; criticizes the FSA for selling out to imperialists. Has supported IS and al-Nusra in confrontations with the US. Somewhat supportive of the Turkish intervention, at least when it opposes Assad’s interests. Supported the “Maoist” YPG’s fight against IS at first, but castigated it for allying with the US and abandoning the fight against Assad. Sources:

http://www.cwgusa.org/?p=1754 (2016)

http://www.cwgusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2017-3-MAR-Class-Warrior-Vol-002-No-2.pdf (2017)

http://www.cwgusa.org/?p=1800# (2017)

Background information: split from the International Leninist Trotskyist Fraction in 2010, mainly over the ILTF’s refusal to characterize China as imperialist. Known as the Liason Committee of Communists until 2015. It is politically close to the Revolutionary Communist International Tendency but appears more harshly critical than the RCIT of the League for the Fifth International’s positions on the Baltic independence movements, the NATO-Yugoslav conflict, and other international issues. The leading section is either the Communist Workers’ Group of New Zealand/Aotearoa or the Communist Workers Group (USA).

Stance on Syria: critically supports opposition. “But the Western imperialists have feared Syria’s popular revolutionary uprising far more [than the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah alliance], because of its potential to advance the struggle against dictatorship and imperialism throughout the region. Thus they have stood by while Assad, armed by Russian imperialism and Iran, slaughtered hundreds of thousands in his counterrevolutionary war, far more than the IS has killed; they have refused to arm even secular democratic rebel forces because they could not trust them to serve their interests; and they have until now refused to clamp down on support for jihadists as long as they were acting primarily to divide and weaken revolutionary forces.” “Our opposition to U.S. imperialism in Syria means absolutely no support for Assad’s rule and no call to defer the struggle against his regime.” “… when it comes to sending arms to rebel forces, we promote the arming only of those that: 1) are independent of foreign powers and committed to defending Syria and all the region’s peoples against imperialism; and 2) are opposed to religious sectarianism and to attacks on civilians.” Sources:

http://www.lrp-cofi.org/statements/iraq_092514.html (2014)

http://www.lrp-cofi.org/statements/syria_83113.html (2013)

Background information: a small Trotskyist international formed in 1992. Known for its theory that the USSR was “statified capitalist”, with some characteristics of capitalism but not as much as Tony Cliff of the International Socialist Tendency thought. Leading party is the League for the Revolutionary Party in the US, which is descended from the same group from which the International Socialist Organization split.

Stance on Syria: supported initial protests, but now critically supports YPG. Criticizes opposition for sectarianism. Praises PYD/YPG’s reforms and fight against jihadis but criticizes it for opportunism, authoritarianism and pro-imperialism. “Villagers are prompted to organise themselves democratically and elect from their ranks those required to police checkpoints. The YPG and SDF militias are given clear instructions to keep out of the villages to ensure there are no fears or claims of intimidation. Through empowering local democracy in the liberated populations, through gaining their trust of them, says the YPG volunteer, the SDF appear to have been able to create a system where the democratic people have been empowered and the brutal jihadists best identified.” “How much the multi-ethnic, secular, gender-equal principles of the YPG have been taken up by the SDF is difficult to judge. The military forces of the YPG/ YPJ and the SDF are clearly where the real power lies in Rojava. A radical army cannot substitute for a radical working-class movement. And there is always a danger that the military discipline needed on the battlefield carries over into unquestioning obedience in social and political life.” Sources:

http://www.workersliberty.org/node/26379 (2016)

http://www.workersliberty.org/story/2012/02/15/down-assad-liberty-and-democracy-syria (2012)

https://www.workersliberty.org/story/2017-10-12/daesh-driven-out-raqqa (2017)

https://www.workersliberty.org/story/2020-02-19/horror-idlib (2020)

Background information: a Third Camp Trotskyist party in the UK. It originally formed in 1966 as a split from the group that later became the Militant Tendency, which founded the Committee for a Workers’ International (listed earlier); after several mergers and defections, it emerged in its modern form in 1992. AWL holds that the USSR and its satellite states were “bureaucratic collectivist”, the same conclusion that the American Max Shachtman came to after he split from the original Fourth International in 1940, creating the Third Camp. Due to this particularly negative view of the USSR and its satellite states, as well as its allegedly “soft” view of Western imperialism and Zionism, AWL has a poor reputation among most other leftist groups.

Left communists

Left communists emerged as critics of both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. Although they initially viewed the October Revolution positively, they grew critical of what they saw as the Soviet Union’s economic compromises and political authoritarianism. Two trends emerged within the movement: the Italian current, initially focused around Amadeo Bordiga and other dissidents in the Italian Communist Party, and the Dutch/German current, also known as council communism and most prominently represented by the Communist Workers’ Party of Germany. Both trends rejected the formation of political fronts with non-revolutionary organizations, dismissed the possibility of reforming the mainstream labor unions, expressed disdain for electoral politics, and saw all wars as imperialist. Only the Italian current survives today. Rosa Luxemburg was an important influence on left communism, though she was murdered before it became a distinct movement.

Stance on Syria: neutral. Supported initial protests. Particularly critical of government and foreign intervention on both sides. Regards war as “imperialist stalemate”. Sources:

http://en.internationalism.org/icconline/201510/13468/syria-russian-intervention-escalates-chaos (2015)

http://en.internationalism.org/worldrevolution/201207/5029/imperialist-powers-hover-syria-sinks-barbarism (2012)

http://en.internationalism.org/forum/1056/internationalist-voice/9215/syria-war-gangsters-crimes-against-humanity (2013)

Background information: a left communist international formed in 1975. Leading party is International Revolution in France. American section is known as Internationalism.

Stance on Syria: neutral. “In this situation the proletariat in Syria can do or say nothing. It has already been ideologically and materially dismembered by either falling into line to defend one of the competing forces or it has simply become victim of the conflict.” “Opposing these wars without giving support to brutal regimes like that of Assad is the start of opposing the system that survives by them.” Critical of the PKK/PYD; compares YPG to Irish Republican Army – seen by many as “progressive” and “revolutionary” but still a sectarian nationalist militia. “It is this threat of ethnic/sectarian war, which heralds the danger for the future. Ultimately despite the differences between the PKK and the Da’esh, the similarities between the two are what links them. A socialist veneer does not stop an ethnic militia from playing its part in the escalation of the cycle of ethnic conflict, and ethnic cleansing. It is clear in this struggle that the Da’esh is the aggressor, and that the PKK is merely defending its turf. It is also clear that compared to the Da’esh, the PKK looks positively progressive. None of this stops either of them playing their roles in the intensification of ethnic conflict.” Sources:

http://www.leftcom.org/en/articles/2013-09-12/syria-another-unending-imperialist-agony (2013)

http://www.leftcom.org/en/articles/2014-10-31/the-bloodbath-in-syria-class-war-or-ethnic-war (2014)

http://www.leftcom.org/en/articles/2015-10-13/putin%E2%80%99s-latest-move-in-syria (2015)

Background information: a left communist international formed in 1983; formerly known as the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party. Leading party is the Internationalist Communist Party (Battaglia Comunista) in Italy, which had split from Amadeo Bordiga’s International Communist Party (see below) in 1952. American section is the Internationalist Workers Group.

Stance on Syria: neutral. Endorses the ICT’s position (see above), though it disagrees on the exact details of the imperialist conflict, such as the strength of Russia. Sources:

http://igcl.org/On-the-Development-of-the (2016)

Background information: formed in late 2013 as a merger of two left communist groups, one of which had split from the International Communist Current mainly over tactical differences. It agrees with most of the political positions of the Internationalist Communist Tendency. It appears to be based primarily in North America and does not have individual sections for different countries.

Stance on Syria: neutral. “The rival bourgeois factions fighting for power in Syria today, whether led by Assad or the opposition forces managed and manoeuvred mainly from abroad, are indisputably enemies of the Syrian, Middle Eastern and international proletariat.” “But the working class in Syria will be equally oppressed either by the current government or the new government to support US; change hands only business with oil and gas.” “PYD didn’t come to power in Western Kurdistan through a revolution: it was handed power by the Assad regime… the PYD regime, ever respectful of private property and capitalism as declared by its constitution, tortured and killed dissidents, opened fire on protesters, and engaged in repressive policies against Arabs, Assyrians and other minorities. The fact that the SDF is under attack by a regional imperialist State which overpowers them is no reason to support what is in essence an anti-proletarian regime.” Sources:

http://www.international-communist-party.org/CommLeft/CL36.htm (2014)

http://www.international-communist-party.org/Espanol/LIC25.htm#Siria (2013)

https://www.international-communist-party.org/English/TheCPart/TCP_016.htm#Kurdistan (2019)

Background information: the party of Amadeo Bordiga, one of the original leaders of the Italian Communist Party. Bordigist left communism has similar views of the “vanguard party” to those of Lenin, although Bordiga began criticizing certain aspects of the authoritarian state that developed as the Bolsheviks emerged from the Russian civil war. He and his followers finally left the Italian Communist Party and the Comintern in 1930. The International Communist Party was founded in 1943 and became an international in the 1960s. In the late 60s and 70s, the ICP began to split into several different organizations, all claiming the original name. The faction linked here is known as “International Communist Party (Il Partito Comunista)” after their newspaper. It is the only faction to have an American section.

Left anarchists

“Left anarchism” encompasses all anarchist schools of thought supporting collectivist economic models, such as Mikhail Bakunin-style collectivism, socialism, or syndicalism (essentially, rule by trade unions). Some also identify as communists (though not Marxists) and are thus called anarcho-communists. Left anarchists themselves typically regard the term “left anarchism” as redundant since they believe all true anarchists are economically left-wing and that laissez-faire anarchists or right anarchists are not true anarchists.

Stance on Syria: supported early FSA. Critically supports YPG; critical of PKK/PYD ideology and alleged authoritarianism. Critical of negotiations. “Since the Syrian revolution degenerated into a civil war , when the revolting masses or its co-ordinating committees and its local decentralized militias firstly known as free Syrian army were substituted by warlords-led semi-regular groups backed by regional despots ; Syrian revolutionaries became in a very difficult situation : cannot accept the victory of the dictator, at the same time they knew very well that his defeat doesn’t mean liberating the masses from dictatorship but substituting a dictator with another…” Sources:

http://i-f-a.org/index.php/article-2/710-about-putin-s-move-into-syria (2015)

https://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2015/01/18/call-for-a-first-mediterranean-anarchist-meeting/ (2014)

http://i-f-a.org/index.php/statements/federation-membre-de-l-ifa/584-anarchist-federation-great-britain-statement-on-rojava (2014)

http://www.ainfos.ca/14/oct/ainfos00488.html (2014)

http://i-f-a.org/index.php/article-2/544-by-zaher-baher-from-haringey-solidarity-group-and-kurdistan-anarchists-forum (2014)

Background information: a left anarchist international. Leading affiliate is the Anarchist Federation in France. No American section.

Stance on Syria: supported early FSA. Did not see Islamists as allies. I can’t find much writing on Syria later than 2012, so their current position is unclear. Sources:

http://www.solfed.org.uk/?q=international/from-a-syrian-anarchist (2012)

Background information: an anarcho-syndicalist international. Leading affiliate is the National Confederation of Labor in Spain (CNT in Spanish), which was one half of the CNT-FAI anarchist alliance that played a prominent role in the Spanish Civil War (the FAI, or Iberian Anarchist Federation, is the Spanish affiliate of the International of Anarchist Federations today). Its American section used to be the Workers Solidarity Alliance (see below).

Stance on Syria: critically supports YPG. Critical of PKK/PYD ideology. Sources:

http://ideasandaction.info/2014/10/rojava-anarcho-syndicalist-perspective/ (2014)

http://ideasandaction.info/2016/07/anarchist-critique-pkk/ (2016)

Background information: an anarcho-syndicalist group in the US. It left the International Workers Association for unknown reasons, though it essentially has the same ideology.

Stance on Syria: supports YPG/SDF. Views the PYD’s libertarian socialist ideology positively. Opposes the Turkish intervention; at least two IWW foreign volunteers in Syria have been killed in Turkish airstrikes (it is unclear if they were combatants or aid workers). Sources:

https://iww.org.uk/news/iww-statement-on-turkeys-invasion-of-northern-syria/ (2019)

Background information: an international labor union formed in the US in 1905. It was more radical than most existing unions and often faced harsh repression by anti-communist authorities. The hayday of the “Wobblies”, as they are known, was in the 1910s and 20s; though membership has declined since then, they are still one of the larger groups on this list in terms of both membership and area of operations. The IWW’s ideology is hard to pinpoint, but it is usually acknowledged as very close to anarcho-syndicalism, so I am listing them in this section.

Stance on Syria: there doesn’t seem to be a single, unified stance on Syria. Most articles are generally critically supportive of the YPG and (to a lesser degree) the opposition. Sources:

http://www.blackrosefed.org/on-interventions-and-the-syrian-revolution/ (2013)

http://www.anarkismo.net/article/29122 (2016)

Background information: a loose platformist network based around a website created in 2005. “Platformism” is a trend within anarcho-communism and anarcho-syndicalism that promotes the organizational philosophies of Nestor Makhno and other Ukrainian and Russian anarchists who led the ultimately-defeated Free Territory in Ukraine during the Russian civil war. Many of Anarkismo’s unofficial “affiliates” were part of the now-defunct International Libertarian Solidarity. Leading “affiliate” is the General Confederation of Labour in Spain, which split from the CNT (see International Workers Association) in 1979 over how to approach the Spanish transition to democracy. Two American “affiliates”: Black Rose Anarchist Federation and Humboldt Grassroots.


Stance on Syria: critically to strongly supportive of government, depending on individual member party. All or nearly all describe the war as a Western imperialist intervention. Sources:

http://www.solidnet.org/search?ordering=&searchphrase=all&searchword=syria (various articles)

Background information: an international based around an annual conference first established by the Communist Party of Greece in 1998. Its members are the “official” Communist Parties – usually, but not always, those which were pro-Soviet. Leninists, Stalinists, Maoists, and Hoxhaists are all represented. Leading parties include the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Communist Parties ruling China, Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba, the Workers’ Party of Korea (which has officially abandoned Marxism and Leninism but retains ties to the world’s communist parties), and countless others. Among these are the Syrian Communist Party (Bakdash), which is Stalinist, and the Syrian Communist Party (Unified), which is Leninist; both are members of the Ba’ath-led National Progressive Front. American section is the CPUSA, listed earlier.

Stance on Syria: vaguely supported government. Called opposition “terrorists” funded by reactionary imperialists. Apparently, one of the more strongly pro-Assad parties, the Communist Party of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist), tried unsuccessfully to include an explicit mention of “the Baathist regime led by Bashar al-Assad” in a 2013 declaration on Syria. Sources:

http://web.archive.org/web/20141014094403/http://www.icseminar.org/ICS/2013/resolutions_ao/ICS2013-resolution%20Syria-EN.pdf (2013)

http://www.lalkar.org/article/219/the-22nd-international-communist-seminar-brussels-31-may-2013-2-june-2013 (2013)

Background information: a loose international based around an annual conference hosted by the Workers’ Party of Belgium, first organized in 1996. Members were mostly anti-revisionist (e.g., Stalinist, Maoist, and Hoxhaist), with some sympathetic Leninists, including some of the “official” Communist Parties, meaning that the ICS overlaps with the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties. The ICS’ faded away after its last conference in 2014. The WPB seems to have abandoned anti-revisionism in favor of Eurocommunism (see CPUSA entry). The Syrian Communist Party (Bakdash) was a regular attendant. American parties that regularly attended include the Freedom Road Socialist Organization (Maoist faction) and Revolutionary Organization of Labor. The Workers World Party and the Party for Socialism and Liberation attended occasionally or were invited but did not attend.

Stance on Syria: supports YPG. Very critical of both government and opposition. “We declare ourselves against the two imperialist blocks: if there’s an [American] intervention in Syria we will be opposed to it, but we will not support the wave that eulogizes Russia just because of mere folklore, because they are just as imperialist as the Americans.” Dismisses reports of the Rojava government oppressing or expelling non-Kurds. Sources:

http://www.icor.info/2013-1/about-the-situation-in-syria-support-the-syrian-and-kurdish-people (2013)

http://www.icor.info/2016/closing-statement-of-the-2nd-conference-middle-east (2016)

Background information: an anti-revisionist international founded in 2010. Mostly made up of Maoist parties, with some Stalinists, Hoxhaists, and Leninists. Leading parties include the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party in Turkey, the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany, and the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist). American section is the Revolutionary Organization of Labor (listed in the Hoxhaists and Stalinists section).

Stance on Syria: critically supports opposition and YPG. “[The war can only end] if there’s a major change in the position of the Syrian regime. The minimum that might be seen by the opposition as the basis of agreement would be a transitional government, with Bashar al-Assad stepping down — any transitional set-up that would be presided over by Assad would be a non-starter.” “Russia’s deadly raids and the intervention of Iran, Hezbollah, and sectarian Iraqi militias champion this profoundly reactionary, anti-democratic project [the Assad regime].” “Syria’s popular classes have suffered tremendously from destruction and deaths since 2011, while progressive and democratic forces within the popular movement have been violently repressed by the regime’s forces on one side, and jihadist and Islamic fundamentalist movements on the other. The most important issue today is the end of the war. This is not in contradiction with reaffirming our opposition to the Assad regime, to refuse its re-legitimisation internationally — not to forget the war crimes, the tens of thousands of political prisoners still tortured in the regime’s jails, the disappeared, the refugees, and the internally displaced, etc.” “Despite the PYD’s own authoritarian practices and mainly top-down rule in its managed areas, its experience has been hailed for the high inclusion and participation of women in all sectors of society, the secularization of laws and institutions, and to some extent the integration and participation of various ethnic and religious minorities… Progressives should oppose the bombing and threats by the regime’s military offensives assisted by its foreign allies against Idlib and the Eastern region, in which millions of displaced civilians have taken refuge.” Sources:

http://www.solidarity-us.org/site/node/4642 (2016)

http://www.solidarity-us.org/site/internationalstatementsyriairaq (2015)

https://solidarity-us.org/atc/196/syrias-disaster/ (2018)

https://solidarity-us.org/atc/192/p5176/ (2018)

Background information: a multi-tendency leftist group in the US. It was the result of a merger of three Trotskyist groups in 1986, one of which was the same group from which the International Socialist Organization had split. It maintains loose links with the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

Stance on Syria: neutral. Says 2011 protests arose mainly the economic inequality of “crony capitalism.” “For the Syrian working class the best likely outcome in present circumstances from an ending of the civil war is a bourgeois capitalist liberal democracy and at worst an Islamic fundamentalist reactionary theocracy. Any group replacing the Assad regime will have to continue to run Syrian capitalism for the benefit of the Syrian capitalist class.” “No matter what the wishes or intentions or, no matter how sincere the participants are, eventually the logic and demands of the capitalist state system will prevail. Rojava, trapped within a spider web of competing Great Powers and local powers, either faced extinction or acceded to this logic and took its own place as a junior partner to one or other of the great military powers… Nationalism, however it justifies itself ideologically, will always be first and foremost a movement for the establishment and defence of a nation within a capitalist world system; Rojava’s principles would always take a second place to this.” Sources:

http://www.worldsocialism.org/spgb/socialist-standard/2010s/2013/no-1309-september-2013/civil-war-syria (2013)

https://www.worldsocialism.org/wsm/rojava-the-end-of-the-kurdish-dream/ (2019)

Background information: an “Impossibilist” Marxist international founded in 1904. Impossibilism is particularly critical of the value of social and economic reforms, arguing that such reforms actually strengthen capitalism and should therefore be avoided. It also rejects Lenin’s concept of the vanguard party and democratic centralism. Leading party is the Socialist Party of Great Britain. American section is the World Socialist Party of the United States.

Stance on Syria: supports opposition. Supports establishing a no-fly zone. Critical of PYD/YPG’s ambiguous relations with Assad and “unprincipled attacks” on FSA. Sources:

http://newsandletters.org/save-aleppo-may-day-solidarity-with-free-syrians/ (2016)

http://www.solidarity-us.org/site/internationalstatementsyriairaq (2015)

Background information: a Marxist Humanist organization in the US founded in 1955. Originally Trotskyists, its members, led by Raya Dunayevskaya, combined a focus on Marx’s philosophical works with the ethics- and rationalist-focused philosophy of humanism. Dunayevskaya had sided with Shachtman in the 1940 split in the Trotskyist movement and ended up agreeing with Tony Cliff (see International Socialist Tendency) that the USSR was state capitalist.

Stance on Syria: critically supports opposition and YPG. Says West is content with handing “a victory to the murderous Assad regime over its internal opponents, more than 200,000 of whom it has slaughtered, and some of whom remain true to the emancipatory ideals of the 2011 uprising.” Sources:

http://www.internationalmarxisthumanist.org/articles/isis-carnage-paris-portends-repression-europe-intensified-war-middle-east-kevin-anderson (2015)

http://www.internationalmarxisthumanist.org/articles/russian-intervention-in-syria-and-interimperialist-realignment-statement-of-the-international-marxist-humanist-organization (2015)

https://newsandletters.org/world-in-view-july-august-2020-syrias-problem-is-assad-not-sanctions/ (2020)

Background information: a small Marxist Humanist international. It was founded in 2010 by the US Marxist Humanists, which was one half of a 2007-2008 split from News & Letters over alleged cliquish leadership and degenerating activity.

  • Marxist-Humanist Initiative (MHI)

Stance on Syria: unclear. Condemns Assad’s crime but also condemns foreign involement in the war. Calls for de-escalation. Sources:

https://www.marxisthumanistinitiative.org/international-news/escalation-is-the-order-of-the-day-in-syria.html (2017)

Background information: the other half of the 2007-2008 split from News & Letters. It criticizes the IMHO, with which it briefly united and then separated from again, of repeating the same errors of N&LC. The IMHO views the MHI similarly.

Stance on Syria: supports government. Says “Syria is being ravaged by a civil war deliberately promoted by Western powers to destabilize the country and prepare it for regime change. The rebels do not speak for the majority of the population.” Sources:

http://forodesaopaulo.org/frankfurter-allgemeine-zeitung-confirms-houla-massacre-committed-by-syrian-rebels/ (2012)

http://forodesaopaulo.org/final-declaration-of-the-21th-meeting-of-the-sao-paulo-forum/ (2015)

Background information: a loose network of Latin American leftist parties founded in 1990. Member parties range from center-left social democrats to the far-left Communist Party of Cuba. Besides the CPC, leading members include the Workers’ Party of Brazil, the Movement for Socialism in Bolivia, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador, and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (the party of the late Hugo Chavez). Three American affiliates, all in Puerto Rico: the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, the Socialist Front, and the Hostosian National Independence Movement.